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Abstract of a thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Accounting. 
Abstract 
Earnings Management:  
Evidence Concerning Shariah-approved Comapnies in Malaysia 
 
by 
Wan Razazila Wan Abdullah 
 
This study addresses the uniqueness of the Malaysian capital market in which the Islamic 
Capital Market (ICM) runs parallel with the conventional capital market. Little research has 
been carried out on the determinants of earnings management, particularly in the ICM. This 
study extends this line of research by using Agency Theory as a basis for the occurrence of 
earnings management and investigating the relationship between earnings management and 
corporate governance characteristics in the Malaysian ICM, where there is no reason to 
suspect systematic management of earnings since such activities are not permitted by Shariah 
law. Selected corporate governance practices (board of directors, audit committee and 
institutional investors’ characteristics) are examined along with specific characteristics of 
Shariah-approved companies (size, leverage, growth, profitability and industry) as factors that 
influence earnings management.  
Using three established earnings management models (the Jones Model, the Modified Jones 
Model, and the Performance Matched Model); this study finds that there is income-decreasing 
earnings management in Shariah-approved companies that are listed on Bursa Malaysia. This 
study reveals a significant negative relationship between earnings management and the 
holding of multiple directorships. The results also indicate that there is a positive statistical 
relationship between the audit committee characteristics of independence and expertise with 
earnings management. Further analysis shows that having one audit committee member with 
financial expertise, as suggested by the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance, does act as 
a control mechanism and is effective in reducing earnings management. In addition, a 
significant relationship between board size and earnings management is found. Consistent 
with previous studies, there is a significant relationship between firm size, leverage, 
performance and growth, and earnings management. Furthermore, companies in the Property 
 iii 
and Construction sectors are found to be more likely to manage their earnings as compared to 
companies in other industry sectors.  
This study provides early evidence that a stronger corporate governance mechanism is needed 
to enhance the quality of financial reporting in the Malaysian context. It is expected that the 
results of this study will give further direction to the Malaysian regulatory bodies regarding 
the mechanisms of corporate governance in the country. As the Malaysian ICM is new and 
unique, subject to Shariah law as well as ‘conventional’ rules and regulations, the result of 
this study may not be generalized to Islamic markets worldwide as the application of 
accounting standards and practices in Islamic finance may not be uniform in all Islamic 
jurisdictions. 
Keywords: Earning Management, Corporate Governance, Islamic Capital Market, Shariah-
approved Companies. 
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     Chapter 1 
Background of the Study and Research Problem 
1.1 Introduction 
The issue of earnings management has been debated and researched for a considerable period 
of time, commencing when Watts and Zimmerman (1986) came out with a positive 
accounting theory behind choices of accounting methods. The issue has recently become more 
obvious because of the publicity associated with large corporate bankruptcies in the United 
States, such as Enron, WorldCom and Xerox, as well as failures such as Parmalat in Italy, 
AIH in Australia, Flowtex in Germany and Royal Ahold in the Netherlands. The publicity 
around those cases questions the credibility of the accounting and auditing professions. 
Although positive accounting theory asserts that allowing management some flexibility in 
accounting policy choice enables a flexible response to changes in the firm’s environment and 
unforeseen circumstances, it also allows for opportunistic management behaviour. Positive 
accounting theory presumes that managers are both rational and self-interested, and will 
choose accounting policies that operate to their advantage if they are able to do so. As a result, 
earnings management could occur. 
There are several definitions of earnings management in the literature, the most common of 
which comes from Healy and Wahlen (1999), who state that “earnings management happens 
when managers alter financial reports with the intention to either mislead readers of those 
statements or to influence contractual outcomes that rely on the accounting numbers reported 
in the financial statements”. On the other hand, earnings management could involve the 
selection of accounting procedures and estimates that conform to generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP). Firms practicing this kind of earnings management would stay 
within the bounds of acceptable accounting manipulations and would not be indulging in 
fraudulent behaviour. 
Ronen and Yaari (2008) summarise different definitions of earnings management from 
previous literature by classifying them as white, gray, and black. It is considered beneficial 
earnings management (white) if it enhances the transparency of reports; gray if the 
manipulation of reports is within the boundaries of compliance with bright-line standards, 
which could be either opportunistic or efficiency enhancing, and pernicious (Hair, Black, 
Babin, & Anderson) if it involves outright misrepresentation and fraud.  
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This thesis will use the Healy and Wahlen (1999) definition of earnings management as it 
reflects the opportunistic behaviour of management. However, it should be noted that such 
opportunistic behaviour is prohibited by the Islam code of conduct, where the emphasis is on 
accountability, transparency, integrity, honesty, ethics, and morality in both business 
transactions and in everyday activities. Consequently, earnings management as such is 
forbidden in Islam.  
The Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and the tragic corporate scandals in the United States and 
European countries have drawn attention to the need for global corporate governance reform. 
Following such reforms, there has been extensive research and literature generated on 
corporate governance and earnings management worldwide. However, little research has been 
done on the determinants of earnings management, particularly in the Islamic Capital Market.  
The objective of this study, therefore, is to examine whether earnings management occurs in 
Malaysian Shariah-approved companies, and to measure the extent of earnings management 
in these companies. In addition, it will examine selected corporate governance practices (such 
as the characteristics of the board of directors, and the characteristics of audit committee and 
institutional investors) for these companies. Finally, this study will determine whether 
specific company characteristics (such as size, leverage, growth, profitability and industry) 
are factors that influence earnings management in Malaysia. 
1.2 Background of the Study 
The East Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 particularly affected Malaysia, one of the main 
contributors being the weak corporate governance practices of Malaysian companies. Some of 
the weaknesses identified were lack of transparency, disclosure and accountability. However, 
the crisis fast-tracked an exercise to enhance the standard of corporate governance, resulting 
in the formation of High Level Finance Committee on Corporate Governance in 1998 to 
conduct a detailed study on this matter.  
The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance, introduced in 2000, provides a set of 
principles and best practice for corporate governance. The revamped Exchange Listing 
Requirements, released in 2001, which was widely recognized as a major milestone in 
Malaysian corporate governance reform, brought the code into full effect by requiring 
mandatory disclosure of the state of compliance with the Code by listed companies. The 
comprehensive blueprint for corporate governance reform also addresses the amendment of 
listing requirements to require: quarterly reporting of financial information; keeping pace with 
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the greater need for financial transparency; a third of the composition of the board of public 
listed companies (PLCs) to comprise of independent directors; directors of PLCs to undergo a 
Mandatory Accreditation Programme; enhancement of the composition and functions of audit 
committees; and disclosure on the extent of a company’s compliance with the code (Finance 
Committee on Corporate Governance, 2000). 
To further strengthen corporate governance practices in line with the developments in the 
local and international capital markets, the Code was revised and re-released in 2007. The key 
amendments to the Code are aimed at strengthening the board of directors and audit 
committees to discharge their roles and responsibilities effectively (Securities Commission, 
2007a). The former prime minister of Malaysia, Dato’ Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi in 
Budget Speech 2008 claimed that the Code is being reviewed to improve the quality of the 
board of listed companies by putting in place criteria for qualification of directors and 
strengthening the audit committee, as well as the internal audit function. 
The  compilation of  best practice for corporate governance involves value systems such as 
accountability, transparency, responsibility, integrity (Omar, 2005). Those values are actually 
paramount in Islam. The word ‘Islam’ stands for, among other things, peace, purity, 
submission and obedience. Islam does not separate religious deeds from political, economic 
or social affairs. Furthermore, Islam encourages individuals to be involved in business and 
hence has clearly articulated commercial law to guide Muslims regarding the types of 
businesses that are lawful and those that are unlawful. The fiqh (Islamic law) prescribes the 
nature of allowable trade and services which generally requires justice, fairness, and honesty 
in all business transactions. Fiqh explicitly forbids transactions which are unclear, unfair, 
unjust and fraudulent. 
Islam puts great emphasis on the need for Muslims to be accountable to God and that 
accountability encompasses man’s accountability to his fellow men. The following verses in 
the Holy al-Quran
1
 elaborate the notion of accountability in Islam. 
“To Allah belongs all that is in the heavens and on earth. Whether you show what is in 
your minds or hide it, Allah calls you to account for it.” (2:284) 
“And fear the Day when you shall be brought back to Allah, then shall every soul be 
paid for what it has earned, and none will be dealt with unjustly.” (2:281) 
                                                 
1
 All the verses are quoted from The Glorious Qur’an Arabic Text and English Translation published by Tahrike 
Tarsile Qur’an Inc. (Ahamed, 2005)  
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In addition, guidance for accountants in discharging their accountability is stated in the 
following verses: 
“O you who believe! Do not betray the trust of Allah and the Messenger 
(Muhammad), and do not misappropriate knowingly things entrusted to you.” (8:27) 
“And know you know that your possessions and your children are only a trial; and 
that it is Allah with whom lies your highest reward.” (8:28) 
Islam also forbids every type of fraud and deception and requires transparency in any 
disclosure practices as explicated in the following verses: 
“O you who believe! Stand out firmly for Allah, as witnesses to fair dealing and let not 
the hatred of others to you make you lean towards wrong and depart from justice.” 
(5:8) 
“O you who believe! When you deal with each other, in transaction involving future 
obligations in a fixed period of time, reduce them to writing. Let a scribe (writer) 
write down faithfully as (a responsible person) between the parties: Let not the scribe 
refuse to write: As Allah has taught him, so let him write….Do not object to reduce to 
writing (your contract) of the future period, whether it be small or big: It is more just 
in the sight of Allah, more suitable as evidence, and more convenient to prevent 
doubts among yourselves...Take witnesses whenever you enter into commercial 
contract.” (2:282) 
Once a decision is made and consensus has been obtained on any matters, especially with 
regards to commercial contracts, it needs to be put into writing. This ensures disclosure and 
transparency in every business transaction. The record should portray the exact happening and 
not the manipulated figures. 
Furthermore, the pertinent Islamic Capital Market Task Force of the International 
Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO)2 principle states that, as the owner of the 
firm, investors are entitled to be supplied with timely, accurate and reliable information to 
help them with their investment decision making (IOSCO, 2004, p. 57). 
                                                 
2
 IOSCO is recognized as the world’s most important international cooperative forum for securities regulatory 
agencies. As the leading international policy forum for securities regulators, IOSCO plays a key role in setting 
international standards for securities regulation, identifying issues affecting global markets, and making 
recommendations for meeting those challenges. 
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1.3 Problem Statement 
Little research has been done on the influence of Shariah law on earnings management in the 
Malaysian context. Abdul Rahman, Dowds and Cahan (2005) investigated whether the 
religious background of Malaysian managers has an influence on earnings management, but 
no statistical evidence was found. On the other hand, there is evidence of earnings 
management in Muslim majority countries such as in Pakistan (Ali Shah, Ali Butt, & Hasan, 
2009), in Iran (Hashemi & Rabiee, 2011; Nahandi, Baghbani, & Bolouri, 2011; Roodposhti 
Rahnamay & Nabavi Chashmi, 2011; Vakili Fard, Nikoomaram, Kangarluei, & Bayazidi, 
2011), and similarly in Saudi Arabia (Al-Abbas, 2009; Al-Moghaiwli, 2010) as well as in 
Kuwait (Algharaballi & Albuloushi, 2008). Prior studies of earnings management in the 
Malaysian context e.g., Abdullah and Mohd Nasir (2004), Adhikari, Derashid, and Zhang 
(2005) and Mohamed Saleh, Mohd Iskandar and Rahmat (2007), Abdul Rahman and 
Mohamed Ali (2008), and Hashim and Devi (2008a) have provided evidence that Malaysian 
listed companies manage their earnings in financial reports. There has, however, been no 
specific investigation of whether Malaysian Shariah-approved companies engage in earnings 
management, hence this study’s aim: to examine whether Shariah-approved companies 
manage their reported earnings, and to measure the extent of earnings management in such 
companies. In addition, this study will examine selected corporate governance practices 
characteristics of boards of directors, audit committees and institutional shareholders) with 
respect to these companies. Finally, this study will determine whether specific characteristics, 
such as size, leverage, growth, profitability and industry are factors influencing earnings 
management.  
The Malaysian capital market is unique in that it has two types of market that operate in 
parallel - the Islamic and conventional. All listed companies in Malaysia are required to 
comply with the certain rules, regulations, accounting standards and best practices of 
corporate governance as stated in the Malaysian Companies Act 1967, the Financial 
Reporting Act 1997, the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements, the accounting standards 
issued by Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB) and the Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance respectively. The same regulatory framework, especially the set 
requirements for disclosure, transparency and governance, applies across both concurrent 
capital markets (Securities Commission, 2006b). Additionally, the companies, products and 
services of the Islamic Capital Market have the specific requirement (second tier regulation) 
of complying with Islamic law or Shariah. In 1997, the Shariah Advisory Council of the 
Malaysian Securities Commission released a set of criteria for listed companies in Malaysia to 
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be categorized under Shariah approved companies list. This criteria are established after 
referring to the Quran, Sunnah (authentic traditions of Prophet Muhammad, PBUH) and 
general Shariah principles (Securities Commission, 2007d). 
In Islam, accountability, transparency, integrity, ethics and morality are important values that 
should operate, not only in business transactions, but also in everyday activities. Islam has 
asserted the importance of honesty in business and monetary dealings, and any acts negatively 
affecting the economy are prohibited by Shariah (Al-Kashif, 2009). According to Healy and 
Wahlen (1999) earnings management “happens when there is an alteration of financial 
reports by managers with the intention to either mislead financial statements users or 
influence contractual outcomes that rely on information in financial statements”. This 
actually reflects the opportunistic behaviour of management, as proven by previous literature 
(as discussed in Chapter 3), where accruals earnings management facilitates such behaviour 
through accounting choices and estimates. As such, earnings management is not welcome in 
Islam and Shariah approved criteria should constrain managers from its use. Proper corporate 
governance is likely to further reduce the incidence of earnings management. 
Lack of good governance has been identified as one of the factors that contributed to the 
Asian Financial crisis in 1997. Significantly, this crisis provided a catalyst for the Malaysian 
government to take the lead and introduce the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance in 
2000. Subsequently, the Malaysian capital market witnessed a series of corporate governance 
reforms, the most recent being the 2007 amendment which focused on the role of the board of 
directors and audit committee functions. This code provides basic principles and best 
practices of corporate governance for Malaysian listed companies which, theoretically, should 
lead to higher corporate performance and better financial reporting practices. Thus, agency 
conflicts are reduced, and managers have more incentive to signal private information to users 
while having less incentive to manage earnings (Klein, 2002; Xie, Davidson, & DaDalt, 
2003).  
Studies such as by Burgstahler & Dichev, (1997); Davidson, Stewart, & Kent, (2005); 
DeFond & Jiambalvo, (1994); Klein, (2002); Koh, (2003); Park & Shin, (2004) and Xie et al., 
(2003) focus on the relationship between corporate governance practices and earnings 
management but provide contradictory results regarding the relationship between several 
corporate governance practices and earnings management. As these studies were conducted in 
developed countries, it is doubtful whether their determinants of earnings management will be 
similar to Malaysia, with its unique capital market and financial reporting requirements. This 
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study is also different from any prior research in Malaysia as it specifically examines 
corporate governance practices in relationship to earnings management in Shariah-approved 
companies.  
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
As demonstrated by Abdullah and Mohd Nasir (2004), Adhikari et al. (2005), Ahmed, 
Godfrey and Saleh (2008), Johl Jubb and Houghton (2007), Mohd Saleh et al. (2007) Abdul 
Rahman and Mohamed Ali (2008) and Hashim and Devi (2008a) there is evidence that 
Malaysian listed companies manage their reported earnings. To date, all published literature 
regarding earnings management done in Malaysia have focused on companies that are listed 
on the Main Board or all listed companies on Bursa Malaysia. Little research has been carried 
out to relate earnings management and Shariah law in Malaysia, therefore, the objectives of 
this study are; 
1. To determine whether earnings management occurs in Malaysian Shariah-approved 
companies. 
Based on the previous studies (as mentioned above) that provide evidence of earnings 
management in Malaysia, it is assumed that there is earnings management in Shariah-
approved companies, thus the following research objectives are established; 
2. To measure the extent of earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-approved 
companies.  
3. To examine whether corporate governance practices are the determinants of earnings 
management of Shariah-approved companies. 
4. To determine whether specific company characteristics, such as size, leverage, growth, 
profitability and industry, are factors influencing earnings management in Shariah-
approved companies. 
In order to achieve these objectives, a number of specific hypotheses were developed and 
tested. To ensure the robustness of the results obtained, three established earnings 
management models were used with the aim of answering the research questions as stated in 
the following section. 
1.5 Research Questions 
The research questions of this study are: 
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1. Does earnings management occurs in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies? 
Assuming that the answer is yes, the following research questions will be explored; 
2. What is the extent of earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies? 
3. What is the relationship between corporate governance practices (represented by board 
independence, board size, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) duality, board expertise, 
multiple directorships, managerial ownership, director remuneration, Malay 
directorship, audit committee (AC) size, AC independence, AC Malay involvement, 
frequency of AC meeting, AC expertise and institutional ownership) and earnings 
management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies? 
4. What is the relationship between company specific characteristics (represented by size, 
leverage, growth and profitability) and industry type with earnings management in 
Malaysian Shariah-approved companies? 
1.6 Significance of the Study 
The results from this study will contribute several benefits to the knowledge of earnings 
management and to Malaysian regulatory bodies. There are also implications for investors and 
users of financial statements, especially those keen on investment in Shariah-approved 
companies in Malaysia. 
This research will extend existing knowledge of earnings management as the area of 
investigation is very unique: specifically that of Shariah-approved Companies in Malaysia, a 
sector in which little study has been undertaken to date. It includes a wide range of corporate 
governance practices, characteristics of boards of directors and characteristics of audit 
committees, in measuring the factors that influence earnings management. Not only focusing 
on corporate governance practices a comprehensive selection of firm specific characteristics, 
such as size, profitability, leverage, growth, and industry classification, are also investigated. 
Most of the previous earnings management studies focus on event studies such as public 
offerings, seasoned equity offerings, import relief investigations, debt covenant violations and 
mergers and acquisitions. This research will broaden the knowledge on earnings management 
during normal times and link the issue with Shariah or Islamic jurisdiction. In addition, this 
will add to the literature on the influence of different cultural and religious background of 
board of directors on earnings management. Since Malaysia is a multiracial and multicultural 
country, there is a mixture of religious background of directors in Malaysian Shariah-
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approved companies. Therefore, the results of this study will initially reveal any evidence of 
the influence of the religious background of Malay (who are the followers of Islam) on 
earnings management. As opportunistic behaviour is prohibited in Islam, the followers of 
Islam are anticipated to behave in accordance with the tenets of Islam; such behaviour being 
reflected in the company behaviour and actions. In addition, the results of this study will show 
the influence of non-Malay directors with different religious backgrounds, other than Islam, 
on earnings management. 
The regulators in the Islamic capital market, i.e. the Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) of the 
Securities Commission, may get a clearer view regarding financial reporting and earnings 
management in Malaysia. This may give direction for further regulation on such activities. At 
present, Shariah-approved criteria promulgated by the Shariah Advisory Council are based on 
the company activities that meet Shariah law. The findings of this study will be useful for the 
Shariah Advisory Council to formulate criteria and screening processes for Shariah-approval 
that cover not only activities or investments that adhere to Shariah, but include the sources of 
financing, especially the use of debt, and the opportunistic behaviour of earnings management 
in financial reporting. In the long run, there should be clearer guidelines and regulations about 
the sources of financing as interest is prohibited in Islam as is opportunistic behaviour. New 
guidelines and regulations would enhance the credibility of Islamic equity products as well as 
the security and confidence of Islamic investors. 
By examining the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and earnings 
management, this study provides a basis for determining whether the existing best practices 
and listing requirements do actually enhance good governance in the Malaysian financial 
environment. It is hoped that the results will give further direction to the Malaysian Securities 
Commission, Bursa Malaysia, the Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance, and the 
Shariah Advisory Council, regarding the mechanisms of corporate governance in Malaysian 
Shariah-approved companies. In addition, the empirical findings of the study could provide 
insights to the Malaysian Accounting Standard Board for future accounting standards in 
Malaysia. 
This study covers a five year time period of cross-sectional analysis over a wide range of 
industries together with three models of earnings management measurement. It offers a more 
comprehensive analysis using panel data than previous studies and therefore will add 
knowledge and contribute to a better understanding by the users of financial statements 
produced by Malaysian Shariah-approved companies. 
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1.7 Structure of the Thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows: The second chapter provides an overview 
of the capital markets, legislation and corporate governance in Malaysia. The third chapter 
contains a review of theoretical and empirical literature relating to earnings management and 
corporate governance. The fourth chapter presents the theoretical frameworks of earnings 
management and develops testable hypotheses regarding earnings management in Malaysian 
Shariah-approved companies and various aspects of corporate governance practices related to 
earnings management; such as the characteristics of the board of directors, the characteristics 
of audit committees, and firm specific characteristics. The fifth chapter outlines the research 
methodology used to test these hypotheses while chapter six presents and discusses the 
results. Finally, chapter seven offers a summary of the conclusions of this study and the 
implications, limitations, and directions for future research. 
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     Chapter 2 
Malaysian Capital Market, Legislation and Corporate 
Governance 
2.0 Introduction 
This section provides information about the Malaysian capital market, legislation and 
corporate governance. To explain the Malaysian regulatory environment, Section 2.1 provides 
information regarding the regulatory organizations that govern the conduct of securities 
dealing in Malaysia. This is followed by a discussion about the Islamic Capital Market (ICM). 
Section 2.2 presents the regulatory bodies in the ICM, facts and figures about Shariah-
approved companies, selection processes, the Islamic Index and Financial market, and 
information about ICM products. The next section presents information about corporate 
governance in Malaysia which includes the development of corporate governance and the 
sequence of its reforms in terms of rules and regulations, best practices, and institutional 
reforms. Finally, Section 2.4 provides a summary of the chapter.  
2.1 Regulatory Organizations in Malaysia 
There are three main regulatory bodies for the Malaysian capital market: the Bursa Malaysia 
Berhad, the Securities Commission and the Labuan Offshore Financial Services Authority 
(LOFSA), their scope and jurisdiction encompassing both Islamic and conventional finance 
matters. The following sub-sections provide individual information regarding these bodies. 
2.1.1 Bursa Malaysia Berhad (BMB) 
The first move towards securities trading occurred in 1930 when the Singapore Stockbrokers’ 
Association was established, however, the first formal organization for the public trading of 
securities commenced when the Malayan Stock Exchange was established in 1960. The Stock 
Exchange of Malaysia came into being in 1964 and was known as the Stock Exchange of 
Malaysia and Singapore, but in 1973, it was divided into the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
Berhad and the Stock Exchange of Singapore (Bursa Malaysia, 2009a).  
The KLSE is a self-regulating organization that governs the conducts of its members (stock 
broking firms) in securities dealing. Established to provide a central marketplace for buyers 
and sellers to transact business in shares, bonds and various other securities of Malaysian 
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listed companies, it is also responsible for the surveillance of the market place and the 
requirements and standards being maintained by listed companies (Bursa Malaysia, 2009a). 
On April 14, 2004, the name of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange was changed to Bursa 
Malaysia Berhad following its demutualisation
3
 and was changed with the purpose of 
enhancing its competitive position and to respond to global trends in the exchange sector. On 
18 March 2005, Bursa Malaysia was listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia Securities 
Berhad as an exchange holding company, approved under Section 15 of the Capital Markets 
and Services Act 2007. It operates a fully-integrated exchange, offering the complete range of 
exchange-related services including trading, clearing, settlement and depository services 
(Bursa Malaysia, 2009a).  
Today, Bursa Malaysia is one of the largest stock markets in Asia with just under 1,000 listed 
companies offering a wide range of investment choices to the world (Bursa Malaysia, 2009b). 
All listed companies are either on the Main Market for large and medium size capitalised 
companies, or the ACE (Access, Certainty and Efficiency) market for high growth and 
technology companies. The main differences between the requirements for listing on the Main 
Market and ACE market are in terms of minimum paid up capital and profit track record.  
Currently, the Malaysian capital market is governed by the Capital Markets and Services Act 
2007, the Securities Industry (Central Depositories Act) 1991, the Securities Commission Act 
1993, the Companies Act 1965, the Offshore Companies Act 1990 and the Labuan Offshore 
Securities Industry Act 1995. Figure 1 represents the regulatory structure of the Malaysian 
capital market, which is ultimately governed by the Ministry of Finance.  
                                                 
3
 Demutualisation is the act of moving from a corporation with no shareholders that is set up by special statute to 
one that is shareowner-based and profit-seeking. 
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Figure 1 : The regulatory structure of Malaysian capital market 
Source: Bursa Malaysia website 2011 
2.1.2 Securities Commission (SC) 
The Securities Commission is the sole regulatory body for the regulation and development of 
the capital market in Malaysia and was set up under the Securities Commission Act (SCA) 
1993. The Commission is responsible for the regulation and supervision of the activities of 
the market institutions, reporting directly to the Minister of Finance. In addition the 
Commission is obliged to encourage and promote the development of the securities and 
futures markets in Malaysia (Securities Commission, 2009a).  
2.1.3 Labuan Offshore Financial Services Authority (LOFSA) 
The Labuan Offshore Financial Services Authority (LOFSA)
4
 is the authority which regulates 
the Malaysian offshore capital market and is assisted by the Labuan International Financial 
Exchange Inc (LFX)
5
, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Bursa Malaysia Berhad. The LFX is a 
web-based financial exchange that provides listing and trading facilities for a wide range of 
financial and non-financial products, including Islamic financial products.  
2.2 Islamic Capital Market 
The unique feature of the Malaysian capital market is that the Islamic Capital Market runs 
concurrently with the conventional capital market. The Islamic capital market refers to the 
market where capital market activities are carried out in ways that do not conflict with the 
                                                 
4
 The LOFSA website (http://www.lofsa.gov.my) provides excellent information about this organisation. 
5
 Further information regarding this exchange can be referred to its website (http://www.lfx.com.my). 
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conscience of Muslims and the religion of Islam. Transactions in Islamic Capital Market are 
free from elements such as usury (Collins & Hribar), gambling (maisir) and ambiguity 
(gharar) (Securities Commission, 2009b).  
Importantly, the requirements for disclosure, transparency and governance apply equally to 
both Islamic and conventional products, thus ensuring that an investor in an Islamic product 
receives the same legal and regulatory protection and recourse that would be available to 
investors in  a conventional product (Securities Commission, 2006b), known as first tier 
regulations. For companies, products and services of the Islamic Capital Market, there is an 
additional requirement of complying with Islamic law, or Shariah, known as the second tier 
regulation. 
The Islamic finance industry in Malaysia has grown tremendously since it emerged in the 
1970’s and, as shown in Figure 2, its growth can be divided into three phases: Phase One 
(1983-1992) known as the Period of Discovery, Phase Two (1993-2001) recognised as the 
Period of Acceptance, and Phase Three (2002 until today) which is acknowledged as the 
Period of Strategic Development (Yakcop, 2002). The Initial set-up in 1980 witnessed the 
introduction of the Islamic Banking Act 1983, the Bank Islam Malaysia in 1983 and the 
Takaful Act in 1984, however, the Islamic Capital Market played a relatively minor role in the 
early stages of the development of the Islamic Financial system in Malaysia.  
There was further significant development in the 1990s when more companies and other 
entities began to source funds from the capital market in order to finance their operations 
(Securities Commission, 2001b). In 1996, there was a promulgation of the Shariah-approved 
criteria and the introduction of Shariah-approved securities by the Securities Commission. 
This led to an increased acceptance of the Islamic Capital Market as an alternative market for 
capital seekers and providers. Similarly, there was a growing interest in Islamic debt securities 
as an alternative instrument for investment and financing.  
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Figure 2 : Evolution of Malaysian Islamic Capital Market 
Source: Yakcop (2002) and Jamaluddin (2008) 
The richness of Islamic financing principles provides issuers with sufficient flexibility to 
structure a wide range of innovative and competitive Islamic securities (Securities 
Commission, 2003). From the year 2000 onwards, the market witnessed the development and 
subsequent issue of a variety of Islamic Capital Market products, encompassing debt or equity 
securities. The first global corporate Islamic bond was issued in 2002 by Kumpulan Guthrie 
Bhd and heralded the starting point in the liberalisation of access to capital markets. In 2004, 
there was another milestone when the first Ringgit denominated Islamic bonds were issued by 
the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private arm of World Bank, which reflects 
the recognition given to Malaysia as an Islamic Capital Market Centre (Securities 
Commission, 2004). Progressing towards the Period of Strategic Development or Developed 
Market, a comprehensive plan consisting of vision, strategic initiatives and recommendations 
was formulated by the Malaysian government including, among others, the Capital Market 
Master Plan, the Ninth Malaysian Plan
6
 and the yearly Budgets from 2007 until 2010. 
                                                 
6
 The Ninth Malaysian Plan, covering year 2006 up to 2010, is a comprehensive blueprint prepared by the 
Economic Planning Unit (Healy & Palepu) of the Prime Minister’s Department and the Finance Ministry of 
Malaysia. The blueprint was announced on 31 March 2006 by the fifth Prime Minister of Malaysia, Datuk Seri 
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi in Parliament. 
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2.2.1 Regulatory Bodies 
The development of an Islamic capital market requires an in depth understanding of the 
operations of the current capital market and contemporary analyses to fulfil the present day 
needs of investors, especially Muslims who wish to participate in economic activities in 
accordance to Shariah principles of Islam (Abdul Rahman, 2007), therefore the regulatory 
bodies play a vital role in the development and operation of the Islamic capital market. The 
two main regulatory bodies are the (Malaysian) Securities Commission and the Malaysia 
International Islamic Finance Centre. 
In order to promote Malaysia as a major hub for International Islamic Finance, the country’s 
financial and market regulators, including the Central Bank of Malaysia, Securities 
Commission Malaysia (SC), Labuan Offshore Financial Services Authority (LOFSA) and 
Bursa Malaysia, together with industry participation from the banking, takaful (Islamic 
Insurance) and capital market sectors in Malaysia launched the Malaysia International Islamic 
Financial Centre (MIFC) in August 2006. The focus of this centre is on areas such as: sukuk 
(Islamic Bond) origination, Islamic fund and wealth management, international Islamic 
banking, international takaful, and human capital development. The Securities Commission, 
together with other regulators, have played an important role in formulating a facilitative 
regulatory framework to strengthen and sustain Malaysia’s position as an international hub for 
an ICM.  
2.2.2 Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) 
Part of Malaysia’s pioneering efforts to create an organised and efficient Islamic capital 
market was the establishment of the Islamic Capital Market Department (ICMD) and the 
Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) in 1996 (Securities Commission, 2007d). The role of the 
Shariah Advisory Council is, with the assistance of the ICMD, to advise the Securities 
Commission on all matters relating to the comprehensive development of the Islamic capital 
market and to function as a reference centre for all Islamic capital market issues (Securities 
Commission, 2007d). In addition, the SAC is charged with the analysis of Shariah principles 
that can be used to introduce new products and services for the Islamic capital market, and to 
determine the extent to which existing conventional capital market instruments comply with 
the Shariah principles (Securities Commission, 2007d). The primary sources for development 
and references for the Shariah principles of Islamic capital market are the Holy Quran and the 
Sunnah (authentic traditions of Prophet Muhammad, PBUH). In addition, secondary sources 
consist of ijmak (consensus of opinion), qiyas (analogical deduction), maslahah (public 
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interest), ‘urf (custom) and others that are in accordance with the Shariah (Securities 
Commission, 2006c). 
2.2.3 Selection Process for Shariah-approved Companies 
The Shariah Advisory Council is also responsible for screening, reviewing and identifying the 
process for attaining Shariah compliant status. There are two parameters considered in the 
selection process - qualitative and quantitative.  
Qualitative Parameter 
The initial focus is on the goals and services offered by the company (Securities Commission, 
2007d) using a set of criteria that have been formulated as basic guidelines in the selection 
process (Securities Commission, 2008b). Companies that carry out any non-permissible core 
activities will not qualify as Shariah compliant. Non-permissible activities encompass: 
financial services based on riba (interest); maisir (gambling); the manufacture or sale of non-
halal products or related products; conventional insurance; certain entertainment activities that 
are not permitted according to Shariah; the manufacture or sale of tobacco-based products or 
related products; broking or trading in securities that are not Shariah-approved securities; and 
other activities that are regarded as not permitted according to Shariah. 
For companies with activities comprising both permitted and non-permitted elements, the 
Shariah Advisory Council considers two additional criteria: (1) the public perception or image 
of the company and (2) whether the core activities of the company are important and 
considered beneficial to Muslims and Malaysia. The non-permitted element must be very 
small and involve matters which are common and difficult to avoid, or are customary and are 
rights of the non-Muslim community which are accepted by Islam. 
Quantitative Parameters 
The second stage of evaluating Shariah approval requires assessment of relevant quantitative 
parameters. The Shariah Advisory Council has established several benchmarks in order to 
determine the tolerable level of mixed contributions from permitted and non-permitted 
activities, based on reasoning from the source of Shariah by qualified Shariah scholars 
(Securities Commission, 2007d). The securities of the company will be classified as Shariah-
compliant if the contributions from non-permissible activities do not exceed the following 
benchmarks: 
a) A five percent benchmark for activities that are clearly prohibited such as interest, 
gambling, liquor and pork. 
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b) A ten percent benchmark for activities that involve elements that affect most people 
and are difficult to avoid, such as interest income from fixed deposits in conventional 
banks, and for tobacco related activities. 
c) A twenty percent benchmark for non Shariah-compliant activities such as rental 
payments from premises that are involved in gambling, sale of liquor etc. 
d) A twenty-five percent benchmark for activities that may affect the Shariah-approved 
status such as hotel and resort operations, share trading, stock broking and other 
activities that are not Shariah approved. 
The Securities Commission compiles the decisions of the SAC and published the list of 
Shariah-compliant stocks twice a year in April and October, however the issuing date was 
changed in 2007 to May and November in order to coordinate with the Bursa Malaysia 
Shariah Index. The list of Shariah-compliant stocks gives investors, especially Muslims, the 
necessary guidance, opportunity and confidence to select and invest in the listed securities or 
companies that comply with the Shariah principles (Securities Commission, 2007c). Figure 3 
presents the number of Shariah-approved securities on Bursa Malaysia from 1997 to 2011 and 
it can be seen that from its inception in 1997, the total number of Shariah-compliant 
companies has steadily grown from 478 to 839 companies as at 31 December 2011 –
representing 89% of the total number of companies listed on Bursa Malaysia  
 
 
Figure 3 : Number of Shariah-approved securities listed on Bursa Malaysia  
Source: Securities Commission Malaysia website 2011 
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The list is essential for further growth in the Islamic capital market since it provides reference 
and guidance to the investing public, and for the development of the Islamic management 
industry (Securities Commission, 2007c). 
In the past, Shariah compliance reviews were conducted on companies after they were listed 
on Bursa Malaysia. To further develop and promote the Islamic capital market in Malaysia, 
the Shariah compliance review process has been extended to include securities at pre-IPO 
stage. From 1 October 2004, prospective issuers may apply to the Securities Commission to 
have such reviews conducted simultaneously with the company’s application to be listed on 
Bursa Malaysia. Currently, the Shariah Advisory Council only conducts sector/activities 
screening for the selection of Shariah-compliant status. Financial ratios are being considered 
but have not yet been implemented in the screening process as capital resources are very 
limited in Malaysia (Securities Commission, 2011). Companies have to rely on banks to 
finance their activities, as compared to Middle Eastern countries where institutions and 
individuals form the major capital providers (Abdul Rahman, Yahya, & Mohd Nasir, 2010). 
However, the inconsistencies should not be considered as disclosing weaknesses, rather, they 
reflect the beauty of Islam in the sense that flexibility is allowed to accommodate particular 
situations in different economic, political and social systems (Abdul Rahman et al., 2010). 
2.2.4 Islamic Index and Islamic Financial Market (Bursa Suq Al-Sila) 
The Malaysian capital market witnessed the introduction of an Islamic index that tracks the 
performance of the Shariah-compliant securities on Bursa Malaysia by RHB Unit Trust 
Management Berhad7 in May 1996. Subsequently, due to the establishment of the Shariah 
compliant list of companies in 1997, the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index (DJIM) by Dow 
Jones and Company was launched in February 1999, the Kuala Lumpur Shariah Index (KLSI) 
by Bursa Malaysia in April 1999 and the FSTE Global Islamic Index Series by the FSTE 
Group in October 1999.  
These indices were launched in order to increase participation by investors who are passionate 
about investing in securities approved by the Islamic Shariah. In addition, they enable 
tracking and benchmarking of the performance of Shariah-compliant securities by investors 
and analysts. The KLSI retired on 1 November 2007 and has been replaced by the FBM 
Shariah Index8 which was launched on 22 January 2007 (Securities Commission, 2007e). 
                                                 
7
 RHB Unit Trust Management Berhad is a unit trust company and a subsidiary of RHB Capital Berhad. 
8
 FBM means FTSE-Bursa Malaysia. 
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Another milestone project to further strengthen Malaysia’s position as an international Islamic 
financial hub is the Bursa Suq Al-Sila', the world’s first commodity trading platform 
specifically dedicated to facilitating Islamic liquidity management and financing by Islamic 
banks (Bursa Malaysia, 2010). One notable feature of this market is that it is a fully 
electronic, web-based platform that provides industry players with an avenue to undertake 
multi-commodity and multi-currency trades from all around the world. In essence it integrates 
the global Islamic financial and capital markets with the commodity market.  
2.2.5 Islamic Capital Market Products 
Modern Islamic financial products and services are generally developed using two different 
approaches. The first approach is to identify and modify existing conventional products and 
services so that they comply with Shariah principles while the second is to offer innovative 
new products and services and  involves the application of various Shariah principles 
(IOSCO, 2004). In Malaysia, both approaches are being used to develop and structure Islamic 
capital market products that will cater to the need of the market (Securities Commission, 
2007d).  
Figure 4 illustrates the variety of financial products that are currently offered in the Malaysian 
Islamic Capital Market.
 
Figure 4 : Malaysian Islamic Capital Market Products 
Source: Securities Commission website 2010 
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Shariah-compliant securities has almost doubled, going from four hundred and seventy-eight 
in 1997 to eight hundred and thirty-nine at the end of 2011 (illustrated in Figure 3).  
Shariah-Based Unit Trust Fund 
The Shariah-based Unit Trust Funds (UTF) are collective investment funds that offer 
investors the opportunity to invest in a diversified portfolio of Shariah-compliant securities 
and are  managed by professional managers in accordance with Shariah principles. This 
enables both Muslim and non-Muslim investors to invest and participate in Islamic 
investments that are professionally managed. The Shariah-based unit trust funds have 
experienced significant growth from two Islamic funds in 1993 to currently more than 150 
Islamic funds, which represents 26% of the total industry in Malaysia.  
 
Figure 5 : Net Asset Value of Unit Trust Funds in Malaysia 
Source: Securities Commission Malaysia website 2011 
Figure 5 shows the value of Shariah-based Unit Trust Funds and the total industry in Malaysia 
from 2001 until 2011. The net asset value (NAV) of Shariah-based Unit Trust Funds at the 
end of 2011 amounted to RM27.90 billion compared to RM2.42 billion in 2001. Although the 
size of Shariah-based unit trust funds is small compared to the overall domestic industry, the 
Malaysian Shariah-based unit trust funds industry is the world’s largest Islamic trust funds 
industry (PriceWaterHouseCoopers, 2008). 
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Islamic Exchange Traded Funds 
Islamic Exchanged Traded Funds (ETF) are funds traded on Bursa Malaysia which track 
indices based on stocks that have been classified as Shariah-compliant listed equities
9
. Among 
the benefits of investing in ETF are: diversification, as ETF invest in a portfolio of securities, 
low minimum investment, as ETF are traded in board lots, and liquidity, as ETF are 
continuously traded on Bursa Malaysia.  
The first Islamic compliant exchange traded fund (ETF) in the Asian region was the MyETF 
Dow Jones Islamic Market Malaysia Titan 25 (MyETF-DJIM25), launched in Malaysia in 
January 2008. It can be seen from Figure 6 that the net asset value (NAV) of Islamic ETFs has 
risen significantly from RM482.73 million in 2008 to RM626 million in December 2010, 
representing 50% of total industry. It is believed that its launch will boost the country’s 
aspiration to become an Islamic financial hub, attract foreign funds, and broaden the market 
(Securities Commission, 2008a). However, it should be noted that the net asset value dropped 
to RM400 million in December 2011. 
 
Figure 6 : Net Assets Value of Exchange Traded Funds (ETF) in Malaysia  
Source: Securities Commission Malaysia website 2011 
Islamic Real Estate Investment Trusts 
Islamic Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) are defined as collective investment vehicles 
that pool money from investors in order to buy, manage and sell real estate through Shariah-
compliant capital market instruments (Securities Commission, 2006a). 
                                                 
9
 The structure of Islamic ETF is similar to a unit trust but it is tradable instantaneously on the Bursa Malaysia 
like equity during the usual trading hours. 
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There is a combination feature of real estate and trust funds in REITs that sits between bonds 
and equities
10
. In addition, the holder essentially owns a fraction of a pool of real estate and 
this provides a platform for international investors to invest in a particular country’s real 
property without any difficulties and responsibilities associated with direct ownership of such  
assets (Securities Commission, 2006a). The first REIT was launched in the healthcare sector 
in 2006 by Al-Aqar KPJ, with a fund size of RM 180 million and at present, there are 14 
REITs offered in Malaysia, including three Islamic REITs. The market capitalisation of 
Islamic REITs in Malaysia has grown significantly to RM 2,900 million at the end of 2011. 
Figure 7 shows the value of Islamic Real Estate Investment Trusts and total industry in 
Malaysia from 2007 to 2011. 
 
Figure 7 : Value of Real Estate Investments Trusts (REIT) in Malaysia 
Source: Securities Commission website and PriceWaterHouseCoopers website 2011 
Sukuk (Islamic Bond) 
Sukuk is a form of financial note, which represents the value of the asset. The issuance of 
Islamic bonds require an exchange of a Shariah-compliant underlying asset for a financial 
consideration through the application of various Shariah principles such as ijarah, 
mudharabah, murabahah, mushakarah, bai’ bithaman ajil and istisna11 (IOSCO, 2004; 
Securities Commission, 2006c).  
                                                 
10
 Investment in REITs will give returns generated from rental income plus any capital appreciation that comes 
from holding the real estate assets over an investment period. The unit holders of REITS will receive returns in 
the form of dividends and capital gains. 
11
 Islamic Businesses contracts: Ijarah (leasing contract), mudharabah (business venture contract: profit sharing), 
musharakah (business venture partnership: profit and loss sharing), bai’ bithaman ajil (assets financing contract: 
deferred payment sale), istisna (progressive sale) are the Islamic principle used for a similar transaction in 
conventional market (refer Appendix A for details) 
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In Malaysia, Sukuk are issued in both Malaysian Ringgit and foreign currencies, thereby 
offering a variety of investment opportunities to all investors, local or foreign, and also to 
local and international entities that seek listing on Bursa Malaysia. Among the five major 
Islamic Capital Market products, Sukuk is the most preferred choice for corporations to raise 
funds, the main reasons being the strong demand from fixed income investors its competitive 
pricing, and its issue without excessive cost (Securities Commission, 2007b).  
 
Figure 8 : Values of Islamic and Conventional Bonds in Malaysia 
Source: Securities Commission website 2011 
In Malaysia, the first Sukuk was issued in 1990 by Shell MDS Sdn Bhd, with the value of 
RM150 million. Figure 8 shows the Malaysian bonds issued since 2000, illustrating the 
significant size of the Sukuk market in Malaysia as compared to the conventional bonds 
market. Over the past ten years, Sukuk have proven to be a viable investment option with the 
size of Sukuk in Malaysia standing at RM33.00 billion as of December 2011, reflecting an 
explosive growth rate from RM7.7 billion at the end of 2000. Meanwhile, the size of 
conventional bonds as at December 2011 was RM33.00 billion, with that market registering 
average growth from 2000. 
2.3 Corporate Governance Structure 
The Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG 2000) which sets out the principles 
and best practices of corporate governance for Malaysian public listed companies was 
released by the Finance Committee on Corporate Governance in March 2000. In January 
2001, the Code was brought into effect with amendments to the Bursa Malaysia’s listing 
requirements. The following sections present definition of corporate governance followed by 
the evolution of corporate governance in Malaysia.  
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2.3.1 Definition 
Corporate governance has been defined in many ways. The Cadbury Report (1992, p. 14) in 
the United Kingdom defined it as “the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled”. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 1999) 
took a broader perspective, describing corporate governance as a set of relationships between 
a company’s board, its shareholders and stakeholders. As defined by the Malaysian High 
Level Finance Committee on Corporate Governance (1999, p. 52):  
“Corporate governance is the process and structure used to direct and manage the 
business and affairs of the company towards enhancing business prosperity and 
corporate accountability with the ultimate objective of realizing long term shareholder 
value, whilst taking into account the interest of other stakeholders”.  
This definition emphasises the contribution of corporate governance to business prosperity 
and to corporate accountability, with the long-term overall objective of the company being to 
enhance shareholder value. Thus, corporate governance will serve as a set of ‘rules’ to 
persons who have the power to direct and manage the firm and make accountable decisions. 
2.3.2 Development of Corporate Governance in Malaysia 
Corporate governance in Malaysia has developed since the enactment of the Malaysian 
Companies Act in 1965which established a governance framework including issues such as 
corporate structure, disclosure requirement, duties and liabilities of directors, protection of 
shareholders in general and minority shareholders in particular, as well as the reporting and 
compliance requirements. Before the Asian financial crisis of 1997, efforts to strengthen 
aspects of good governance practices in Malaysian corporate sectors had commenced with the 
introduction of the Securities and Industry Act (SIA) 1983, the Banking and Financial 
Institution Act in 1989, and the Securities Commission Act in 1993. In addition, the Code of 
Ethics for Directors had been introduced in 1996 by the Companies Commission of Malaysia 
as an initiative towards creating better board of directors. The financial crisis in 1997 has 
provided an impetus for corporate governance reforms in Malaysia. The following figure 
(Figure 9) identifies key implementation milestones in the development of the legal and 
institutional framework for corporate governance, as recommended or highlighted by the 
Finance Committee in its Report on Corporate Governance and the Capital Market Master 
plan (CMP). 
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Figure 9 depicts the key implementation milestones divided into 3 parts; rules and regulation, 
best practices, and institutional reforms. A significant milestone in terms of best practice 
occurred in March 2000 when the High Level Finance Committee on Corporate Governance 
(FCCG)
12
 released the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG 2000) which sets 
out the principles of best practice and as well as best practices to assist companies to design 
their governance. The Code (MCCG 2000) was brought into effect in January 2001 with 
amendments to the KLSE’s listing requirement. The revamped Listing Requirements of Bursa 
Malaysia in 2001 provide greater obligation for listed companies to enhance Malaysia’s 
corporate governance regime.  
The Malaysian Securities Commission released a revised Code of Corporate Governance in 
2007 which aims to strengthen Malaysia’s corporate governance framework, especially the 
roles and responsibilities of boards of directors and audit committees, and bring it in line with 
current global best practice. Furthermore, the revised listing requirements required directors 
of Malaysian listed companies to attend a compulsory training programme (known as the 
mandatory accreditation of directors) covering matters such as directors’ legal rights and 
responsibilities, operation of the board of directors, listing requirements, risk management and 
internal control, and relevant securities laws. Moreover, the revised Code details the 
composition of audit committees, the frequency of meetings and the need for members to 
attend continuous training in financial and other related development. In order to preserve the 
independence of the audit committee, the executive directors will no longer be allowed to 
become members of the audit committee. 
 
                                                 
12
 The High Level Finance Committee on Corporate Governance (FCCG) was formed in March 1998 to establish 
a framework for corporate governance, setting the benchmark for best practice for the industry and to provide a 
report on ways to improve corporate governance in Malaysia. 
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Figure 9 : Key Implementation Milestones in Corporate Governance Reform in Malaysia 
Source: Securities Commission website 2011 
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This study, however, covers the period from 2003 until 2007 so is focussed on the initial Code 
of Corporate Governance and excludes any subsequent revisions to that Code. The following 
section explains and provides details about the initial code issued in 2000. 
2.3.3 Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) 2000 
The Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) 2000 is divided into four parts:  
a) Part 1 – 13 Basic Principles of Corporate Governance 
b) Part 2 – 33 Best Practices in Corporate Governance 
c) Part 3 – Principles and Best Practices for other corporate participants 
d) Part 4 – Explanatory Notes 
Part 1 sets out 13 broad principles of good corporate governance which is further divided into 
four classifications namely, board of directors, directors’ remuneration, shareholders, 
accountability and audit. All the principles in Part 1 were set out with the objective of 
increasing the efficiency and accountability of the boards.  
Part 2 attends to the issue of compliance. A set of guidelines are identified to assist companies 
in designing their approach to corporate governance. The 33 best practices for companies are 
sub-classified into principal responsibilities of the board, constructing an effective board, size 
of non-executive directors and their participation, board structures and procedures, 
relationship of the board to management, the audit committee, and the relationship between 
the board and shareholders. Part 3 is addressed to investors and auditors to enhance their role 
in corporate governance while the last part (Part 4) provides explanatory notes to the 
Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 2000. 
Although compliance with the Code is voluntary, the amendment to the Bursa Malaysia 
listing requirements in 2001 required all listed companies to address in their annual report the 
Statement of Corporate Governance, a narrative account of how they applied the principles of 
the Code to their structures and processes and the extent to which they complied with it along 
with a statement of the effectiveness of internal controls, composition of the board of 
directors, composition of audit committee, disclosures of executive directors’ remunerations 
and details of directors seeking re-election at annual general meetings (Bursa Malaysia, 
2001). Furthermore, identification of and reasons for areas of non-compliance with the Code, 
together with alternative practices adopted, have to be addressed by all listed companies. 
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The monitoring functions of boards as well as the role of the audit committee have been 
focused on by the Code to enhance the quality of internal control and financial reporting. The 
Code also recommends one third of the board comprises of independent non-executive 
directors, and required the separation of powers between the chairman and the chief executive 
directors. In addition, it also recommends a formal selection process of directors with the 
establishment of a nomination committee together with a remuneration committee and an 
audit committee.  
The MCCG 2000 was revised in 2007 with the aim to strengthen the roles and responsibilities 
of boards of directors, audit committees and internal auditors in the financial reporting 
process, to assist them in effectively discharging their duties, and bring the code in line with 
current global best practice (Anwar, 2007). Amongst the recommendations on best practice, is 
that the nomination committee should have the necessary skills, knowledge, expertise, 
experience, professionalism and integrity to strengthen the board and ensure the board 
discharges its roles and responsibilities effectively. Furthermore, the audit committee is 
required to comprise at least three members (all non-executive directors), a majority of whom 
are independent. In addition, the revised code recommends all audit committee members be 
financially literate (able to read, analyse and interpret financial statements) with at least one 
member being a member of an accounting association or body.  
While this thesis was in the writing stage, the MCCG was again revised and released in 2012, 
to ensure excellent corporate governance practices in Malaysia through strengthening self and 
market discipline and promoting good compliance and corporate governance structure 
(Anwar, 2012). The revised code focuses on strengthening board structure and composition, 
recognising the role of directors as active and responsible fiduciaries. There are six areas, 
emphasized in the code: Shareholders Rights, Role of Institutional Investors, Board of 
Directors, Disclosure and Transparency, Role of Gatekeepers and Influencers, and Public and 
Private Enforcement and Implementation. Amongst the recommendations is that the code 
mandate a cumulative term for the position of independent director with an average tenure of 
nine years. The code also mandates separation of the roles of chairman and CEO to ensure a 
balance of power and authority and allow them to focus on their respective responsibilities. 
Furthermore, all boards must establish a Nominating Committee, which should comprise 
exclusively of non-executive directors, with an independent director as chairman. Companies 
must also disclose board composition in their annual report with policies and targets for 
increased participation of women on their boards and the number of multiple directorships is 
limited to a maximum of five. The MCCG 2012 supersedes the revised code of 2007, and its 
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observance is not mandatory, however listed companies are required to report on their 
compliance with the code in their annual reports (Anwar, 2012). The implications of the 
revised code will be further discussed in Chapter 7. 
Other significant parts of the corporate governance reform in Malaysia, in terms of 
institutional reform, are the Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG) and the 
Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG), explained in the following sections. 
2.3.6 Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG) 
The Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG) was established in March 1998 by 
the High Level Finance Committee on Corporate Governance. The MICG is a non-profit 
public company limited by guarantee, with founding members consisting of the Federation of 
Public Listed Companies (FPLC), the Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA), the 
Malaysian Association of Certified Public Accountants (MICPA), the Malaysian Institute of 
Chartered Secretaries and Administrators (MAICSA), and the Malaysian Institute of Directors 
(MID). The MICG’s mandate was to raise the awareness and practice of good corporate 
governance in Malaysia with the main objective of providing continuing education 
programmes regarding best corporate governance practices for boards of directors, audit 
committees, and investors in Malaysia.  
2.3.7 Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group (MSWG) 
The Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) was established on 30 August 2000 as 
part of a broader capital market framework to protect the interest of minority shareholders. It 
has four of the largest institutional funds in the country as its founding members; the National 
Equity Corporation (Permodalan Nasional Berhad - PNB), the Armed Forces Fund Board 
(Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera - LTAT), the Pilgrimage Board (Lembaga Tabung Haji - 
LTH), and the Social Security Organisation (Pertubuhan Keselamatan Sosial- PERKESO) 
(MSWG, 2011). The basic role of the MSWG is the enhancement of shareholder activism and 
the protection of minority interest as an integral part of the development of the capital market. 
Since commencing operation on 1 July 2001, the MSWG has focused on public campaigns 
raising awareness of shareholder activism by capturing the hearts and minds of the Malaysian 
investing public.  
Initiatives undertaken by the Malaysian government towards good corporate governance 
practices by all listed companies are substantial. Every angle, such as rules and regulations, 
best practices and institutional reform, is included in the schedule of reformation. All parties 
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in either the regulatory bodies or the market are involved to ensure the objective in Malaysia 
is achieved. Importantly, it is a continuous effort where in all aspects are being reviewed by 
the respective bodies. 
2.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presents the background of Malaysian capital markets, legislation and corporate 
governance. The first section presents the formation and functions of the three main capital 
markets regulatory bodies: Bursa Malaysia Berhad, the Securities Commission, and the 
Labuan Offshore Financial Services Authority. The second section reviews the development 
of regulatory bodies in the Malaysian Islamic Capital Market, and the selection process for 
Shariah-approval status. In addition, this section presents and illustrates facts and figures of 
Islamic Capital Market products in Malaysia. The third section presents the development of 
corporate governance in Malaysia since the 1960s, and reviews the Malaysian Code of 
Corporate Governance 2000 and its subsequent amendments.  
The next chapter (Chapter Three) presents a comprehensive review of prior literature on 
earnings management, corporate governance and Shariah-approved companies. 
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     Chapter 3 
Literature Review 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the previous literature on earnings management, corporate governance 
and the Islamic Capital Market. Section 3.1 discusses the various definitions of earnings 
management, and is followed by Section 3.2  which reviews previous studies on earnings 
management. Next, Section 3.3 presents a review of previous studies on earnings management 
in Malaysia, whereas Section 3.4 presents a review of previous studies on earnings 
management in Islamic countries (other than Malaysia). Section 3.5 concentrates on the issue 
of corporate governance. Section 3.6 discusses the previous studies on corporate governance 
and earnings management, including discussion of internal governance and external 
governance while, finally, Section 3.7 reviews studies on Shariah-approved Companies in 
Malaysia.  
3.1 Definition of Earnings Management 
The most common definitions of earnings management in academic writing on accounting are 
from Schipper (1989) and Healy and Wahlen (1999). Schipper (1989) defines it as, “an 
involvement in the process of preparing financial statements, purposely to acquire personal 
benefits”. A similar definition of earnings management as an opportunistic behaviour is 
expressed by Healy and Wahlen (1999) as follows:  
“…earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting 
and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some 
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to 
influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.” (1999, 
p. 368) 
Similarly to Healy and Wahlen, Landsittel (2000) stated that earnings management is “where 
public companies inappropriately manage earnings by intentionally recording accounting 
misstatements in order to adjust reported earnings presumably to obtain a targeted earnings 
figure or facilitate an earnings growth”. 
Earnings management involves the selection of accounting procedures and estimates that 
conform to generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). Explicitly, firms that have 
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earnings management would still be classified as within the bounds of accepted accounting 
procedure manipulation as conservative accounting, neutral earnings and aggressive 
accounting are all within the GAAP. 
Parfect (2000 ) mentioned that improper earnings management is a bad and unproductive 
behaviour arising in a complex situation, one in which analysts and investors are key players 
along with corporate management. He made distinctions between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ earnings 
management, seeing ‘bad’ earnings management, or improper earnings management, as 
intervention by management to hide real operating performance by creating artificial 
accounting entries or stretching estimates beyond a reasonable point. However, the ‘good’ 
kind of earnings management involves reasonable and proper practices that are part of 
operating a well-managed business and delivering value to shareholders (Parfect, 2000 ).  
A diverse definition by Giroux (2004) has earnings management comprise the whole range of 
accounting decisions from conservative to fraud and asserts that the huge range of accounting 
judgments provide incentives to management. The chief financial officer, in conjunction with 
executives and board members, develops a perspective on what the economic reality is and 
how it should be reported. This is a dynamic process that may change from quarter to quarter, 
as meeting financial analysts’ expectations is important. Within this approach, he further 
defines earnings management as a practice in financial reporting towards some objectives and 
plan (Giroux, 2004).  
Meanwhile, Ronen and Yaari (2008) offer an alternative view of earnings management and 
summarize different definitions of earnings management by classifying them as white, gray 
and black. Earnings management is considered as beneficial (white) if it enhances the 
transparency of reports; pernicious (Hair et al.) if it involves outright misrepresentation and 
fraud, and gray if the manipulation of reports is within the boundaries of compliance with 
bright-line standards, which could be either opportunistic of efficiency enhancing (Ronen & 
Yaari, 2008). They further claim that earnings management can be beneficial if it signals 
long-term value, pernicious if it conceals short or long term value, and neutral if it reveals the 
true short term performance. 
The definitions of earnings management actually differ depending on the instruments of 
manipulation, the purpose of the earnings management behaviour, and its timing. Although 
defined in a variety of ways, the previous literature on the definition of earnings management 
generally agree it comprises elements of an action purposely undertaken to alter the 
information in financial statements in order to mislead their user. As such indiscretion is 
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normally performed by the managers with the objective of acquiring some personal benefits, 
this is an opportunistic behaviour and, as such, is prohibited in Islam (Al-Kashif, 2009). 
On the other hand, financial fraud, which deliberately distorts the true economic performance 
of a business, clearly violates GAAP. Financial fraud has been defined by the Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners as purposely misleading information prepared in order to influence 
the user of the information to change their decision, and therefore does not come under the 
umbrella of earnings management. 
Basically, earnings management can be classified into two categories: accruals earnings 
management and real earnings management. Accruals earnings management happens when 
managers manipulate reported earnings by exploiting accounting discretion which is allowed 
under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) to try to hide true economic 
performance (Dechow & Skinner, 2000). On the other hand, real earnings management 
happens when managers attempt to alter reported earnings by adjusting the timing and scale 
of underlying business activities
13
, such as financing, investment or operating activity, in an 
effort to influence the output of the financial reporting (Roychowdhury, 2006). 
The difference between the two categories is that real earnings management involves 
manipulation of earnings through real business operations that deviate from normal practices 
with direct cash flow consequences. However, accruals earnings management involves 
manipulation of earnings that involve accounting estimates and accounting choices with no 
direct cash flow effects. Gunny (2010) claims that accruals earnings management is 
accomplished through the choice of accounting methods to represent those activities, while 
real earnings management involves altering the firm’s underlying operations in an effort to 
enhance current-period earnings.  
It is argued by Baderstscher, Phillips, Pincus and Rego (2009) and Cohen and Zarowin (2008) 
that real earnings management alters a firm’s operations and is more costly than accruals 
earnings management, as real earnings management involves cash flow consequences. In 
addition, Roychowdhury (2006) states that real earnings management is a departure from 
normal operational activities and may likely have a negative impact on future performance. 
                                                 
13
 Roychowdhury state that firms use multiple earnings management methods to meet certain financial reporting 
benchmarks such as : 
i) Reduction in discretionary expenses - R&D, advertising, and SG&A expenses 
ii) Sales manipulation – offer price discount and lenient credit term 
iii) Overproduction – giving price discount to report lower COGS 
iv) Investment decisions – timing of assets disposals to report gain 
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Another reason why accruals earnings management is preferable is that it provides more 
timing discretion for managers to manage the reported earnings. As claimed by Gunny (2010), 
accruals earnings management is preferable to real earnings management because accruals 
management can take place after the fiscal year end and when the need for earnings 
management is the most certain, whereas real earnings management decisions must be made 
prior to the fiscal year end. In addition, Gunny reveals evidence that real earnings 
management has a significantly negative impact on future operating performance. 
Using sample companies in the U.S., Cohen and Zarowin (2008) reveal evidence of managers 
shifting away from accruals based earnings management to real earnings management in the 
period following the Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002
14
. However, the trend is documented only in 
U.S. companies following the Act. To the best of our knowledge, previous literature in the 
Malaysian context has provided evidence of extensive usage of accruals earnings management 
(refer to section 3.3 for details) but none of an emerging shift to real earnings management.  
In addition, accruals earnings management techniques are being widely used in the previous 
literature in detecting opportunistic earnings management (Ahorany, Lin, & Loeb, 1993; 
Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006; DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Skinner, 1994; DeFond & 
Jiambalvo, 1994; Erickson & Wang, 1999; Gaver, Gaver, & Austin, 1995; Han & Wang, 
1998; Healy, 1985; Jones, 1991; Magnan, Nadeau, & Cormier, 1999; Navissi, 1999; 
Stammerjohan & Hall, 2003; Sweeney, 1994).  
According to agency theory, the separation of ownership and control, and different levels of 
risk preferences, leads to a divergence of interest between managers and shareholders (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). Consequently, managers tend towards fulfilling their personal interests, 
which is considered an opportunistic behaviour, through earnings management.  This study 
will examine whether there is earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-approved 
companies, where there is no reason to suspect earnings management as such behaviour is 
prohibited in Islam. 
3.2 Studies on Earnings Management 
There is a body of research on earnings management around the world, most of which 
addresses the possible circumstances for earnings management. Healy and Wahlen (1999) 
                                                 
14
 Sarbanes Oxly Act 2002 is also known as the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection 
Act (in the Senate) and “Corporate and Auditing Accountability and Responsibility Act (in the House). It is a 
United States Federal law that set new or enhanced standards for US public company boards, management and 
public accounting firms. 
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reviewed the earnings management literature and grouped the reasons for managing earnings 
into three main motives; capital market motivations, contractual motivations; and regulatory 
motivations. 
3.2.1 Capital Market Motivations 
The widespread use of accounting information by investors and financial analysts in order to 
ease the valuation of shares can create an incentive for managers to manipulate earnings in an 
attempt to influence short-term share price performance (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). A number 
of studies have provided evidence of earnings management in order to influence stock price 
valuation, with recent studies documenting empirical evidence of earnings management 
related to initial public offerings (IPO), (Ahorany et al., 1993; Neill, Pourciau, & Schaefer, 
1995; Shivakumar, 2000; Teoh, Welch, & Wong, 1998a) and seasoned equity offerings, 
(Teoh, Welch, & Wong, 1998b).  
Ahorany et al. (1993) argue that IPO issuers opportunistically manage earnings upward in an 
effort to increase the initial offering price. Their theory suggests that issuers attempt to inflate 
the offering proceeds, bolstering the price with claims of higher value substantiated by 
accounting reports. Neill et al. (1995) provide evidence that there is a marginally significant 
positive association between the initial proceeds of offering and the selection of accounting 
methods that result in larger income and assets values.  
Meanwhile, Teoh et al. (1998a) note that the IPO process is particularly susceptible to 
earnings management because there is high information asymmetry between investors and 
issuers at the time of the offerings. Consistent with their expectation, they found issuers of 
IPO firms manipulated earnings upwards prior to public listing to improve the terms on which 
share prices are sold to public. Incentives to manage earnings also exist in seasoned equity 
offerings as Teoh et al. (1998b) discovered issuing firms that adjust discretionary current 
accruals to report higher net income prior to the offering have lower post-issue long-run 
abnormal stock returns and net income. 
The incentive to engage in earnings management also exists in stock financed acquisitions. 
According to Erickson and Wang (1999) one way to increase share price is through increased 
accounting earnings - the higher the earnings, the higher the share price. Thus, the higher the 
price of the acquiring firm’s stocks on the agreement date, the fewer the number of shares that 
must be issued to purchase the target firm. Therefore, they conclude that the acquiring firm 
has an incentive to increase accounting earnings prior to the acquisition in order to raise the 
market price. 
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Another event where incentive towards earnings management exists is during management 
buyouts, and DeAngelo (1986) and Perry and Williams (1994) investigate whether executives 
attempt to use discretionary accruals to reduce the share price of the firms in such situations. 
The results from DeAngelo, did not support
15
 the hypothesis that managers understated 
reported income in the period before a management buyout of public stockholders. On the 
other hand, the results by Perry and William provide evidence of earnings management prior 
to management buyout proposals and offer convincing evidence of earnings management in 
the year before the public announcement of intention to bid for control of a company. 
Kaszik (1999) examines whether managers who issue earnings forecast manage reported 
earnings towards their forecasts, fearing legal actions by investors and loss of reputation for 
accuracy16. He found evidence of positive association between levels of overestimated 
earnings forecast and litigation cost proxies, consistent with firms in danger of falling short of 
management earnings forecast using unexpected accruals to manage earnings upwards. 
3.2.2 Contractual Motivations 
According to Healy and Wahlen (1999), accounting data are used in order to help monitor and 
regulate contracts between the firm and its stakeholders, however, Watts and Zimmerman 
(1978) suggest that these contracts create incentives for earnings management. Meeting debt 
covenant is one example of  a contractual situation that could stimulate earnings management, 
wherein managers may increase reported earnings to reduce the probability of default and 
avoid costly debt covenant violations (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986).  
A number of studies have examined whether managers opportunistically take action to 
prevent violation of debt covenants (DeAngelo et al., 1994; DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; 
Sweeney, 1994). DeFond and Jiambalvo document evidence that supports the existence of 
opportunistic earnings management in relation to debt covenants. Similarly, Sweeney 
provides evidence that managers of firms approaching technical default resort to earnings 
management to circumvent debt covenants violation. Meanwhile, DeAngelo et al. find large 
accruals are due to difficult times for a firm. 
 
                                                 
15
 DeAngelo claimed that managers do not systematically understate earnings, not because earnings are 
unimportant; rather, because earnings are likely to attract detailed scrutiny by parties who will be affected by a 
successful earnings management strategy. Perry and William, however, raised several questions about the 
reliability and generality of the sample used in her study that probably reduced the power of her results.  
16
 Kasznik (1999) examined 499 sample companies in the United States with forecasts issued between 1987 and 
1991. 
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Empirical evidence of earnings management is also found in meeting executive compensation 
targets in terms of annual bonus schemes (Gaver et al., 1995; Healy, 1985; Holthausen, 
Larcker, & Sloan, 1995). Healy (1985) concludes that managers use accruals to strategically 
manipulate their bonus income. Similar to Healy, Holthausen et al. (1995) find evidence 
consistent with the hypothesis that managers manipulate earnings downwards when their 
bonuses are at their maximum. On the other hand, unlike Healy, they find no evidence that 
managers manipulate earnings downwards when earnings are below the minimum necessary 
to receive any bonus and Gaver et al. (1995) conclude that earnings are managed to smooth 
income rather than manipulate bonuses. Finally, in a more recent study, Bergstresser and 
Philippon (2006), found evidence that the use of discretionary accruals to manipulate reported 
earnings significantly increased when potential CEO compensation was more closely related 
to the value of stock and option holdings. 
3.2.3 Regulatory Motivations 
Regulatory actions (such as import relief investigation, antitrust investigations, litigation 
events, price regulation and political scrutiny) can also create incentives for earnings 
management. According to Watts and Zimmerman (1978), it is often alleged that managers of 
firms that are vulnerable to an anti-trust investigation or other adverse political consequences 
have incentives to manage earnings to appear less profitable. 
Regulatory motivations for earnings management have gained considerable attention in the 
academic literature. Jones (1991) investigates whether firms in industries with import relief 
investigations use accruals decisions to decrease reported earnings, documenting that 
companies in industries with import relief tend to understate income in the year of application. 
In a similar vein, Magnan, Nadeau, and Cormier (1999) investigated Canadian firms that 
lodged antidumping complaints against foreign competitors opportunistically reducing their 
reported earnings to obtain favourable rulings from the Canadian External Trade Tribunal. 
They documented evidence of earnings management during the investigation period. 
Cahan (1992) and Makar, Alam and Pearson (1998) further studied whether companies that 
are subject to antitrust investigation managed their reported earnings. Both studies found 
evidence of earnings management in companies involved in antitrust investigation. Another 
regulatory action being studied is litigation events. Stammerjohan and Hall (2003) revealed 
evidence that oil firms facing potentially large damage awards made income-decreasing 
accounting choices during the litigation periods relative to other years, and relative to other oil 
firms not facing major litigation.  
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Price control regulation is a type of regulatory intervention that can impact a firm’s 
accounting decisions because it is costly to firms (Watts & Zimmerman, 1978), therefore, it is 
another motivation towards earnings management. Navissi (1999) examined discretionary 
accruals made by New Zealand manufacturing firms in response to two sets of regulations 
issues in 1971 and 197217 with evidence of income decreasing discretionary accruals by 
manufacturing firms for the years during which they could apply for price increases. 
3.3 Studies of Earnings Management in Malaysia 
Malaysia is definitely not lagging in the research of earnings management. Studies on subjects 
such as earnings management and debt renegotiation have been conducted by Mohd Saleh and 
Ahmed (2005), and Ahmed, Godfrey and Saleh (2008) while earnings management and 
corporate tax rate has been investigated by Roubi and Richardson (1998), and Adhikari, 
Derashid and Zhang (2005). In the same area, earnings management and initial public 
offerings has been examined by Ahmad-Zaluki, Campbell and Goodacre (2009), while, Johl, 
Jubb, and Houghton (2007) investigated the association of earnings management and audit 
opinion.  
More recently, the association between several corporate governance practices (board of 
directors, audit committee, institutional investors and culture) and earnings management have 
been investigated by Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali (2008), Abdullah and Mohd Nasir 
(2004), Guan, Pourjalali, Sengupta and Teruya (2005), (Hashim & Devi, 2008b), and Mohd 
Saleh, Mohd Iskandar and Rahmat (2007), however, contradictory results were found. Details 
of their studies are presented in chronological order within type of earnings management 
study in Table 1. However, to the best of our knowledge, little research has been carried out 
relating earnings management, corporate governance and Shariah law in Malaysia, which is 
the aim of this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 These regulations allowed manufacturing firms to apply for price increases to gain relief from financial 
hardship caused by the 1970 Price Freeze Regulation. 
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Table 1: Studies on Earnings Management in Malaysia 
No
. 
Type of Study Authors Issues (Aims/ 
Objectives) 
Key Findings 
1. Earnings 
management 
and debt 
renegotiation 
Mohd Saleh 
and Ahmed 
(2005) 
To examine 
discretionary accruals 
(DACC) in distressed 
firms that have 
undertaken debt 
contract renegotiation 
subsequent to debt 
covenant violation. 
Evidence distressed firms 
manipulate earnings downward 
during the year surrounding 
renegotiations with lenders, & this 
DACC is more negative than 
those control sample of firms 
without debt renegotiation. 
2.  Ahmed, 
Godfrey and 
Saleh (2008) 
To examine the market 
valuation of DACC for 
debt renegotiating 
Malaysian firms. 
Negative DACC for debt 
renegotiating firms are associated 
with higher market values of 
equity & not related to the firm’s 
future earnings. 
3. Earnings 
management 
and corporate 
tax policy 
Roubi and 
Richardson 
(1998) 
To examine the mgt of 
DACC by 
nonmanufacturing 
corporations in 
response to changes in 
the statutory corporate 
income tax rates. 
Evidence nonmanufacturing 
corporations in Canada, Malaysia 
& Singapore manage their DACC 
in response to changes in the 
statutory corporate income tax 
rates. 
4.  Adhikari, 
Derashid and 
Zhang (2005) 
To investigate the link 
between effective tax 
rates (ETR) and 
earnings management 
(EM). 
Evidence that large Malaysian 
firms with low ETR decrease 
book income prior to a reduction 
in corporate tax in order to 
influence tax policy. 
5. Earnings 
Management 
and capital 
market  
Abdul Rahman 
and Abu Bakar 
(2002) 
To investigate whether 
there is any 
manipulation of 
earnings by acquiring 
firms in the period 
preceding & 
completion of 
acquisition. 
Evidence that in the year prior to 
the acquisition, acquiring firms in 
share acquisitions manage 
earnings upward. 
No evidence for cash acquisition 
firms. 
6.  Ahmad-
Zaluki, 
Campbell and 
Goodacre 
(2009) 
To investigate whether 
IPOs in Malaysia 
manage their earnings. 
General evidence of income 
increasing EM in the IPO year. 
7. Earnings 
management 
and auditor:  
Johl, Jubb and 
Houghton 
(2007) 
To examine auditor 
reporting behaviour in 
the presence of 
aggressive EM in 
Malaysia. 
Big 5 auditors in Malaysia appear 
to qualify more frequently than 
their non Big 5 counterparts when 
high levels of abnormal accruals 
are present. 
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No
. 
Studies Authors Issues (Aims/ 
Objectives) 
Key Findings 
8. Earnings 
management and 
corporate 
governance 
practices 
Abdullah and 
Mohd Nasir 
(2004) 
To investigate 
whether 
independence of 
BOD & AC able to 
constrain DACC/EM 
No significant evidence that board 
& AC independence influence the 
level of accrual mgt. 
Significant positive evidence that 
degree of dispersion of 
shareholdings affect EM. 
9.  Guan, 
Pourjalali, 
Sengupta and 
Teruya 
(2005) 
To examine the 
possible impact of 
cross country 
differences in culture 
on EM in 5 Asia 
Pacific countries. 
Cultural values positively 
associated with EM. 
Size & debt to equity ratio only 
significant after measures of 
cultural values included in the 
model. 
10.  Mohd Saleh, 
Mohd 
Iskandar and 
Rahmat 
(2005) 
To assess the 
effectiveness of BOD 
characteristics to 
monitor management 
behaviour with 
respect to their 
incentives to manage 
earnings. 
Multiple directorships factor is 
negatively related to EM only 
with negative unmanaged 
earnings. 
Independence of BOD is not 
significantly related with EM in 
firms with duality status 
11.  Abdul 
Rahman, 
Dowds and 
Cahan 
(2005) 
To investigate 
whether religious 
background has an 
influences on EM 
practices 
 
No statistical evidence that 
Muslim managers practice less 
EM than non-Muslim managers. 
12.  Aman, Mohd 
Iskandar, 
Pourjalali 
and Teruya 
(2006) 
To examine the 
reasons for earnings 
management in 
Malaysia. 
Size of the company has a 
negative relationship, and 
nominee ownership has a positive 
relationship with earnings 
management. 
13.  Mohd Saleh, 
Mohd 
Iskandar and 
Rahmat 
(2007) 
To assess the 
effectiveness of AC 
characteristics to 
monitor mgt 
behaviour with 
respect to EM. 
The presence of fully independent 
AC reduces EM practices. 
Firms with more knowledgeable 
AC members & more AC 
meetings recorded less EM 
compared with other firms. 
14.  Abdul 
Rahman and 
Mohamed 
Ali (2008) 
To investigate the 
effectiveness of 
monitoring functions 
of BODs, AC & 
concentrated 
ownership in 
reducing EM. 
EM is positively related to the 
size of BOD. 
Insignificant relationship between 
CG mechanism and EM 
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No. Studies Authors Issues (Aims/ 
Objectives) 
Key Findings 
15. Earnings 
management and 
corporate 
governance 
practices 
Hashim and 
Devi (2008b) 
To examine the 
internal governance 
mechanism and 
earnings quality. 
Positive association between 
board governance & firm specific 
expertise & EM. 
16.  Mohd Ali, 
Mohd Salleh 
and Hassan 
(2008) 
To examine the 
association between 
the level of 
managerial 
ownership and 
earnings 
management 
activities. 
Managerial ownership is 
negatively associated with the 
magnitude of accounting accruals, 
particularly in small firms. The 
firm’s size moderates the 
relationship between the level of 
executive ownership and 
discretionary accruals. 
17.  Johari, Mohd 
Saleh, Jaafar 
and Hassan 
(2008) 
To examine the roles 
of independence 
board, CEO duality, 
board competency 
and board ownership 
on earnings 
management. 
Managerial ownership more than 
25% may induce manager to 
manage earnings. CEO duality 
does not influence EM in 
Malaysia. The minimum 
composition of one-third 
independent directors is not 
adequate to monitor the 
management regarding EM. 
18.  Bukit and 
Mohd 
Iskandar 
(2009) 
To examine whether 
high surplus free 
cash flow is related 
to EM and whether 
independence AC 
provide an effective 
monitoring over EM. 
Free surplus cash flow is 
positively related to EM. More 
independent AC reduces EM. 
19.  Yang, Chun 
and 
Mohamad 
Ramadili 
(2009) 
To examine the role 
of outside directors 
and institutional 
shareholders in 
constraining the 
earnings 
management 
activities. 
Weak evidence that outside 
directors can constrain earnings 
management in the construction 
sector. 
20.  Abdul Jalil 
and Abdul 
Rahman 
(2010) 
To study the impact 
of institutional 
shareholdings on 
earnings 
management 
activities of their 
portfolio firms. 
Only Malaysia Shareholders 
Watchdog Group (MSWG) 
institutional shareholdings are 
effective in mitigating self-
serving earnings management. To 
be effective, institutional investors 
need to be involved in shareholder 
activism. 
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3.4 Studies on Earnings Management in Islamic Countries 
The research area of earnings management has drawn attention and become a popular subject 
of investigation all over the world, including Islamic countries other than Malaysia. This 
section provides the latest
18
 empirical evidence of earnings management in other Islamic 
countries, from Saudi Arabia (Al-Abbas, 1999; Al-Moghaiwli, 2010; Alwarshdeh, 2011), Iran 
(Hashemi & Rabiee, 2011; Nahandi, Baghbani & Bolouri, 2011; Roosposshti, Rahnamay & 
Nabashi Cashmi,2011; Vakili Fard, Nikoomaram, Kangarluei & Bayazidi, 2011; Kangarluei 
& Hesar, 2012), Pakistan (Ali Shah, Ali Butt & Hassan, 2009; Tahir, Muhammas Sabir & Ali 
Shah Ali, 2011; Naz, Bhatti, Ghafoor & Hussain Khan, 2011), Jordan (Al-Kabash & Al-
Thuneibat, 2009; Abed, Al-Attar & Suwaidan, 2012) Tunisia (Inaam, Khmoussi & Fatma, 
2012) Indonesia (Siregar &Utama, 2008; Muhandi, 2010; Sanjaya & Jaya, 2011; Mukti & 
Wardhani, 2012) and Bangladesh (Razzaque, Rahman & Salat, 2006). Details of the studies 
are presented in chronological order within country in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Studies on Earnings Management in Islamic Countries 
No
. 
Country Authors Issues (Aims/ 
Objectives) 
Key Findings 
1. Saudi Arabia (Al-Abbas, 
2009) 
 
To examine the 
association between 
CG mechanism & EM 
in the Saudi business 
environment. 
No evidence that CG factors 
mitigate against EM. Audit firm 
size has negative impact on EM 
[Saudi Arabia companies 2005-
2007, Discretionary current 
accruals, Teoh et al (1998)] 
2.  Al-Moghaiwli 
(2010) 
To examine the extent 
of EM by managers of 
Saudi Arabia 
companies. 
Evidence of EM in Saudi Arabia 
to avoid potential political cost. 
Companies with large assets and 
high ratio of foreign employees 
are positively related with EM. 
[Saudi Arabia companies 2005-
2007, change in acctg accruals n 
change in CF] 
3.  Alwarshdeh 
(2011) 
To examine the reason 
of widespread earnings 
management in Saudi 
Arabia stock market. 
Evidence the implementation of 
Saudization policy has negative 
effect on performance and thus 
companies increase EM. 
 
  
                                                 
18
 Most of these studies were published when this thesis was in the last stage of preparation. 
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No
. 
Country Authors Issues (Aims/ 
Objectives) 
Key Findings 
4. Iran Hashemi & 
Rabiee (2011) 
To examine the 
relationship between 
REM and AEM to 
smooth earnings in 
Iran 
Evidence of REM & AEM is 
sequential to smooth income. 
[Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE), 
2000-2010, Dechow, Kothari & 
Watts (1998), Roychowdhury 
(2006) Jones (1991), +ve AEM, -
ve REM] 
5.  Nahandi, 
Baghbani & 
Bolouri (2011) 
To examine the 
influence of BOD 
combination on EM in 
Iran 
Evidence of positive relationship 
between CEO duality & EM. 
[TSE, 2001-2008, Modified Jones 
(1995), +ve DCA] 
6.  Roosposshti, 
Rahnamay & 
Nabashi 
Chasmi (2011) 
To examine the 
association between 
CG mechanism & EM 
in Iran. 
Evidence of negative relationship 
between block holders ownership, 
board independence & EM. 
Evidence of positive relationship 
between institutional ownership, 
CEO duality, firm size & leverage 
with EM. 
[TSE, 2004-2008, Modified Jones 
(1995), +ve DCA] 
7.  Vakili Fard, 
Nikoomaram, 
Kangarluei & 
Bayazidi 
(2011) 
To examine the 
relationship between 
EM & conservatism in 
Iran. 
Evidence of income increasing 
accruals & negative relationship 
between EM & conservatism. 
Evidence of lower conservatism 
financial reporting.  
[TSE, 2003-2009, Jones (1991), -
DCA] 
8.  Kangarluei & 
Hesar (2012) 
To investigate the 
effect of conservatism 
in financial reporting 
& EM in Iran. 
Evidence that conservatism limits 
AEM, & conservatism facilitates 
REM. 
[TSE, 2002-2010, AEM Jones 
(1991) & Discretionary Current 
Accruals, REM Anderson et al 
(2003), Gunny (2005), 
Roychowdury (2003)] 
9. Pakistan Ali Shah, Ali 
Butt & Hasan 
(2009) 
To examine the 
relationship between 
quality of CG & EM in 
Pakistan. 
Evidence of positive relationship 
between quality of CG and EM. 
[Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE), 
Modified Jones (1995), 2006, +ve 
DCA] 
10.  Tahir, 
Muhammad 
Sabir & Ali 
Shah (2011) 
To identify factors 
related to EM that 
having impact on 
capital structure in 
Pakistan. 
Evidence of positive relationship 
between EM and gearing ratio, 
negative relationship between 
ROA, ROE & EM. 
[Companies listed on KSE, 2001-
2005, Modified Jones (1995), +ve 
DCA] 
11.  Naz, Bhatti, 
Ghafoor & 
Hussain Khan 
(2011) 
To investigates the 
impact of firm size & 
capital structure on 
EM in Pakistan. 
Evidence of negative relationship 
between capital structure and EM 
suggesting the use of debts as a 
tool to mitigate EM. 
[Companies listed on KSE 2006-
2010, Jones (1991)] 
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No
. 
Country Authors Issues (Aims/ 
Objectives) 
Key Findings 
12. Jordan Al-Khabash & 
Al-Thuneibat 
(2009) 
To provide evidence of 
EM from the 
perspective of external 
& internal auditors in 
Jordan 
Evidence that managers engage in 
legitimate EM in Jordan. Internal 
governance structures have a 
significant effect on illegitimate 
EM. [Questionnaires] 
13.  Abed, Al-Attar 
& Suwaidan 
(2012) 
To examines the 
relationship between 
EM & characteristics 
of CG mechanism in 
Jordan 
Evidence of negative relationship 
between board size & EM. Low 
compliance of CG regulation. 
[Amman Stock Exchange, 2006-
2009, Modified Jones (1995), +ve 
DCA] 
14. Tunisia Inaam, 
Khmoussi & 
Fatma (2012) 
To examine the effect 
of financial security 
law & audit quality on 
EM in Tunisia. 
Evidence of AEM & REAM. 
Evidence of negative relationship 
between Big4 auditors & AEM, 
positive relationship audit size 
and REM. [Tunisia Stock 
Exchange +DCA, Modified Jones 
(1991), Roychowdury (2006)] 
15. Indonesia Siregar & 
Utama (2008) 
To investigate whether 
listed companies 
conduct efficient / 
opportunistic EM. To 
examine the effect of 
ownership structure, 
firm size & CG 
practices on it 
Evidence of efficient EM.  
Positive relationship between 
family ownership & EM. 
[Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSE), 
1995-1996, 1999-2002, Jone 
(1991), Modifies Jones (1995), 
Kaszik (1999), Dechow et al. 
(2002), -ve DCA] 
16.  Muhandi 
(2010) 
To examine the effect 
of good CG practices 
on EM in Indonesia. 
Evidence of CEO duality & 
controlling shareholder has a 
positive relationship with EM. 
Income decreasing accruals to 
avoid tax. 
[Companies on JSE, 2005-2007, 
Jones (1991), -ve DCA] 
17.  Sanjaya & 
Jaya (2011) 
To investigate whether 
cash flow rights and 
leverage influence 
earnings management 
in Indonesia. 
Evidence of controlling 
shareholder manipulates earnings 
to hide the acquired private 
benefits through expropriation. 
Positive relationship between cash 
flow right leverage & EM. 
[Companies on JSE, 2001-2007, 
Kang & Shivaramakrishnan 
(1995), +ve DCA] 
18.  Mukti & 
Wardhani 
(2012) 
To examine the 
influence of CG 
mechanism & audit 
quality bon EM. In 
Indonesia 
Evidence of negative relationship 
between board commissioners & 
Big4 with EM. 
[Manufacturing companies on 
JSE, 2007-2009, Dechow & 
Dichev (2002), +ve DCA] 
19. Bangladesh Razzaque, 
Rahman & 
Salat (2006) 
To evaluate EM 
practice in textile 
sector of Bangladesh 
listed companies 
Evidence of EM practices. 
[Textile listed companies on 
Dhaka & Chittagong stock 
exchanges 1992-2002, Modified 
Jones (1995)] 
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3.5 Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance has been described as a set of mechanisms protecting investors from 
opportunistic behaviour (Denis & McConnell, 2003; Gillan, 2006; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
According to Gillan (2006) the definition of corporate governance differs depending on one’s 
view of the world, while Shleifer & Vishny (1997) define corporate governance as “the ways 
in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment”. Taking a broader perspective on the issue, Gillian and Starks (1998) define 
corporate governance as “the system of laws, rules, and factors that control operations at a 
company”.  
The basic principles of good corporate governance are to promote transparent and efficient 
markets, protect and facilitate the exercise of shareholder’s rights, ensure the equitable 
treatment of all shareholders, and ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is made on all 
material matters (Chen, Kao, Tsao, & Wu, 2007). Poor corporate governance practice in most 
Asian countries has been acknowledged as a significant contributing factor leading to the East 
Asian economic downturn and financial crisis (Kim, 1998). Besides the crisis, accounting 
scandals in Malaysia, such as Perwaja Steel in the mid 1990’s, hastened the Malaysian 
government to comprehensively review and reform corporate governance in Malaysia. The 
financial crisis and the tragic corporate scandals in the United States and Europe have led to 
several corporate governance reforms around the world and extensive research into earnings 
management and corporate governance has been conducted worldwide. 
3.6 Studies on Earnings Management and Corporate Governance 
Recent research on earnings management provides empirical evidence of corporate 
governance practices as determinants of earnings management, initiated by Beasley (1996) 
and Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney (1996). Both papers document empirical evidence that certain 
attributes of corporate governance are generally associated with earnings manipulations.  
The study by Beasley (1996) showed that the inclusion of larger proportions of outside 
members on the board of directors significantly reduces the likelihood of financial statement 
fraud, however, the presence of an audit committee does not significantly affect its likelihood. 
Additionally, as outside director ownership in the firm and outside director tenure on the 
board increase, and as the number of outside directorships in other firms held by outside 
directors decreases, the likelihood of financial statement fraud decreases (Beasley, 1996).  
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On the other hand, Dechow et al. (1996) investigated firms subject to accounting enforcement 
actions by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) for alleged violations of Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). It was found that firms manipulating earnings are 
more likely to have boards of directors dominated by management, and have a Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) simultaneously serving as Chairman of the Board.  
A relatively new area of research is the association between corporate governance and 
earnings management. A number of studies have provide empirical evidence that certain 
attributes of corporate governance are significantly related to earnings management (Bedard, 
Chtourou, & Courteau, 2004; Chtourou, Bedard, & Courteau, 2001; Chung, Firth, & Kim, 
2002; Cornett, Marcus, & Tehranian, 2008; Klein, 2002; Park & Shin, 2004; Peasnell, Pope, 
& Young, 2000; Piot & Janin, 2007; Xie et al., 2003). Most of those studies were carried out 
in developed countries such as United Kingdom and the United States and the results are 
contradictory regarding the association of corporate governance attributes with earnings 
management variables. 
Gillian (2006) provides a broad framework of corporate governance split into two 
classifications; Internal Governance and External Governance19. As claimed by Denis and 
McConnell (2003), the internal mechanisms of primary interest in many studies are the board 
of directors and the equity ownership structure of the firm while the primary external 
mechanisms are the external market for corporate control and the legal system.  
3.5.1 Internal Governance 
The internal governance structure of a firm consists of the functions and processes established 
to oversee and influence the actions of the firm’s management. There is considerable 
literature on internal corporate governance mechanisms, especially on the characteristics of 
boards of directors and earnings management, with prior studies addressing the importance of 
certain characteristics of boards of directors and audit committees in constraining earnings 
management (Beasley, 1996; Bedard et al., 2004; Dechow et al., 1996; Hutchinson, Percy, & 
Erkurtoglu, 2008; Park & Shin, 2004; Peasnell, Pope, & Young, 2005; Xie et al., 2003). The 
mechanisms that will be examined in this study are characteristics of boards of directors and 
characteristics of audit committees. 
                                                 
19
 He further divides Internal Governance into 5 basic categories; Board of Director (BOD), Managerial 
Incentives, Capital Structure, Bylaw and Charter Provisions (or anti takeover measure) and Internal Control 
Systems. The External Governance is also divided into 5 groups; Law and Regulation, Market 1 (capital market, 
corporate control market, labour market and products market), Market 2 (capital market information), Market 3 
(accounting, financial and legal services from external parties) and Private Sources of External Oversights. 
 
48 
 
3.5.1.1 Board of Directors 
Positive accounting theory, as developed by Watts and Zimmerman in the 1980’s, is based on 
the assumption that the behaviour of an individual is driven by self interest and will act in an 
opportunistic manner that will increase their wealth. Positive accounting theory highlights the 
importance of contracting costs
20
 and the roles of accounting policy choices in minimizing 
these costs. The theory argues that flexibility in choosing accounting policies leads to 
opportunistic behaviour since managers are rational and will choose accounting policies that 
are the most beneficial to their personal interest. (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986, 1990). Positive 
accounting theory also predicts that organizations will find ways and employ mechanisms to 
align the interest of managers (agents) to the interests of the owners of the firms (principal). 
On the other hand, according to agency theory, conflict of interest between managers and 
shareholders may arise due to separation of ownership and control of a firm (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shapiro, 2005). The cost of resolving 
the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders is known as agency cost and it 
includes incentives to align managers’ interests, and the monitoring cost of implementing 
control devices. Therefore, good corporate governance mechanisms play an important role in 
the alignment of the managers’ and shareholders’ interests and eliminate conflicts of interest 
between them. 
A number of research studies have identified several important characteristics of boards of 
directors such as their composition, size, duality status, expertise, number of directorships, 
ownership, remuneration, and experience, as being related to earnings management. The list 
of these governance attributes and the related studies are presented in Table 3 but, although a 
number of these document a significant association between board characteristics and 
earnings management, their results are inconclusive. Details of the results obtained are 
discussed further in the hypothesis development section of this thesis.  
  
                                                 
20
 Contracting costs consist of transaction costs, agency costs, information costs, renegotiation costs and 
bankruptcy costs. 
49 
 
Table 3: Studies on Governance Attributes and Earning Management 
Governance Attributes: 
Board of Directors 
Studies 
Independent Board Bedard et al. (2004), Cornett et al. (2008),  
Davidson et al., (2005), Ebrahim (2007), Klein (2002), Niu (2006), 
Park and Shin (2004), Peasnell, Pope, and Young (2005), 
Sireger and Utama (2008), Xie et al. (2003) 
 
Size Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali (2008); Beasley (1996), 
Ebrahim (2007), Peasnell et al. (2005), Xie et al. (2003) 
 
Duality Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali (2008), Cornett et al. (2008), 
Davidson et al. (2005), Dechow et al., (1996),  
Hashim and Devi (2008a), Mohamed Saleh et al. (2005),  
Xie et al. (2003) 
 
Expertise Hashim and Devi (2008b), Park and Shin (2004) 
 
Number of Directorship Beasley (1996), Bedard et al. (2004) 
 
Managerial Ownership Hutchinson et al. (2008); Niu (2006) 
Warfield, Wild, and Wild (1995),  
 
Remuneration Cornett et al. (2008), Gao and Shrieves (2002),  
 
3.5.1.2 Audit Committee 
The audit committee has important oversight roles in monitoring financial reporting, internal 
control and audit activities in a company. As stated in the MCCG 2000, among others, audit 
committees serve to support the oversight function of the board in several ways, providing a 
means of reviewing the company’s process for producing financial data and its internal 
control, reinforcing the independence of external auditors, and providing a forum for dialogue 
between external and internal auditors. The requirement of an audit committee and its 
composition is significant, as set out in Chapter 15, Part C on Audit Committees, of the 
Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia: 
(a) the audit committee must be composed of at least three directors; 
(b) all the audit committee must be non-executive directors, with a majority of them 
being independent directors; 
(c) at least one member must be a member of the Malaysian Institute of Accountants 
(MIA); or, if not a member, he or she must have at least 3 years’ working 
experience and have passed the examinations specified in Part 1 of the 1
st
 
Schedule of the Accountants Act 1967; or must be a member of one of the 
associations of accountants specified in Part II of the 1
st
 Schedule of the 
Accountants Act 1967. 
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In addition, the Listings Requirements sets out the minimum functions of the audit committee 
and states that the audit committee must have written terms of reference which deal with its 
authority and duties. Furthermore, in the MCCG 2000, the audit committee are encouraged to 
meet regularly to discuss and record its conclusions in discharging its duties and 
responsibilities. Although there is no specific number of meetings stated in the Code, an audit 
committee meeting should be conducted at least once a year without the presence of executive 
board members, and details of the meeting, number of meetings held a year and attendance of 
each director, must be disclosed.  
The composition of audit committees in terms of their size, independence, expertise and 
number of meetings has been emphasised in the Listing Requirements and the MCCG 2000 in 
order to ensure effective performance of authority and duties. Prior literature indicates that the 
effectiveness of audit committees is dependent, in part, on several characteristics such as; size 
(Davidson et al., 2005; Lin, Li, & Yang, 2006; Xie et al., 2003), independence (Bradbury, 
Mak, & Tan, 2006; Ebrahim, 2007; Peasnell et al., 2005), number of meetings (Mohd Saleh et 
al., 2007), and expertise (Abbott, Parker, & Peter, 2004; Bedard et al., 2004). Nevertheless, 
they provide inconclusive results regarding the relationship of audit committee characteristics 
and earnings management. On top of internal governance mechanisms, external governance 
mechanisms have also received attention from many studies and are discussed in the 
following section. 
3.5.2 External Governance 
Studies at country level (Johnson, Boone, Breach, & Friedman, 2000; La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000; Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003) provide empirical 
evidence that legal system is one of the most significant external governance mechanisms. 
These studies provide evidence that better corporate governance practices that provide strong 
investor protection are associated with lower levels of earnings management. One significant 
mechanism of external corporate governance is institutional investors. Institutional investors 
have the opportunity and ability to monitor, discipline, and influence managers of firms 
(Monks & Minow, 1995) and a growing body of research has examined the relationship of 
institutional investors with earnings management (Chung et al., 2002; Chung, Firth, & Kim, 
2005; Dechow et al., 1996; Koh, 2003; Rajgopal & Venkatachalam, 1997; Zhong, Gribbin, & 
Zheng, 2007). In the study of firms subject to enforcement action by the SEC, Dechow et al. 
(1996) provide evidence that the presence of large block holders has been found to mitigate 
managerial incentives to report aggressively.  
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In addition, institutional investors have economic incentives to engage in governing a firm by 
monitoring managers and constraining them from engaging in accrual manipulation (Rajgopal 
& Venkatachalam, 1997) and their presence is shown to play an active role in monitoring and 
curtailing the opportunistic behaviour of managers (Chung et al., 2002). Institutional investors 
act to deter positive earnings management when surplus free cash flow is high, but, when 
there is no surplus free cash flow, they do not constrain earnings management (Chung et al., 
2005). They are able to effectively monitor and influence the actions of management, 
especially regarding earnings management, because they have the resources, expertise and 
power (Chung et al., 2002). 
On the other hand, there is evidence that outside blockholder ownership is positively 
associated with earnings management for firms that face declining pre-managed earnings. 
Outside blockholders, therefore, are claimed as ineffective monitors of earnings management 
(Zhong et al., 2007). In conclusion, prior studies prove inconclusive regarding an association 
between the internal governance mechanism (board of director and audit committee) and the 
external governance mechanism (institutional investors). This study will therefore focus on 
the relationship between the characteristics of the board of directors, the characteristics of the 
audit committee, institutional investors, and earnings management.  
3.7 Studies on Shariah-approved Companies in Malaysia 
The listed companies on Bursa Malaysia are classified as Shariah-approved companies and 
non-Shariah approved companies, based on a set of Islamic criteria promulgated by the 
Shariah Advisory Council of the Malaysian Securities Commission. The Islamic criteria were 
first introduced in order to accommodate for the emergence of the Islamic Capital Market and 
to provide guidance, especially for Muslim investors, regarding permissible securities from 
the Shariah point of view (Securities Commission, 2007c). In addition, one of the main 
objectives of  the Malaysian Capital Market Master plan is to position Malaysia as an 
international hub for the Islamic capital market (Securities Commission, 2001a), with number 
of strategic initiatives towards achieving this objective outlined in the Master Plan21.  The 
success of the government’s efforts has been studied by Mohd Yusof and Abd. Majid (2008) 
whose main objective is to evaluate the dynamic effects of both Islamic and conventional 
                                                 
21
 The strategic initiatives were outlined as follows: 
 Facilitate the development of various competitive products and services related to the Islamic capital 
market; 
 Create an independent market to mobilize Islamic funds effectively; 
 Ensure an appropriate and comprehensive accounting, tax and regulatory framework; and 
 Enhance the international recognition of the Malaysian Islamic capital market. 
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stock markets on foreign portfolio investment. The findings of their study indicate that both 
the conventional and Islamic securities markets in Malaysia are significant in attracting such 
investment, implying that the government’s effort in promoting Malaysia as the international 
hub for the Islamic capital market has been successful. 
Using a sample of Shariah-approved companies, Anuar, Sulaiman and Nik Ahmad (2004) 
examined the extent of environmental reporting by Shariah-approved companies in Malaysia, 
concluding that Shariah-approved companies have a higher level of environmental disclosure 
compared to non-Shariah approved companies. They suggest that the higher extent of 
environmental disclosure may reflect an attempt to embody the Islamic principle of full 
disclosure and social accountability. 
In considering the investors demand for information with which to analyse companies’ 
performance and accumulate of wealth in accordance to Shariah law, Mohd Dali, Mudasir and 
Abdul Hamid (2008) employed a sample of Malaysian Shariah-approved companies in the 
plantation industry in their study. They established a new instrument and model using 
multiple discriminant analysis to distinguish between performing and under-performing 
companies and claimed that their model offers higher accuracy and flexibility as it does not 
depend on just one variable by which investors evaluate and select their optimal investment 
portfolio. 
In addition, Ousama and Fatima (2010) investigated the extent of voluntary disclosure (i.e. 
overall, conventional and Islamic disclosure) in the annual reports of Shariah-approved 
companies listed on Bursa Malaysia. They document unpredicted evidence that Shariah-
approved companies still lack voluntary disclosure, especially for the Islamic Disclosure
22
 
items.  
Another study by Othman, Md Thani and Ghani (2009) examines whether there is any 
relationship between Shariah-approved companies’ characteristics and Islamic Social 
Reporting
23
. They reveal that company size, profitability and the number of Muslim directors 
in the board are statistically significant with the level of Islamic Social Reporting. 
A comparison study between the KLSE Islamic Index and Dow Jones Islamic Market Index 
was conducted by Abdul Rahman, Yahya and Mohd Nasir (2010) in screening for permissible 
                                                 
22
Islamic Disclosure items in their study include information about Zakat, current value balance sheet (CVBS), 
Shariah compliance, prohibited activities or transactions etc. Zakat is a levy on Muslims whose wealth exceeds a 
certain specified minimum (Sulaiman, 1998) 
23
 Islamic Social Reporting is an extension of social reporting which encompasses a broader expectation of the 
society with regard to companies’ roles in the economy including a spiritual perspective (Haniffa, 2002) 
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companies for investment purposes. The study examined two controversial criteria, 
companies’ debt level and liquidity level, and revealed that the KLSE Shariah Index does not 
use both criteria set by the DJIM during the screening process. They assert that the main 
reason for the difference is due to micro-factors faced by Malaysian companies, such as 
limited capital resources, and suggest efforts should be made by regulators in the respective 
countries to harmonise the differing criteria used.  
To date, several studies have been conducted on the performance and financial reporting of 
Shariah-approved companies, nevertheless, little research has been conducted on Shariah-
approved companies in relation to earnings management. This study makes a unique 
contribution, and will extend this line of research.  
3.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented the relevant literature regarding earnings management and corporate 
governance. The chapter also specifically reviewed and discussed the relevant characteristics 
of boards of directors and audit committees in relation to earnings management. In addition, 
previous literature on Shariah-approved companies in Malaysia and other Islamic countries 
are presented. Having presented the relevant literature in relation to earnings management and 
corporate governance, the following chapter will present the testable hypotheses development 
of this study. 
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     Chapter 4 
Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses Development 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the testable hypothesis development of this thesis. Section 4.1 presents 
the theoretical framework for earnings management. Section 4.2 develops the basic 
hypothesis regarding earnings management of Malaysian Shariah-approved companies. This 
is followed by Section 4.3 that develops hypotheses related to various aspects of corporate 
governance practices in relation to earnings management, such as the characteristics of boards 
of directors, audit committees, and institutional investors. Finally, Section 4.4 focuses on 
testable hypotheses related to a firm’s specific characteristics. The chapter ends in Section 4.5 
with a summary. 
4.1 Theoretical Framework for Earnings Management 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) , an agency relationship is a contract under which 
principals (shareholders) engage agents (managers) to perform some service on their behalf 
which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent. The agent, therefore, 
has more knowledge about the company, especially on the company’s internal information, 
than the principal. This condition is known as asymmetric information, which gives incentives 
to managers towards earnings management, achieving opportunistic goals instead of 
maximizing shareholders wealth.  
The agent may not act in the best interest of the principal, or may act partially in the best 
interest of the principal (Mallin, 2007). Therefore, an agency problem arises when there is 
divergence of interest between principal and agent. When the goals and risk preference 
between two parties differ, the agent may not always take actions that are in the best interest 
of the principal. Indeed, agency theory suggests that, under these conditions, the agent will 
make decisions that maximize their self-interest rather than maximize the principal’s goals. 
Examples of managerial goals are to increase corporate wealth, growth and size and may not 
necessarily be the same as increased shareholders wealth (Ross, Westerfield, & Jaffe, 2008). 
Managerial goals may be expensive perquisites, survival and independence while the main 
objective of shareholders is the maximizing of their wealth through high dividend payments 
and capital gain when the share prices increase (Ross et al., 2008). 
55 
 
However, shareholders may devise a contract that aligns the incentives of the managers with 
the goals of the shareholders, allowing shareholders to subsequently monitor the managers’ 
behaviour. Such contracts, however, incur costs known as agency costs. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) classified agency costs into three categories: 
i) Monitoring cost- cost to limit divergences of the agent, which includes proper 
accounting procedures, establishing budgets and limits on expenditure. 
ii) Bonding cost – cost that aligns the agent’s interest with the principal’s interest, 
including a compensation or reward structure to guarantee that the agent will not 
take certain actions which may not be in the best interest of the principal. 
iii) Residual loss - all cost incurred besides monitoring and bonding costs as a result of 
non-alignment of the interests of agent and principal.  
Previous literature, as discussed in Chapter 3, provides evidence of opportunistic earnings 
management, driven by; capital market motivation (Ahorany et al., 1993; Erickson & Wang, 
1999; Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Shivakumar, 2000), contractual motivations (Bergstresser & 
Philippon, 2006; DeAngelo et al., 1994; DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Gaver et al., 1995; 
Sweeney, 1994) and political motivations (Han & Wang, 1998; Jones, 1991; Magnan et al., 
1999; Navissi, 1999; Stammerjohan & Hall, 2003). Basically, the objectives behind these 
motivations are: to report reasonable profit or avoid losses, to obtain bank loans and avoid 
debt covenant violation, to increase share prices, and to avoid regulatory actions.  
Due to the separation of ownership and control, and different levels of risk preference, agency 
theory expects managers to pursue their own interests and goals. The accounting system 
provides discretion for managers to manage earnings through accounting choices and 
estimates, with more opportunistic behaviour possible via accruals earnings management. 
Such management happens when managers manipulate reported earnings by exploiting 
accounting discretion, which is allowed under GAAP. The perspective of opportunistic 
behaviour takes the view that managers take advantage of the agency problem and the 
asymmetric information thus arising to maximise their personal gain. 
However, good corporate governance practices provide mechanisms that can align the 
interests of managers and shareholders and thus reduce agency costs and earnings 
management, as well as opportunistic behaviour. Furthermore, Shariah or Islamic law 
emphasizes accountability, transparency, honesty and integrity in everyday activities; that 
includes personal or business activities. Therefore, corporate governance and Shariah law 
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should lead towards better financial reporting and internal control and mitigate opportunistic 
behaviour such as earnings management. 
Using agency theory as a basis for explaining earnings management behaviour, the following 
sections develop hypotheses regarding earnings management in Shariah-approved companies 
in the Malaysian context. This is followed by another section that develops hypotheses related 
to various aspects of corporate governance practices, and firms’ characteristics in relation to 
earnings management. 
4.2 Earnings Management in Malaysian Shariah-approved 
Companies 
Prior research investigates and provides evidence on earnings management by Malaysian 
listed companies from many aspects. For example, Mohd Saleh and Ahmed (2005), and 
Ahmed et al. (2008) investigate debt renegotiation; Roubi and Richardson (1998), and 
Adhikari et al. (2005) investigate reduction in corporate tax rates; Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2009) 
study initial public offerings, and Johl et al. (2007) study audit opinions. The association of 
several corporate governance practices with earnings management was investigated in 
research undertaken by Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali (2008), Abdullah and Mohd Nasir 
(2004), and Mohd Saleh et al. (2007).  
All these studies have been carried out to investigate earnings management by listed 
companies on the Main Board or by all listed companies on Bursa Malaysia in general. 
However, little research has been done on the influence of Shariah law on earnings 
management. The Islamic law requires accountability, transparency, justice, and honesty in all 
business transactions and prohibits opportunistic behaviour. As defined by Healy and Wahlen 
(1999), earnings management reflects opportunistic behaviour by management, hence, in 
Islam, it is prohibited. However, in a different socio-economic environment, Ali Shah et al. 
(2009) obtained evidence of earnings management in the mainly Islamic Pakistani capital 
market. Therefore, the following null hypothesis is proposed:  
H01: Malaysian Shariah-approved companies do not manage their reported earnings. 
On the assumption that H01 is rejected, in other words, Shariah-approved companies do 
manage their earnings, further hypotheses will be developed to explore the association 
between earnings management and (i) selected corporate governance practices and (ii) 
characteristics of Shariah-approved companies. 
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The following section presents discussion on several factors of earnings management and 
develops hypotheses related to various aspects of corporate governance practices in relation to 
earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies. 
4.3 Determinants of Earnings Management in Malaysian Shariah-
approved companies  
Several factors will be examined in relation to earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-
approved companies. The corporate governance practices to be studied are the characteristics 
of the boards of directors, the audit committee, and institutional investors. Firm specific 
characteristics such as size, leverage, growth, profitability and industry will also be studied to 
determine if they are factors.  
4.2.1 Boards of Directors 
Boards of directors and managers are required by the Malaysian Companies Act (1965) 
section 167, “to properly keep accounting and other records to enable a true and fair profit 
and loss account and balance sheet to be prepared from time to time”. These requirements 
reflect the important role that the board has in determining the content of a firm’s financial 
reports. 
According to Fama and Jensen (1983), another important role of the board of directors is to 
eliminate conflicts of interest between principal and agents. Conflicts exist when the principal 
(shareholders) wish to achieve maximum wealth, while their agents (top managers) prefer to 
pursue their own objectives in order to maximize their compensation, wealth and/or rewards. 
Consequently, an effective board would play a monitoring role to ensure that management 
acts in the interest of the shareholders, thereby reducing the agency costs. The effectiveness of 
the board of directors should be reflected in its characteristics such as independent 
membership, size, share ownership, expertise, number of directorships held, duality status of 
CEO, and experience. These characteristics, with related hypotheses, are explained in the 
following sections. 
i) Board Independence 
Fama and Jensen (1983) state that board independence can be achieved through the inclusion 
of outside directors. In order to develop their reputations as expert decision makers, outside 
directors have more incentives to effectively monitor top management. In Malaysia, the Bursa 
Malaysia Revamped Listing Requirement (2001) states that all Malaysian listed companies 
must ensure that at least one third of their board of directors consists of independent non-
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executive directors, thus enhancing board independence. As defined by Bursa Malaysia, an 
independent director is a director who “is independent of the management and free from any 
business or other relationship which could interfere with the exercise of the independent 
judgment or the ability to act in the best interest of the stakeholders”. 
A number of studies have reported a link between a higher proportion of independent non-
executive directors and financial reporting quality. Beasley (1996) and Dechow et al. (1996) 
found that the proportion of independent directors on the board is negatively associated with 
the likelihood of financial statement fraud, suggesting that independent directors enhance a 
board’s ability to properly execute its oversight function. Several studies have found that 
outside directors are negatively associated with earnings management (Bedard et al., 2004; 
Cornett et al., 2008; Davidson et al., 2005; Ebrahim, 2007; Klein, 2002; Mulgrew & Forker, 
2006; Niu, 2006; Peasnell et al., 2005; Xie et al., 2003) 
However, not all research has found an association between this characteristic and earnings 
management. A Canadian study by Park and Shin (2004) and an Indonesian study by Sireger 
and Utama (2008) found no significant association between board composition and earnings 
management. Studies in Malaysia by Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali (2008), Abdullah and 
Mohd Nasir (2004), and Mohd Saleh et al. (2005) also show an insignificant relationship 
between board independence and earnings management while a more recent study by Hashim 
and Devi (2008b) found a slightly significant but contrary relationship between board 
independence and earnings management in Malaysia. Because of these conflicting results, it is 
hypothesized that: 
H02: There is no relationship between the proportion of independent directors and 
earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies. 
ii) Board Size  
The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 2000 states that the “optimum number of 
board members should be appropriately determined by the whole board to ensure that there 
are enough members to discharge their responsibilities”. Pierce and Zahra (1992) suggest 
that there is a relationship between size of the board and firm performance, with Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and Yermack (1996) further claiming that smaller boards are more effective 
because they have less difficulty coordinating their efforts. However, larger boards are also 
claimed to have better access to information and better overall expertise compared to a 
smaller board. Ebrahim (2007), Peasnell et al. (2005) and Xie et al. (2003) find that having a 
larger board is associated with less earnings management, with Xie et al. (2003) arguing that 
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larger boards bring together a greater number of experienced directors and the resulting 
combined expertise plays a role in limiting earnings management. 
Conversely, Beasley (1996) finds that as board size increases, the likelihood of financial 
statement fraud also increases, hence smaller boards provide more of a controlling function 
than do larger boards. Similarly, in Malaysia, Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali (2008) reveal 
that earnings management is positively related to size of the board of directors. They claim 
that larger boards appear to be ineffective in their oversight duties relative to smaller boards, 
but, Cornett et al. (2008) find no significant relationship between board size and earnings 
management. Due to these conflicting results, it is hypothesised that: 
H03: There is no relationship between board size and earnings management in 
Malaysian Shariah-approved companies. 
iii) Chief Executive Officer (CEO) duality 
CEO duality occurs when one person assumes two roles, namely CEO and chairman of the 
board (Booth, Cornett, & Tehranian, 2002; Gul & Leung, 2004; Ho & Wong, 2001). 
According to Fama and Jensen (1983), Jensen (1993) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) agency 
theory suggests that the separation of duties leads to efficient monitoring of board processes. 
Finkelstein and D’Aveni (1994) claim that without the separation of  the chairman and CEO 
roles, the monitoring function of the board over earnings management may be jeopardized 
since the CEO has more discretion to manipulate financial reports.  
Accordingly, the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 2000 recommends that the role of 
the chairman be separated from the role of the CEO in order to facilitate better corporate 
governance. When the monitoring role (i.e. the board chairman) and implementation role (i.e. 
the CEO) are vested in a single person, the monitoring role of the board could be severely 
impaired (2004). Dechow et al. (1996) provide evidence that firms whose CEO chairs the 
board of directors are more likely to be subject to accounting enforcement actions by the SEC 
for alleged violations of GAAP. In contrast, however, Cornett et al., (2008), Xie et al. (2003) 
and Davidson et al. (2005) find that CEO duality is unrelated to earnings management.  
In the Malaysian context, Mohd Saleh et al. (2005) finds that earnings management is 
positively related to the existence of CEO-chairman duality, however, Abdul Rahman and 
Mohamed Ali (2008) fail to identify any significant relationship between earnings 
management and the duality role, stating that separating the roles of the CEO and chairman 
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has no effective monitoring function in curbing earnings management. Accordingly, it is 
hypothesised that: 
H04: There is no relationship between CEO duality and earnings management in 
Malaysian Shariah- approved companies. 
iv) Board Expertise 
Having a corporate and financial background is essential for directors to be effective in 
monitoring a firm, especially in issues that relate to financial reporting as they have better 
understanding of earnings manipulation (Xie et al., 2003). In their study, they find that boards 
of directors with a corporate background, who are more likely to be financially sophisticated, 
are negatively related to the level of earnings management. Park and Shin (2004) further find 
that directors from financial intermediaries, who are financially sophisticated, improve the 
monitoring of abnormal accruals activity and help the board reduce earnings management. In 
Malaysia, Hashim and Devi (2008b) find no significant association between the financial 
expertise of the entire board and earnings quality and  suggest that the reason for this is the 
dominance of inside directors who are not financially literate. Due to limited evidence from 
prior studies related to board expertise and earnings management, it is hypothesized as null 
that: 
H05: There is no relationship between the financial expertise of the board and earnings 
management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies. 
v) Multiple Directorships 
Economic theory suggests that the desire to establish a favourable reputation in the labour 
market is one of the main motivating factors for directors to act in the interest of shareholders 
(Peasnell, Pope, & Young, 1999). The composition of the board of directors is an important 
factor in creating an effective monitor of management actions (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Additional outside directorships held by a director serves as a measure of that director’s 
reputation as it not only signals outside directorial competence to the managerial labour 
market, but also provides them a platform to gain governance expertise and knowledge of best 
board practices (Bedard et al., 2004). However, if the number of other directorships is large, it 
may reduce the time that can be devoted to any particular firm, thus decreasing the notion of 
governing effectiveness (Bedard et al., 2004; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988). 
Consequently, Bedard et al. (2004) claim that additional directorships may improve 
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effectiveness up to a point but, beyond that point, the committee may be penalized because of 
the time and effort absorbed by other directorship commitments. 
In addition, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) state that cross-directorships help the directors to be 
more transparent in making decisions as they can make comparisons based on their 
knowledge of the best board practices that have been gained from other firms. The study by 
Bedard et al. (2004) finds that the greater the additional number of directorships held by board 
members, the lower the likelihood of earnings management by the firm. Conversely, Beasley 
(1996) finds a positive relationship between additional directorships and the likelihood of 
financial statement fraud, claiming that holding more directorship responsibilities will distract 
those directors from their monitoring responsibilities.  
Practice Note 13 (PN 13) was issued by the Bursa Malaysia in 2002, which states the 
maximum number of directors as ten in public listed companies and fifteen in private limited 
firms. Mohd Saleh et al. (2005) find that the experience of directors with multiple 
directorships only plays an active role in mitigating earnings management in firms that 
recorded decreasing income. Based on the above arguments and conflicting findings, this 
study hypothesises that: 
H06: There is no relationship between multiple directorships and earnings management 
in Malaysian Shariah- approved companies. 
vi) Percentage of Managerial Ownership 
According to agency theory, increasing the level of executive share ownership might reduce 
the amount of owner/manager conflict, leading to a clearer alignment of the goals of 
management and shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Consistent with this theory, 
Warfield et al. (1995) provide evidence that the magnitude of discretionary accruals is 
inversely related to managerial ownership. They interpret their results as being consistent with 
the belief that managerial shareholdings act as a disciplining mechanism in constraining 
managers from pursuing their own objective instead of maximizing shareholders wealth. In 
addition, Niu (2006) find managerial ownership negatively related to earnings management 
and suggest that this factor may be effective in monitoring managerial opportunism. 
Nevertheless, Hutchinson et al. (2008) find evidence that increasing executive share 
ownership provides incentives to manipulate earnings, regardless of governance reforms in 
Australia. They suggest that there should be limitations placed on the level of executive 
director ownership to mitigate the incentive to manipulate earnings. However, in Malaysia, 
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the results by Mohd Ali et al. (2008) provide evidence that managerial ownership is found to 
be an effective monitoring mechanism, particularly in small firms. Although Johari et al. 
(2008) provide evidence that managerial ownership is positively related to earnings 
management in Malaysia, and claim that excessive managerial ownership may induce 
managers to act opportunistically. Furthermore, Aman et al. (2006) provide insignificant 
evidence of a relationship between managerial ownership and earnings management in 
Malaysia, thus  it is hypothesized that: 
H07: There is no relationship between the percentage of managerial ownership and 
earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies. 
vii) Directors Remuneration 
The principles of best practice in the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (2000) 
provide for sufficient directors’ remuneration in order to attract and retain them and run the 
company successfully. In addition, listed companies are required to report details of the 
remuneration of each director in their annual report.  
Agency theory predicts that management compensation should be positively correlated with 
firm performance as performance related compensation could eliminate or minimize the 
agency cost associated with divergent managerial and shareholder interests.  
Gao and Shrieves (2002) investigate how components of compensation influence earnings 
management behaviour, with their results showing the existence of stock options and bonuses 
are positively related to earnings management, whereas salaries are negatively related. The 
study by Cornett et al. (2008) provides further evidence that options compensation strongly 
encourages earnings management, where the quality of reported earnings degrades 
dramatically with options compensation. These results are consistent with the hypothesis 
developed by Healy in 1985 that managers have incentives to use discretionary accruals to 
maximize bonus plan awards. 
The null hypothesis is thus: 
H08: There is no relationship between directors’ remuneration and earnings 
management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies 
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ix) Malay Directors 
The population of Malaysia consists of many ethnic groups
24
, with Malay and other 
indigenous people, known as Malay or Bumiputra, “sons of the soils”, as the largest group in 
the population. The Federal Constitution of Malaysia: Article 160 defines Malay as a 
Malaysian citizen born to be a Malaysian citizen who professes to be a Muslim. Therefore, 
Islam is the largest practised religion in Malaysia. 
This study used the ethnic Malay to represent people who are followers of Islam thus their 
behaviour should reflect the tenets of Islam. It examines whether or not the religious 
background of boards of directors, represented by the number of Malay directors, has an 
influence on earnings management. For the purpose of this study, Malay names are 
interpreted as an indicator of whether person is Muslim as the religion of directors is not 
directly disclosed in the annual reports. It is believed that the higher the proportion
25
 of 
Muslim directors, the more likely their behaving in accordance with the tenet of Islam, such 
behaviour being reflected in the company behaviour and action. The structure of Malay names 
is unique and consists of a personal name, followed by ‘bin’ (son of) or ‘binti’ (daughter of), 
and their father’s name. For example: Azhar bin Ahmad for men, and Alia binti Ali for 
women. For other ethnic groups and non-Muslim
26
 the structure of their names is different, 
using either their father’s name or surname as part of their personal name. The use of Malay 
names, however, may not capture everybody who is a follower of Islam, as there is the 
possibility that people who are not named traditionally could be of Muslim faith. Such board 
members could have yet more influence, which would strengthen the result rather than 
weaken it. 
The mixture of non-Malay directors on the board, who are assumed to be non-Muslim, will 
provide evidence of how religious background influences earnings management. Prior 
research posits that religiosity is associated with fewer incidences of financial reporting 
irregularities, i.e. earnings management (Dyreng, Mayew, & Williams, 2010; Grullon, 
Kanatas, & Weston, 2010; McGuire, Omer, & Sharp, 2012). Using sample companies in the 
                                                 
24
 In 2010, Malays make up 50.4% of the population, followed by Chinese 23.7%, Indian 7.1%, and  indigenous 
11% (refer to Department of Statistics Malaysia at www.statistics.gov.my) 
25
 The proportion used in this study is almost the same as the consolidation situation: less than 50% - 
shareholders have significant control, more than 50% - shareholders have absolute control. 
26
 For the other major ethnic groups: Chinese – their name would normally have three words, for example Tan 
Mei Ling, the first word being the surname and the other two words their personal name. As for Indian – their 
name consists of a personal name, followed by ‘anak lelaki’ (son of) or ‘anak perempuan’ (daughter of), 
followed by their father’s name, for example Ramasamy a/l Muthusamy. For other indigenous groups in Sabah 
and Sarawak, many of them use the word ‘anak’ (child of) after their personal name followed by their father’s 
name, for example Aziz anak Ramlan. 
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U.S., their results suggest that firms headquartered in areas with strong religious social norms 
generally experience lower incidences of financial reporting. Therefore, McGuire et al. 
(2012), Dyreng et al. (2010) and (Grullon et al., 2010) claim that religious social norms act as 
an alternative monitoring mechanism over corporate financial reporting irregularities. On the 
other hand, in a cross-country analysis, Callen, Morel and Richardson (2011) find no 
significant evidence of a relationship between religion and earnings management but provide 
significant evidence that earnings management is associated with cultural values, as defined 
by Hofstede (1980, 1991). Callen et al. (2011), believe that religious denomination and 
religiosity does matter but are subsumed by other cultural variables. 
Other studies have also shown various aspects of culture and cultural differences to influence 
business practices, organizations, accounting disclosure practices, audit services and 
governance structures such as (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Desender, Castro, & De 
Leon, 2011; Guan et al., 2005; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Hofstede, 1980; Yatim, Kent, & 
Clarkson, 2006).  
In their study, Guan et al. (2005) examine the possible impact of cross-country differences in 
culture on earnings management in five Asia Pacific countries
27
: Australia, Japan, Hong 
Kong, Malaysia and Singapore. Their result provides an additional explanation for differences 
observed in different countries in respect of earnings management, namely cultural values. 
One cultural factor, ethnicity of directors, has been found to be significantly associated with 
the extent of voluntary disclosure by Malaysian listed companies (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). 
The reason for higher voluntary disclosure in firms dominated by Malay directors, who are 
Muslim, is suggested to be due to Muslim directors, attributed with Islamic business ethics 
which encourage transparency in business (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). As discussed in Chapter 
One, in addition to transparency, the Islamic law emphasises accountability, honestly and 
fairness in business activities. Transactions which are unclear, unfair, unjust, opportunistic or 
fraudulent are prohibited in Islam, therefore, Muslim directors should not practice earnings 
management since it is not in accord with Islam. However, Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali 
(2008) find insufficient evidence regarding the presence of Malay directors on the board and 
audit committee influencing the detection of earnings management in Malaysia. In addition, 
Abdul Rahman et al. (2005) find no significant evidence that Muslim directors practice less 
earnings management than non-Muslim directors. This leads to the following null hypothesis: 
                                                 
27
 It is claimed in their study that Asia Pacific countries have significantly different socio/economic/cultural and 
institutional environments from those of the western countries and therefore provide a suitable setting in which 
to examine the effect of cultural differences. 
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H09: There is no relationship between the proportion of Malay directors and earnings 
management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies. 
4.2.2 Audit Committee 
The audit committee specialises in monitoring the financial reporting and audit activities. The 
greatest protection for shareholders in monitoring the financial discretion of management and 
maintaining the credibility of firm’s financial statement is likely to be provided by the audit 
committee (Davidson et al., 2005). Several studies provide evidence regarding the 
characteristics of audit committees as best governance practice in financial reporting 
(Beasley, 1996; Bedard et al., 2004; Dechow et al., 1996; Ebrahim, 2007; Xie et al., 2003),  
however, Peasnell et al. (2005) find insufficient evidence regarding the effectiveness of the 
audit committee in reducing the level of earnings management. Several characteristics such as 
size, independence, number of meetings, and expertise of audit committees are considered 
significant in their governance role so hypotheses related to characteristics of audit 
committees are presented as follows.  
i) Audit Committee Size 
The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 2000 requires that the board should establish 
an audit committee that comprises of at least three directors. Davidson et al. (2005) and Xie et 
al. (2003) find that size of audit committee is insignificantly related to earnings management. 
Similarly, Mohd Saleh et al. (2007) failed to show a significant relationship between audit 
committee size and the occurrence of earnings management in Malaysia. The hypothesis 
which relates audit committee size and earnings management is therefore set as follows: 
H010: There is no relationship between audit committee size and earnings management 
in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies. 
ii) Audit Committee Independence 
One of the essential qualities for an audit committee to fulfil its oversight role is independence 
and the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 2000 required that the majority of the audit 
committee be independent directors. However, the revised Code in 2007 strengthens the role 
of audit committees by requiring that they be fully comprised of non-executive directors. 
Consistent with Klien (2002), Davidson et al. (2005) finds a majority of independent directors 
on the audit committee is related to a reduction in earnings management, but that an entirely 
independent committee has no meaningful relation with earnings management. On the other 
66 
 
hand, Mohd Saleh et al. (2007) find evidence that the presence of a fully (100 percent) 
independent audit committee reduces earnings management. While Abdul Rahman and 
Mohamed Ali (2008) obtain insufficient evidence of a relationship between proportions of 
independent directors on the audit committee and earnings management. They deduce that the 
establishment of an audit committee in listed companies in Malaysia has yet to achieve 
success in its monitoring role. Thus, it is hypothesized that: 
H011: There is no relationship between the proportion of independent directors on the 
audit committee and earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-approved 
companies. 
iii) Audit Committee Meeting 
Prior research suggests that an audit committee that meets frequently can reduce the incidence 
of financial reporting problems. Vafeas (2005) demonstrated that an audit committee that 
meets frequently improves monitoring, thereby leading to financial reports of better quality. 
Furthermore, Xie et al. (2003) find that the number of board and audit committee meetings is 
negatively related to earnings management, which means the larger the number of audit 
committee meeting, the lower the earnings management. They claimed that both boards of 
directors and audit committees that meet often should be able to devote more time to issues 
such as earnings management while boards that seldom meet may not focus on these issues 
and may perhaps only rubber-stamp management plans. Menon and Williams (1994) argue 
that the number of audit committee meetings does not provide any indication of the extent of 
work accomplished during the meeting. They also note, however, that an audit committee that 
does not meet or meets infrequently is less likely to be a good monitor. No significant 
relationship between the frequency of audit committee meetings and the likelihood of 
earnings management is found by Bedard et al. (2004).  
The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 2000 states that, as best practice, an audit 
committee should meet at least once a year without the presence of executive board members, 
however, the total number of meetings depends on the company’s terms of reference and the 
complexity of the company’s operations. A more active audit committee is expected to 
provide an effective monitoring mechanism, therefore, the revised Code of 2007 recommends 
that the audit committee should meet with the external auditors without executive board 
members present at least twice a year. 
In Malaysia, Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali (2008) failed to find any significant 
association between the frequency of audit committee meetings and the incidence of earnings 
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management. However, further analysis by Mohd Saleh et al. (2007) provides evidence that 
firms which have high proportions of knowledgeable audit committee members and 
conducted more audit committee meetings recorded less earnings management (Mohd Saleh 
et al., 2007). 
Based on the above arguments and findings, it is hypothesized that: 
H012: There is no relationship between the frequency of meeting of audit committees 
and earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies. 
iv) Audit Committee Expertise 
A strong knowledge of accounting is essential for members of the audit committees, since 
their duty is to review financial statements with respect to accounting policies, compliance 
with accounting standards, and the going concern assumption. The Bursa Malaysia listing 
requirement necessitates that one of the committee members has to have adequate knowledge 
of accounting, business and finance. In order to ensure that the audit committees will be able 
to effectively discharge their functions, the revised Code requires all members to be 
financially literate and able to read, analyse and interpret financial statements. In addition, the 
Code also notes at least one member should be a member of an accounting association or 
accounting professional body as this will assist them to understand and interpret financial 
statements and play their role in effectively monitoring the company’s internal control 
systems and financial reporting.  
Abbott et al. (2004) find a significantly negative association between an audit committee 
having at least one member with financial expertise and the incidence of financial 
restatement. Similarly, Bedard et al. (2004) provide evidence that the presence of a financial 
expert on the audit committee is negatively related to the likelihood of earnings management. 
However, Xie et al. (2003) discover that the percentage of outside members of audit 
committees from legal backgrounds and commercial banks is unrelated to earnings 
management but having members from investment banks is significantly related to earnings 
management. Strangely, it is generally held that the presence of investment bankers on an 
auditing committee improves its monitoring function.  
The Malaysian evidence from Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali (2008), shows that the 
competency of audit committees is not significantly related to earnings management and state 
that the formation of audit committees in Malaysia is still not effective in restraining earnings 
management. In their study, Mohd Saleh et al. (2007) indicate that more members of an audit 
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committee having accounting knowledge is not associated with lower earnings management. 
Hence, it is hypothesised that: 
H013: There is no relationship between the financial expertise of the audit committee 
and earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies. 
v) Malay members on the Audit Committee 
The formation of an audit committee has the main objective of monitoring the financial 
reporting and auditing process. They should provide good governance to ensure true and fair 
views in financial reporting and deter any misstatement or manipulation of financial 
statements presented. In addition, as discussed in Chapter One (paragraph 1.2 Background of 
the Study) and Chapter Four (paragraph 4.2.1 Malay Directors), earnings management is 
prohibited in Islam, therefore, Muslim audit committees in Malaysia should follow the tenets 
of Islam  which should put them in a stronger position to limit  opportunistic earnings 
management. Consistent with Malay Directors, this study uses Malay names as a surrogate for 
the religious background of the members of an audit committee, and the proportion of Malay 
is used to represent the level of Muslim influence on the committee. The higher the proportion 
of Malay directors on the audit committee, the more likely the influence in accordance with 
Islamic principles should be, with their behaviour reflected in the company’s behaviour and 
action. 
The findings of prior research provide evidence that religiosity is associated with fewer 
incidences of earnings management (Dyreng et al., 2010; Grullon et al., 2010; McGuire et al., 
2012). On the other hand, some provide insufficient evidence to relate religiosity with 
earnings management, but significant evidence to relate cultural values with earnings 
management (Callen et al., 2011). It is argued by Callen et al. (2011) that religiosity is 
important but no significant evidence was found as  it is incorporated in other cultural 
variables. Additional but contradictory evidence is provided by Guan et al. (2005) and Abdul 
Rahman and Mohamed Ali (2008) regarding the association between culture and earnings 
management. Using Hofstede’s (1983) four dimensions (individualism, power distance, 
uncertainty avoidance and long-term social values), Guan et al. (2005) provide significant 
evidence that cultural variables are related to earnings management in five Asia-Pacific 
countries. Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali, however, fail to provide sufficient evidence 
associating of culture (Malay audit committee) and earnings management in Malaysia. This 
leads to the following null hypothesis: 
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H014: There is no relationship between the proportion of Malay directors on the audit 
committee and earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies 
4.2.3 Institutional Ownership 
According to Lang and McNichols (1997) , institutional investors are large investors, other 
than individuals, who exercise discretion over the investment of others. The important role of 
institutional investors in ensuring good governance practices in Malaysia, particularly in 
monitoring the composition of the boards, the appointment of non-executive directors, and the 
implementation of the best practices of corporate governance, has been set out in the Code. 
The Code also specifically states that institutional investors are encouraged to have frequent 
dialogue with the firm to ensure good governance practices. In Malaysia, the largest 
institutional investors are the Employee Provident Fund (EPF), Lembaga Tabung Angkatan 
Tentera (LTAT), Perbadanan Nasional Berhad (PNB), Pertubuhan Keselamatan Sosial 
(PERKESO) and Lembaga Tabung Haji (Holthausen et al.). As defined by the code, 
institutional investors are organizations that largely hold shares on behalf of individuals; e.g. 
insurance companies, pension funds, and professional fund managers, therefore, this study 
includes not only the five largest institutional investors but all institutional investors, as 
defined by the code and consistent with the study conducted by Yang et al. (2009). These 
institutional investors are identified from the Top-Twenty Shareholders lists published by all 
listed companies in their annual reports ensuring the institutional ownership chosen is large 
enough to be able to exert influence on the corporate governance of the companies.  
It is believed that institutional investors can directly influence management activities because 
of the size of their ownership. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) assert institutional shareholders are 
more efficient in preventing managers from pursuing their own interests because they have 
exclusive access to  technology acquainting them with profitable operational strategies. This 
makes large institutional investors a better monitoring mechanism as they are capable of 
taking over  the company and replacing inefficient management (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). In 
addition, institutional investors are claimed to have the opportunity, resources, and ability to 
monitor, discipline and influence managers of firms (Monks & Minow, 1995). 
The study by Bushee (1998) further finds that the magnitude of institutional shareholdings are 
associated with higher levels of research and development (R&D) expenditure by firms. Their 
result supports the view that the large stockholdings and sophistication of institutional 
investors allow them to monitor and discipline managers thereby ensuring that managers 
choose R&D levels that maximize long-run value rather than  meet short-term earnings goals 
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thereby reducing the incentive for earnings management. A similar study by Bange and De 
Bont (1998) also finds less earnings management (related to R&D) when institutional 
shareholdings are high. 
Chung et al. (2002) provide evidence that the presence of large institutional shareholdings 
also inhibits managers from increasing or decreasing reported profits towards their own 
desired level or range of profits. They claim that the evidence is consistent with institutional 
investors monitoring and constraining the self-serving behaviour of corporate managers. A 
similar result is presented by Cornett et al. (2008), who find evidence that earnings 
management is lower when there is more monitoring of management discretion from sources 
such as institutional ownership of shares and representation on the board. 
The results from Koh (2003) reveal that the association between institutional ownership and 
firms’ income-increasing discretionary accruals varies as the level of institutional ownership 
increases. A positive association is found at lower institutional ownership levels, consistent 
with the view that transient (short-term oriented) institutional investors create incentives for 
managers to manage earnings upwards. In contrast, a negative association is found at the 
higher institutional ownership levels, consistent with the view that long-term oriented 
institutional investors’ monitoring and participation in firms’ corporate governance limits 
managerial accruals discretion. The Malaysian evidence from Mohd Ali et al. (2008) indicates 
that there is a significant negative relationship between institutional ownership and earnings 
management. But the study on the impact of institutional ownership and earnings 
management by Abdul Jalil and Abdul Rahman (2010) said that only the Malaysia 
Shareholders Watchdog Group (MSWG) institutional shareholdings are effective in 
mitigating earnings management. It is claimed that ownership alone is not enough and 
institutional ownership need to be involved in shareholder activism in order to be effective as 
an external monitor. Furthermore, Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali (2008) and Yang et al. 
(2009) provide no significant relationship between institutional ownership and earnings 
management in Malaysia, such conflicting results leading to the following hypothesis: 
H015: There is no relationship between the proportion of institutional ownership and 
earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies 
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4.4 Firm Specific Characteristics 
Previous literature provides evidence that certain firm-specific characteristics are factors 
which influence earnings management. This study will examine the five characteristics of, 
Size, Leverage, Profitability, Growth and Type of Industry to ascertain their influence on 
earnings management.  
4.3.1 Size 
One of the most vital characteristics of a firm is its size. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) 
hypothesized that the larger the firms the more likely the manager is to choose accounting 
procedures that defer reported earnings from the current to future period(s). Differently, Gu, 
Lee, & Rosett (2005) assert that large firms are more likely to be mature, operate steadily, are 
more diversified and have less operating profit volatility than small firms, thus, they have less 
incentive to manage earnings. Furthermore, Benkel, Mather and Ramsay (2006) claim that 
larger firms will receive higher public scrutiny and this provides a stronger incentive for 
directors to be better monitors as compared to smaller firms. In addition, Dechow and Dechiv 
(2002) find that accrual quality is positively related to firm size and that large firms have 
more stable and predictable operations and  more diversified business activities, therefore 
smaller and fewer estimation errors. Lee and Choi (2002) provide empirical evidence that 
small companies tend to more frequently manage earnings to avoid losses, in line with Jordon 
et al. (2008) , who find that small firms appear to manage earnings more intensively than 
large firms. Furthermore, according to Warfiled et al. (1995), large firms are more likely to 
report higher quality earnings, primarily due to political pressure and investor scrutiny. A 
significant negative relationship has also been found to exist between firm size and earnings 
management (Davidson et al., 2005; Ebrahim, 2007; Jaggi & Leung, 2007; Niu, 2006; Park & 
Shin, 2004) although Lobo and Zhou (2006) find there is a significant positive relationship 
between firm size and earnings management, proposing that larger firms may have more 
opportunities to overstate earnings due to the complexity of their operations and the difficulty 
for external users in detecting  restatements. Bedard et al. (2004) and Klien (2002) find 
insufficient evidence to relate firm size with earnings management. 
Based on the above arguments and different findings, it is hypothesized that: 
H016: There is no relationship between firm size and earnings management in 
Malaysian Shariah-approved companies. 
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4.3.2 Leverage 
Companies that possess high debt leverages represent a risky investment and Ahorany et al. 
(1993) state that heavily leveraged firms are more prone to manipulate earnings than 
companies with low levels of debt. Furthermore, Defond and Jimbalvo (1994) claim a high 
level of debt can lead managers to manage earnings up wards in order to avoid technical 
default, or downwards to facilitate renegotiation of debt contracts. Similarly, Sweeney (1994) 
reports that managers use discretionary accruals to satisfy debt covenant requirements, with 
Glaum, Lichtblau and Linderman (2004) finding  that earnings management practice is more 
prevalent among German firms with high leverage than US firms. Other prior studies provide 
evidence of a significant positive relationship between leverage and earnings management 
(Davidson et al., 2005; Jaggi & Leung, 2007; Klein, 2002) but, conversely, Park and Shin 
(2004) claim that highly indebted firms may be less able to practice earnings management 
because they are under close scrutiny by lenders and Chen, Lin and Zhou (2005) and Niu 
(2006) find significant evidence that leverage is negatively related to earnings management. 
Jordon et al. (2008) assert that low-leverage companies exhibit the practices more frequently 
than high leverage firms, nevertheless, Sun and Rath (2009), Abdul Rahman and Mohamed 
Ali (2008), Abdul Rahman, Dowds and Cahan (2005), Bedard et al. (2004) and Jones and 
Sharma (2001) all find no significant relationship between earnings management and 
leverage. These conflicting results lead to the following null hypothesis. 
H017: There is no relationship between leverage and earnings management in 
Malaysian Shariah-approved companies 
4.3.3 Growth 
Another firm characteristic that has been examined in previous literature is growth. Glaum et 
al. (2004) contend that managers of high growth firms may resort to earnings management in 
order to fulfil investor’s expectations. According to Firth, Fung and Rui, (2007) high growth 
firms may also have incentives to engage in earnings management as they require a lot of 
funding, and it is easier for them to engage in earnings manipulation than their counterparts 
since it is difficult to observe the business activities of high growth firms. In addition, Park 
and Shin (2004) suggest that high growth firms may increase their reported current assets in 
anticipation of future sales growth, thus leading to a positive relationship between growth 
opportunities and earnings management. Teoh et al. (1998a) document significant accrual 
based earnings management when firms raise capital, either during the IPO or in the seasonal 
equity market. Despite a considerable body of prior research finding  a significant positive 
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relationship between firms’ growth and earnings management (Davidson et al., 2005; 
Ebrahim, 2007; Jiang, Lee, & Anandarajan, 2008; Jones & Sharma, 2001; Klein, 2002; Park 
& Shin, 2004). Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali (2008) document a significant negative 
relationship while, Firth et al. (2007), Jaggi and Leung (2007) and Bedard et al. (2004) find 
insufficient evidence to support any relationship between firm growth and earnings 
management. Thus, the following null hypothesis is proposed. 
H018: There is no relationship between firm growth and earnings management in 
Malaysian Shariah-approved companies 
4.3.4 Profitability 
Profitability is another characteristic that has been shown to affect the level of earnings 
management. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) suggest that companies manipulate earnings 
upward to prevent reporting negative profit or declining earnings with Jordon et al. (2008) 
depicting managers of negative earning firms no longer engaging in manipulative behaviour, 
while managers of positive earnings firms continued to do so. In addition, Klien (2002) and 
Davidson et al. (2005) find evidence of a significant positive relationship between firm 
profitability and earnings management. On the other hand, many researchers find a significant 
negative relationship between the level of profitability and earnings management, that is, less 
profitable companies managing their earnings more compared to more profitable companies 
(Ashari, Koh, Tan, & Wong, 1994; Bedard et al., 2004; Sun & Rath, 2009). Thus, it is 
hypothesized that: 
H019: There is no relationship between firm profitability and earnings management in 
Malaysian Shariah-approved companies 
4.3.5 Type of Industry 
Managerial accounting choices may differ between industries and the literature suggests 
companies in different industries manage their earnings to varying degrees. McNichols and 
Wilson (1988) provide evidence of income decreasing manipulation in publishers, business 
services and nondurable wholesale industries, from the provision of bad debts. Gu et al. 
(2005) claim that different level of inventories and accounts receivables for manufacturing 
and retail companies allow earnings management through inventory valuation and bad debt 
provision while Beasley, Carcello, Hemanson and Lapides (2000) assert that financial 
statement fraud techniques vary by industry, supporting the industry-effect hypothesis 
(Schmalensee, 1985). Teoh et al. (1998b) claim that earnings management may be prevalent 
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in computer and electronics industries because of high information asymmetry and limited 
past history on the appropriateness of accounting choices by these relatively new industries. 
In addition, Ashari et al. (1994) suggest that companies in more ‘risky’ industries28, such as 
hotel and properties, have greater opportunities and a greater tendency to smooth their 
income. Bedard et al. (2004) reveal evidence that earnings management varies across 
industries, whereby earnings management is more prevalent in service firms because they 
usually exhibit higher growth and are based on human capital, thus, leading us to the 
following null hypothesis: 
H020: There is no relationship between type of industry and earnings management in 
Malaysian Shariah-approved companies 
4.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter developed and presented the hypotheses that relate to the three main objectives 
of this research. The hypothesis relating to earnings management by Shariah-approved 
companies in Malaysia was discussed in section one. The hypotheses relating to the 
characteristics of boards of directors, characteristics of audit committees, and institutional 
investors as the determinants of earnings management were discussed in section two. The 
hypotheses relating to firm-specific characteristics as determinants of earnings management 
were discussed in the final section. Having a total of 20 testable hypotheses stated, the 
following chapter (Chapter Five) presents the research methodology employed in this study. 
 
  
                                                 
28
 In their study, they claimed the hotel and properties industry in Singapore is highly competitive and is very 
reactive to international economic and political events 
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     Chapter 5 
Research Methodology 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter describes the research methodology employed in this study. Section 5.1 presents 
how samples are selected, while Section 5.2 explains the data collection and Section 5.3 
discusses the data screening, in terms of missing data, outliers, normality and transformations. 
Section 5.4 presents the data analysis, including earnings management measurements and the 
measurements used for independent variables followed by Section 5.5 which outlines the 
assumptions for the multiple regression analysis and explains how this study meets all the 
assumptions. The chapter ends with a summary and conclusions in Section 5.6. 
5.1 Sample selection 
The Malaysian capital market provides a unique research setting where there are two capital 
markets that operate simultaneously (Islamic capital market and conventional capital market), 
there are two tiers of regulations with which the markets need to comply (as explained in 
Chapter 2), and the people in Malaysia have different cultural and religious backgrounds. 
The population of interest in this study covers all Malaysian listed companies on the Main 
Board, Second Board and MESDAQ companies of Bursa Malaysia for the year 2002 that are 
continuously listed until 2007. The selection starts from the year 2002, since the classification 
of Shariah-approved securities was introduced in 1997 and the Kuala Lumpur Shariah Index 
in 1999 with, the Bursa Malaysia Revamped Listing Requirement, commonly recognized as a 
major highlight in Malaysian corporate governance reform, in January 2001, giving sufficient 
time for firms to meet the criteria and be classified as Shariah-approved and at the same time 
fulfil the requirements of Bursa Malaysia.  
Data for the year 2008 are not chosen as it marked the start of the global financial crisis that 
affected the performance of all companies all over the world, including Malaysia. According 
to Copeland (1968) a four-to-six year time horizon is adequate to reduce classification errors, 
therefore the sample selection from 2002 to 2007 should be adequate. The yearly lists of 
public listed companies for the period of 2002-2007 are provided by Bursa Malaysia, on 
which, over this period, there were, on average, 1,000 companies listed. To arrive at the total 
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eligible population, the following types of firms are excluded from the population being 
considered in this study: 
a) Initial Public Offerings Firms 
All initial public offering firms from 2003 through to 2007 are excluded from the sample, 
because they do not provide data for the six years under study.  
b) Non-Shariah Approved Companies 
The yearly list
29
 of Shariah approved securities, released by the Securities Commission’s 
Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) and starting from the year 2002, are used to identify and 
classify companies into two groups: Shariah-approved and non-Shariah-approved. Only those 
companies that maintain their Shariah-approved status throughout the period 2002-2007 and 
appear on both lists released by the SAC each year will be chosen (Anuar et al., 2004). 
c) Finance Companies 
All companies that are classified under the finance sector, trusts and closed end funds will be 
excluded due to their unique features and different compliance and regulatory environment 
(Abdul Rahman & Mohamed Ali, 2008; Peasnell et al., 2005; Xie et al., 2003).  
d) Different Names and/or Financial Year End 
Companies that changed their name and/or their financial year end
30
 are excluded from the 
selection process as the main reasons for such changes are mergers, acquisitions and 
takeovers. The measurement of earnings management might be affected by these events and, 
consequently, will not give a true picture of the company.  
e) Delisted Companies and Incomplete Data 
Those companies being delisted during the study period as well as those with incomplete 
financial data or incomplete information on corporate governance data are excluded from this 
study.  
                                                 
29
 The lists are released twice a year by the Securities Commission, which are accessible and downloadable from 
the Securities Commission web site (http://www.sc.com.my). Prior to 2007, the list was released in April and 
October each year but, in conjunction with the objective of streamlining with the FTSE Bursa Malaysia (FBM) 
EMAS Shariah Index, starting from 2007 the list is released in May and November each year. 
30
 Lists of companies that changed their name, financial year end, or  involved with merger and acquisition, were 
requested directly from Bursa Malaysia. 
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5.1.1 Final Eligible Population 
This study involves a cross-sectional analysis of the Shariah-approved companies listed on 
Bursa Malaysia for the period 2002 until 2007 Table 4 presents the selection process, starting 
with all companies listed on Bursa Malaysia in 2007. Out of 1,004 companies, 256 initial 
public offering firms during the period were excluded, with another 49 companies excluded 
because they are classified under finance companies, trusts and closed end funds. In addition, 
a total of 186 companies that changed their name and financial year end were excluded and 37 
more were ineligible due to incomplete data. The 119 companies with non-Shariah status 
were finally excluded, thus leaving the final eligible population of 357 companies.  
Table 4: Selection Criteria for Eligible Population 
Selection Criteria Number of companies 
Listed Companies on Bursa Malaysia in year 2007  1004 
Less: Initial Public Offerings companies  256 
Less: Finance Companies 49 
Less: Companies that changed their name and/or financial year end  186 
Less: Companies with incomplete data 37 
Less: Companies with non-Shariah status 119 
Eligible Population 357 
A rule of thumb suggests that sample sizes larger than 30 and less than 500 are appropriate for 
most research (Roscoe, 1975) as noted by Sekaran (2003, p. 295). In order to meet the 
objective of this study, the sample size will be calculated as below, as suggested by Krejcie 
and Morgan (1970): 
2
2 2( 1)
NZ pq
n
N e Z pq

 
 
Equation 5.1 : Sample Size 
Where; 
 n  = Sample size 
N  = Population size 
 2Z  = Standard Confidence Interval (Gu et al., p. 1.96) 
 2e  = Tolerable error level 
 pq  = Variance estimate 
The sample size is calculated based on the population of all listed companies on Bursa 
Malaysia from 2003 - 2007 that meet the criteria as discussed above in paragraph 5.1. Krejcie 
and Morgan (1970) and Sekaran (2003) provide a Sample Size Table to ease and ensure a 
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good decision when determining sample size (see Appendix B). From the total eligible 
population of 357 companies, using the above formula and the sample size table, the ideal 
sample calculated is 185, giving 925 [185 companies x 5 years] firm-year observations. Since 
listed companies on Bursa Malaysia are classified into different industries, a further sampling 
technique is needed to ensure the final sample fairly represents the whole population, as 
explained in the following paragraphs. 
Multi-stage sampling is a technique that combines sampling techniques in a variety of useful 
ways to address sampling needs in the most efficient and effective manner possible (Trochim, 
2006). In this study, the sampling process involves two stages: stratified random sampling for 
stage one and systematic random sampling for stage two.  
Stratified random sampling involves a population being divided into subpopulation or 
subgroups, called strata, with a sample randomly selected from each stratum (Cochran, 1977; 
Lind, Marchal, & Wathen, 2008). It is also called proportional or quota random sampling, 
dividing a population into homogeneous subgroups and taking a simple random sample from 
each subgroup (Trochim, 2006).  
Stratified random sampling has the advantage of reflecting the characteristics of the entire 
population, including minorities or less frequent cases, while avoiding the possibility of  
gathering a ‘bad’ sample, unrepresentative of the population because of bad sample design 
(Barrow, 2006). Stratification may also generate precision in the estimation of characteristics 
of the whole population (Cochran, 1977) and ensures that the result obtained not only 
represents the overall population but includes the key subgroups of the population (Trochim, 
2006). Therefore, stratified random sampling best suits this study due to its advantages over 
simple random sampling (Barrow, 2006).  
All listed companies on Bursa Malaysia are classified into 14 types of industry based on the 
nature of their business, such as Consumer Products, Industrial Products, Construction, 
Plantation, Property, Technology and Trading and Services (Appendix C and Appendix D 
presents the full list). The relative frequency for each industry is calculated at this stage in 
order to calculate the breakdown of the total sample. The relative frequency is equal to the 
Number of Firms divided by the Total Eligible Population, i.e. the relative frequency for 
Construction industry is equal to 27/357 = 0.08. The breakdown of sample companies 
according to their industry is presented in Table 5. 
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Table 5: Analysis of Sample by Industry 
No. Industry Number of Firms Relative Frequency Number in Sample 
1. Construction 27 0.08 14 
2. Consumer Products 63 0.18 33 
3. Industrial Product 140 0.39 73 
4. Plantation 22 0.06 11 
5. Property 31 0.09 16 
6. Technology 16 0.04 8 
7. Trading or Services 58 0.16 30 
 Total 357 1.00 185 
In order to select the final sample companies systematic random sampling is used and 
explained in the following section.  
Systematic random sampling is a technique frequently used by researchers for its simplicity 
and its periodic quality (Castilo, 2009). This sampling technique adds a degree of system and 
process into the random selection of subjects, with the added assurance that the population 
will be evenly sampled (Experiment Resources, 2011). Systematic random sampling is fairly 
easy to do and, in most situations, more precise than simple random sampling (Trochim, 
2006). 
In order to use this technique, the population must first be listed in random order (Trochim, 
2006). Then, the interval size (k) must be calculated from the population (N) divided by the 
sample size (n) thus /N n  = 357/185 = 2 (rounded to the nearest significant whole number). 
In this study, the 1st unit for each interval was chosen as the starting number, so the sample 
will consist of company 1, 3, 5 and so on until the required 185 companies are selected from 
the total eligible population of 357. The number of sample companies by industry, provided in 
Table 5 is distributed over different industry classifications, with some concentration on the 
industrial products group and the lowest number from the technology classification. This is 
consistent with Davidson et al. (2005), Klien (2002) and Hashim and Devi (2008a) who 
require at least eight firms in any one industry classification. As this is a five year study, the 
total firm-year observations for the technology industry is 40 [5 years x 8 companies] which  
meets the rules of thumb by Roscoe (1975) and Sekaran (2003). 
5.2 Data Collection  
Both financial data and corporate governance data are needed for this study, and is gathered 
from the following sources. Financial data is from the Datastream Worldscope system, with 
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any missing data obtained from the published annual reports including financial statements. 
The corporate governance data are gathered from published annual reports as disclosed on the 
Bursa Malaysia web site (http://announcement.bursamalaysia.com). 
5.2.1 Pilot Test 
Prior to the data collection process, a pilot study was conducted to ensure the required 
information for this research was available and to estimate the time involved with data 
collection. Ten listed companies on Bursa Malaysia were chosen at random and their financial 
data and annual reports were downloaded to ensure the availability of the data for all the 
variables proposed. The time taken and the cost of gathering all the information for all 
variables required for the proposed methodology were estimated, calculated and recorded. 
Gathering the corporate governance variables involved reading and understanding many 
sections of the annual reports, such as the Corporate Information, Executive Chairman’s 
Statement, Statement of Corporate Governance, Statement of Internal Control, Directors 
Report and Shareholdings Analysis. Other supporting information for the sampling and 
sample selection, such as the lists of Shariah-approved companies, Initial Public Offering 
companies, Merger and Acquisition companies, and Listed and Delisted companies, were 
obtained from Bursa Malaysia’s website and the Securities Commission website. 
All these tasks were carried out during the pilot study to ensure the feasibility and validity of 
the methodology of this study and also ensure the practicality of the study and achievement of 
its objective within the time frame proposed. The results from this pilot study also give 
information concerning the sampling technique, which could be undertaken once the pilot 
study was completed. 
5.3 Data Screening 
Cooke (1998) states that data should be screened carefully, regardless of the type of analysis 
that is being proposed, in order to reveal any normality problems, as well as problems of 
outliers and non-linearity. Consequently, collected data was screened in order to ensure 
validity for the analysis stage of this study. 
5.3.1 Missing Data 
Missing data happens when there are invalid values for one or more variables available for 
analysis (Hair et al., 2010). Missing data will lead to a reduction in sample size available for 
analysis with any statistical results based on  this sample possibly biased which may lead to 
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erroneous results (Hair et al., 2010). Therefore, missing values were checked for every 
variable in this study before further analysis was undertaken. 
5.3.2 Outliers 
Outliers are extreme values that are unusually large or unusually small in a data set 
(Anderson, Sweeney, & Williams, 2009). There are four reasons for the presence of outliers: 
incorrect data entry, failure to specify missing value code, not being a member of the 
population, or the variable having a more extreme value than a normal distribution 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Identified from a univariate, bivariate or multivariate 
perspective, based on the number of variables considered (Hair et al., 2010), a common rule 
of thumb is that a single variable that is more than three standard deviations beyond the mean 
may be an outlier, although a multivariate outlier has an extreme score on two or more 
variables (Kline, 2005). It is important, however, to check that the outlier’s score is genuine, 
and not just a data-entry error (Pallant, 2007).  
Outliers may lead to both Type I and Type II errors
31
 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), but 
according to Hair et al. (2010) outliers should be retained to ensure generalisability to the 
entire population, unless there is demonstrable proof that they are truly not representative of 
the population. There are several options for reducing the impact of outliers, such as removing 
the case if there is a good reason to believe that it is not from the population, transforming the 
data, or changing the score (Field, 2009; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Therefore, the presence 
of outliers in the data for every variable in this study is tested before further analysis was 
carried out. 
5.3.3 Normality  
The most essential assumption in multivariate analysis is normality, and checking for it is an 
important early step in any multivariate analysis (Hair et al., 2010; Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007). Normality refers to the shape of the data distribution for an individual metric variable 
and its correspondence to the normal distribution, the benchmark for statistical methods (Hair 
et al., 2010). There are two basic ways to assess normality, either by graphical or statistical 
methods. Examples of graphical methods are observing the normal probability plot, box plot, 
detrended normal probability plot, scatter plot, and the histogram shape of data distribution. 
On the other hand, statistical approaches to assessing the normality of a data set include 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics, skewness and kurtosis.  
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 Type I error is declaring a significant difference between two things when in fact they are not significantly 
different. A Type II error is declaring no significant difference when a difference really does exists. 
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Skewness refers to the symmetry of the distribution - whether it is unbalanced and skewed to 
one side (right or left)- while kurtosis refers to its “peakedness” or “flatness” compared with 
the normal distribution (Hair et al., 2010). The value of skewness and kurtosis can be 
examined to determine whether the selected variables are normally distributed in a large 
sample (200 and more) (Field, 2009). The measure of skewness is zero and the measure of 
kurtosis is three for a normal distribution according to Gujarati and Porter (2009) while 
Garson (2007) says the skewness and kurtosis values should be within the +2 and -2 range 
when the data are normally distributed (Garson, 2007). However, for a large sample size, an  
absolute value of skewness greater than 3 and an absolute value of kurtosis greater than 8 
indicate problems with normality (Kline, 2005).  
5.3.4 Transformation 
Data transformation is useful in regression analysis, involving the application of mathematical 
functions to create new variables and eliminate undesirable characteristics which allows for 
better measurements (Hair et al., 2010). As reported by Kruskal and Tanur (1978) the benefits 
of transforming are usually said to be simpler relationship, more stable variance and improved 
normality. In addition, a transformation allows the central information in the data to be 
expressed more succinctly and permits a simpler, more accurate or more revealing subsequent 
analysis (Kruskal & Tanur, 1978). Transformation may also be useful for dealing with 
outliers since transformation alters the shape of the data distribution (Kline, 2005). 
5.4 Data Analysis 
The main objective of this study is to determine the extent of earnings management of 
Malaysian Shariah-approved companies. To this end, three well-recognised earnings 
management models (Jones Model, Modified Jones Model and Performance Matched Model) 
are employed and explained in the following section. 
5.4.1 Earnings Management Models 
Teoh, Wong, & Rao (1998) and Peasnall et al. (2005) state that managers have greater 
flexibility and control over current versus long term accruals. In addition, Beneish (1998) 
states that depreciation offers limited potential as a tool for systematic earnings management 
since changes in depreciation policy cannot be made very frequently without attracting 
adverse attention from the auditor or investors. Despite it being claimed that discretionary 
current accruals provide managers with greater leeway, this study will use the discretionary 
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accrual of total accruals as earnings management measures since such accruals should capture 
a larger portion of a manager’s manipulation (Jones, 1991). 
In fact, previous research such as Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986) use total accruals from 
their estimation period to measure non-discretionary accruals in the event period with an 
assumption that there is no earnings management in the estimation period. The models of  
Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986) also assume that non-discretionary accruals are constant 
over time with Healy (1985) defining the amount of non-discretionary accruals as an average 
of total accruals over an estimation period prior to the event period, the discretionary accrual 
in the event period therefore being the difference between total accruals in that period and the 
estimate of non-discretionary accruals. DeAngelo (1986) employed the last period’s total 
accruals (divided by the last period’s total assets) as a measure of non-discretionary accruals, 
the calculated amount of discretionary accruals in the event period being the difference 
between total accruals in that period and the estimate of the non-discretionary accruals.  
5.4.1.1 The Jones Model 
A new methodology using regression analysis to separate discretionary accruals and non-
discretionary accruals by relating them to the firm’s economic conditions was proposed by 
Jones in1991.  She examined whether firms that would benefit from import relief attempted to 
decrease earnings through earnings management during the import relief investigation by the 
U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC). Using 23 firms in her final sample, her research 
found that the managers of those firms did indeed make income decreasing accruals during 
import relief investigations.  
Jones’s model relaxes the assumption that non-discretionary accruals are constant over time 
and suggests that these accruals are affected by changes in the firm’s economic conditions, as 
reflected in changes in revenue and the level of fixed assets. Jones (1991) claimed that 
revenues are used to control for the economic environment of the firm, and the gross amount 
of property, plant and equipment
32
 is included to control for the portion of total accruals 
related to nondiscretionary expenses (Jones, 1991). This research by Jones is an event study 
implicitly assuming that firms do not manage earnings before the event, therefore, in the 
estimation period, the normal accruals are calculated as: 
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 In Jones’s model, gross property, plant and equipment value is included in the estimation model rather than 
changes in this account as the total depreciation expense is included in the calculation of total accruals. 
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   1 1 1 1 2 1/ 1/ / /it it i it it it it itNDAC TA TA REV TA PPE TA          
Equation 5.2 : Jones Model 
Where; 
itNDAC  = The non-discretionary accruals year t 
1itTA     = The total assets in year t-1 
itREV  = The change in revenues in year t  
itPPE  
 = The property, plant and equipment in year t  
it   = The intercept in year t 
it   = The slope coefficient in year t 
i   = The individual firm in year t 
5.4.1.2 The Modified Jones Model 
Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) made a modification to eliminate the speculative 
tendency of the Jones Model to measure discretionary accruals when discretion is exercised 
over revenue. In order to estimate discretionary accruals in the event period, the discretionary 
accruals are calculated by multiplying the estimated coefficient of the change in sales by the 
change in cash sales (the change in revenue minus the change in accounts receivable) instead 
of the change in sales. However, Dechow et al. (1995) still used the parameters obtained from 
the original Jones Model in the pre-event period for each firm in their sample to estimate 
discretionary accruals in the event period. This version with a novelty in the treatment of 
accounts receivable is known as the Modified Jones Model. 
   1 1 1 1 2 1/ 1/ ) / /it it i it it it it it itNDAC TA TA REV REC TA PPE TA           
Equation 5.3 : Modified Jones Model 
Where; 
itNDAC  = The non-discretionary accruals year t 
1itTA     = The total assets in year t-1 
itREV  = The change in revenues in year t  
itREC  = The change in receivables in year t  
itPPE  
 = The property, plant and equipment in year t  
it   = The intercept in year t 
it   = The slope coefficient in year t 
i   = The individual firm in year t 
Although some argue the ability of Modified Jones Model to detect earnings management, 
Dechow et al., (1995) and Guay, Kothari, and Watts (1996) contend that the modified model 
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is the most powerful for detecting earnings management in the context of managers exercising 
their discretion over revenue recognition. The advantage of the cross sectional approach is 
that the specific year changes in economic conditions affecting expected accruals are filtered 
out. This is vital, since the period of examination covers changes in both company and 
microeconomic conditions (Teoh, Welch, et al., 1998a, 1998b).  
In addition, Subramayam (1996) and Bartov, Gul, Tsui and Judy (2001) use both the Jones 
Model and Modified Jones Model to evaluate whether cross-sectional models are similar to 
time series models in providing reliable estimates of discretionary accruals. Their studies 
found that the cross-sectional Jones Model and the cross-sectional Modified Jones Model 
perform better than their time-series models in detecting earnings management. The cross-
sectional versions of the models are better because they generate a larger sample and therefore 
increase the precision and lower the standard error of the estimates (Subramanyam, 1996). In 
addition, their coefficients have fewer outliers and a greater proportion are of the predicted 
signs (Subramanyam, 1996). The cross sectional accruals models also help to avoid the 
survivorship bias problems inherent in the time series approach (Bartov et al., 2001; Peasnell 
et al., 2005) the and allow the inclusion of firms with short histories (Bartov et al., 2001). In 
comparison, the time series accruals model requires a lengthy period of time, up to ten years, 
and it is possible for it to be misspecified due to being nonstationary
33
 (Subramanyam, 1996). 
Also, the use of a time series model lowers its power to examine behaviour in discretionary 
accruals due to overlapping estimation and treatment periods (Subramanyam, 1996). 
5.4.1.3 The Performance Matched Model 
Another model that is commonly used for estimating discretionary accruals is the one 
proposed by Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005), who argue that the firm’s performance plays 
an important role in managing discretionary accruals and therefore should be taken into 
consideration. In their study, they found discretionary accruals estimated using the Jones 
Model and the Modified Jones Model and adjusted for performance matched discretionary 
accruals (return on assets) more powerful than the Jones Model and the Modified Jones 
Model, enhancing the reliability of inferences. Kothari et al. (2005) claim that the technique 
used by Dechow et al. (1995) in the Modified Jones Model is likely to generate large 
estimated discretionary accruals whenever a firm experiences more extreme growth in the test 
period compared to the estimation period. Since they do not have a ‘pre-event’ period they 
estimate the model as if all changes in accounts receivable arise from earnings management, 
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 Nonstationary means that the model does not meet the stationary assumption, that is the mean and the variance 
of the underlying process are constant and does not change when shifted in time or space. 
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using the change in cash sales (the change in revenue minus the change in accounts receivable
( )
it it
REV REC   ) instead of the change in sales prior to the estimating model. Consequently,  
Kothari et al. (2005) propose a model which is similar to the Jones and Modified Jones 
Models, except that it is expanded to include an intercept in order to mitigate 
heteroscedasticity and return on assets (ROA) for the effect on performance of discretionary 
accruals. Consistent with the studies conducted by Chen et al. (2007), Hutchinson et al. 
(2008) and Ye (2007), this study used the performance matched model of Kothari et al. 
(2005): 
   1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1/ 1/ ) / /it it i it it it it it it itNDAC TA TA REV REC TA PPE TA ROA                
Equation 5.4 : Performance Matched Model 
Where; 
itNDAC  = The non-discretionary accruals year t 
1itTA     = The total assets in year t-1 
itREV  = The change in revenues in year t  
itREC  = The change in receivables in year t  
itPPE  
 = The property, plant and equipment in year t  
1itROA   = The return on assets in year t-1  
it   = The intercept in year t 
it   = The slope coefficient in year t 
i   = The individual firm in year t 
 
5.4.2 Earnings Management Detection 
Extensive results from previous studies have provide evidence on opportunistic behaviour of 
managers through accruals based earnings management opportunistic behaviour of earnings 
management (Ahorany et al., 1993; Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006; DeAngelo et al., 1994; 
DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Erickson & Wang, 1999; Gaver et al., 1995; Han & Wang, 1998; 
Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Jones, 1991; Magnan et al., 1999; Navissi, 1999; Stammerjohan & 
Hall, 2003; Sweeney, 1994). Most of these studies have employed the three well established 
earnings management models (the Jones Model, the Modified Jones, and the Performance 
Matched Models) in detecting opportunistic earnings management. In line with the main 
objectives of this study in examining earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-approved 
companies, quantitative approach by using information gathered from secondary data is 
suitable and sufficient for this study. 
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This study will use discretionary accruals (DACC) as the measurement of earnings 
management. As in other research, total accruals (TACC) is assumed to be the sum of non 
discretionary accruals (NDAC) and discretionary accruals (DACC), therefore, discretionary 
accruals will be the difference between total accruals and nondiscretionary accruals, i.e. 
DACC = TACC – NDAC.  
5.4.2.1 Total Accruals 
Similar to previous studies (Dechow et al., 1995; Jones, 1991; Kothari et al., 2005; Perry & 
Williams, 1994) this study uses the balance sheet approach to calculate total accruals (TACC), 
which is measured as the change in non-cash current assets, minus the change in current 
liabilities (excluding the current portion of long-term debt), minus depreciation scaled by 
lagged total assets as follows: 
1[( ( ) ] / ( ))it it it it it it itTACC CA Cash CL STD Dep TA       
 
Equation 5.5 : Total Accruals 
Where;  
itTACC  = The total accruals in year t 
itCA    = The change in current assets in year t 
itCash  = The change in cash and cash equivalents in year t  
itCL    = The change in current liabilities in year t-1 
itSTD  = The change short term debt in year t  
itDep    = The depreciation and amortization in year t-1 
1itTA    = The total assets for company in year t-1 
i   = The individual firm in year t 
Collins and Hribar (1999) argue that the balance sheet approach is inferior in certain 
circumstances, particularly when the firm is involved with mergers and acquisitions. They 
claim that other non-operating events (such as mergers, acquisition and divestitures) impact 
the balance sheet but not the income statement, therefore, this study excludes those companies 
involved in such circumstances in order to measure earnings management that is due to 
normal operating activities.  
5.4.2.2 Estimation of Coefficients 
In order to use the aforementioned models, the coefficients ( ˆ , 
1
ˆ ,
 2
ˆ  and 
3
ˆ ) for the 
discretionary accruals for each model should be estimated for each year using the following 
OLS regression model: 
88 
 
Jones Model: 
   1 1 1 1 2 1ˆ ˆˆ/ 1/ / /it it i it it it it it itTACC TA TA REV TA PPE TA            
Modified Jones Model: 
   1 1 1 1 2 1ˆ ˆˆ/ 1/ ( ) / /it it i it it it it it it itTACC TA TA REV REC TA PPE TA             
Performance Matched Model: 
    11 1 1 1 2 1 30 ˆ ˆ ˆˆ/ 1/ ( ) / / itit it i it it it it it it itTACC TA TA REV REC TA PPE TA ROA               
 
Total assets are used as the denominator in all models to reduce heteroscedasticity (Dechow et 
al., 1995; Jones, 1991; Kothari et al., 2005; Teoh, Welch, et al., 1998a). The next step is to 
estimate the nondiscretionary accruals (normal accruals) for the sample firms. 
5.4.2.3 Non Discretionary Accruals (Normal Accruals) 
The estimated parameters ( ˆ , 
1
ˆ , 
2
ˆ  and 
3
ˆ ) from the previous section were then plugged 
into the equations to generate the estimated accrual activity for each of the sample firms. 
Jones Model: 
   1 1 1 2 11/ / /it i it it it it itNDAC TA REV TA PPE TA         
Modified Jones Model: 
   1 1 1 2 11/ ( ) / /i it it it it it itNDAC TA REV REC TA PPE TA          
Performance Matched Model: 
    11 1 1 2 1 30 1/ ( ) / / itit i it it it it it itNDAC TA REV REC TA PPE TA ROA               
5.4.2.4 Discretionary Accruals (Abnormal Accruals) 
The discretionary accruals (DACC) can therefore be calculated as the remaining portion of the 
total accruals: 
1/it it it it itDACC TACC TA NDAC      
Equation 5.6 : Discretionary Accruals 
Where;  
it
DACC
 
= The discretionary accruals in year t 
it
TACC   = The total accruals in year t 
it
NDAC  = The nondiscretionary accruals in year t 
1itTA     = The total assets in year t-1 
it   = The error term in year t 
i   = The individual firm in year t 
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All variables in the regression model are deflated by total assets to reduce heteroscedasticity 
problems (Abdul Rahman & Mohamed Ali, 2008; Dechow et al., 1995; DeFond & Jiambalvo, 
1994; Jones, 1991; Klein, 2002; Peasnell et al., 2005; Teoh, Welch, et al., 1998a). 
5.4.3 Determinants of Earnings Management 
A number of studies have provided empirical evidence that certain characteristics of corporate 
governance are significantly related to earnings management (Abdul Rahman & Mohamed 
Ali, 2008; Bedard et al., 2004; Chtourou et al., 2001; Chung et al., 2002; Cornett et al., 2008; 
Hashim & Devi, 2008a; Johari et al., 2008; Klein, 2002; Mohd Saleh et al., 2005; Mohd Saleh 
et al., 2007; Park & Shin, 2004; Peasnell et al., 2000; Piot & Janin, 2007; Xie et al., 2003). 
Most of these studies have gathered information on corporate governance practices through 
content analysis from annual reports. Thus, in order to achieve the third objective of this 
study, examining whether corporate governance practices are determinants of earnings 
management, a quantitative approach through content analysis from annual reports is 
appropriate and adequate for this study. 
In order to determine the factors influencing earnings management, this study incorporates the 
absolute value of DACC as the dependent variable and the direction of earnings management 
(positive/negative value of DACC) is disregarded in order to measure the combined effect. 
Thus, to measure the determinants of earnings management, the following analysis is 
conducted: 
5.4.3.1 Correlation Analysis (Bivariate Analysis) 
A correlation coefficient analysis indicates the strength and direction of the relationship 
between dependent and independent variables. A further idea of how much variance there is 
in the dependent or criterion variable will be explained when several independent variables 
are theorised to simultaneously influence it (Sekaran, 2003), consequently, multiple 
regression analysis is employed. 
5.4.3.2 Multiple Regression Analysis (Multivariate Analysis) 
The Ordinary Least Square regression includes the corporate governance practices and 
financial characteristics of the firms. There are many criteria available for measurement under 
corporate governance practices, but, as discussed in Chapter Four, this study focuses on the 
characteristics of the board of directors, characteristics of the audit committee and 
institutional ownership. As for the firm-specific characteristics, the focus is on size, leverage, 
growth, profitability and industry classification. As claimed by Gu et al. (2005) managers’ 
accounting choices may differ among industries as there are different levels of inventories and 
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accounts receivables in manufacturing and retail companies which allow earnings 
management through inventory valuation and bad debt provision. 
The value of DACC as the dependent variable will be regressed with the independent 
variables: the characteristics of the board of directors, the characteristics of the audit 
committee, institutional investors and firm-specific characteristics. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14
7
15 16 17 18 19
1
it it it it it it it it it it
it it it it it it
it it it it it
i
DACC BI BS BD BE BMD BO BR BM
ACS ACI ACM ACE ACB IO
FS FL FP FG FIndDummy
        
     
     

        
     
     
 
Equation 5.7 : Determinants of Earnings Management 
Table 6 presents all the variables together with their measurement scales as used in Equation 
5.7.   
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Table 6: Dependent and Independent Variables with Measurement Scales 
 Variables Acronym Measurement Scales 
 Dependent Variable:  
Discretionary Accruals 
DACC Jones Model, Modified Jones Model, & Performance 
Matched Model. 
 Independent Variables:   
 A. Characteristics of Board of Directors 
1. Independent Directors  
 
BI Number of independent non-executive directors/ 
Total number of board members  
2. Board Size 
 
BS Total number of board members 
3. CEO Duality 
 
BD Indicator variable with the value of ‘1’ if roles of 
chairman and CEO are combined and ‘0’ otherwise. 
4. Board Expertise 
 
BE Number of directors with financial expertise/  
Total number of directors 
5. Multiple Directorship 
 
BMD Number of directors with multiple directorships/ 
Total number of directors 
6. Managerial Ownership BO Percentage of total shares own by directors 
7. Directors Remuneration BR Average remuneration of board members / 
Total assets 
8. Malay Directors 
 
BM Number of Malay directors /  
Total number of directors 
    
 B. Characteristics of Audit Committee (AC) 
9. Audit Committee Size 
 
ACS Total number of directors on Audit Committee 
10. Independent Directors on 
AC 
ACI Number of independent non-executive directors/ 
Total number of AC members 
11. Frequency of AC Meeting  
 
ACMT Number of AC meeting in 1 year. 
12. Expertise of AC ACE Number of directors on AC with financial expertise /  
Total number of directors on AC 
13. Malay Directors on AC ACM Number of Malay directors /  
Total number of directors on AC 
 C. Institutional Ownership 
14. Proportion of Institutional 
Ownership  
IO Total shares held by institutional investors/  
Total number of shares outstanding 
 D. Characteristics of Firm 
15. Size  FS Natural log of Total assets  
16. Leverage FL Total Debt / Total assets 
17. Profitability  FP EBIT / Total assets 
18. Growth FG Market Value of Equity/Book Value of Equity 
19. Industry  FI The listed industries on Bursa Malaysia 
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5.5 Assumptions in Multiple Regression Analysis 
Testing for multiple regression assumptions, and corrections if violations occur, is important 
to confirm that the obtained data truly represent the sample and that the researcher has 
obtained the best results (Hair et al., 2010). The assumptions for multiple regression analysis 
apply to both individual dependent and independent variables, and to the overall relationship 
of model estimations (Hair et al., 2010), hence each is explained in the following sections. 
5.5.1 Multicollinearity  
Multicollinearity occurs when any single independent variable is highly correlated with a set 
of other independent variables (Hair et al., 2010). When these variables are highly inter-
correlated, it becomes difficult to divide their separate effects or the predictive power of each 
of the explanatory variables on the explained variables (Hair et al., 2010; Maddala, 2001). 
Perfect collinearity happens when the correlation coefficient is 1, while the complete lack of 
collinearity would result in a correlation coefficient of 0, however multicollinearity is a 
question of degree, not whether it is present or absent. The presence of multicollinearity will 
not necessarily cause any problems in inference and does not bias the estimates of the 
coefficients, only assessment of the relative strength of the explanatory variables and their 
joint effects become unreliable (Garson, 2007; Maddala, 2001; Thomas, 2005). 
In order to ensure that the results obtained from the regression analysis are valid, it is essential 
that the regression analysis meet the assumption of no multicollinearity. A bivariate 
correlation of 0.7 between two variables is high and they should not be included in the same 
analysis (Pallant, 2007). The initial inspection of the Pearson Correlation Matrix revealed a 
strong correlation between Board Malay (BM) and Audit Committee Malay (ACM) (Pearson 
coefficient r = 0.80) with another high correlation between Board Expertise (BE) and Audit 
Committee Expertise (Xie et al.) (r = 0.57). Since the audit committee is a sub-committee of 
the board, regressing the same criteria for both variables in one regression will reduce their 
independence (Bradbury et al., 2006). Therefore, in order to avoid unreliable regression 
analysis results, some of the criteria for audit committees and boards are excluded, as 
discussed further in Chapter Six.  
In addition, this study used the value of variance inflation factor (VIF), which measures the 
strength of the relationship between a single independent variable and other independent 
variables in the regression analysis. A value of VIF exceeding 10 indicates the potential 
presence of multicollinearity (Pallant, 2007), however this study returns values of VIF for all 
independent variables in each of the regression analyses of less than 10 (Appendix E).  
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5.5.2 Linearity 
Regression analysis is a linear procedure (Garson, 2007) and the concept of linearity means 
the degree to which the change in the dependent variable is associated with the independent 
variable (Hair et al., 2010). It is necessary to ensure linearity in regression analysis as a 
substantial violation of linearity means the results may be unusable, although minor 
departures from linearity will not substantially affect the interpretation of the regression 
output (Garson, 2007). An examination of the residual scatter plot is the most common way of  
identifying any nonlinear patterns in the data, with corrective action increasing both the 
predictive accuracy of the model and the validity of the estimated coefficients (Hair et al., 
2010). The ordinary corrective action for nonlinearity is data transformation, otherwise, 
inclusion of nonlinear relationships in the regression model or the use of using specialized 
methods of nonlinear regression analysis may be employed (Hair et al., 2010). 
The residual scatter plot against the predicted dependent variables scores for all regression 
models appears in Appendix G. From inspection, the plots do not reveal any systematic 
pattern or nonlinearity thus; the models met the linearity condition. 
5.5.3 Constant variance (Homoscedasticity) of the error terms 
The assumption of equal variance (homoscedasticity) of the error term is critical to the proper 
application of linear regression (Hair et al., 2010). It is a description of data for which the 
variance of the error terms appears constant over the range of values of an independent 
variable. Lack of homoscedasticity may mean that there is an interaction effect between a 
measured independent variable and an unmeasured independent variable not in the model, or 
that some independent variables are skewed while others are not (Garson, 2007). The 
condition of unequal variances is known as heteroscedasticity and is the most common 
assumption violation in multiple regression analysis (Hair et al., 2010), generally expected in 
cross-sectional analysis if small, medium and large size firms are sampled together (Gujarati 
& Porter, 2009). 
This assumption is usually tested through the visual plot of standardized residuals against the 
regression standardized predicted value. A randomly scattered residual plot with no indication 
of a consistent pattern provides evidence of the assumption of homoscedasticity (Garson, 
2007; Gujarati & Porter, 2009). Such plots were produced for this research and the residuals 
appeared to scatter randomly and did not show any pattern, suggesting that the error terms are 
homoscedastic (Appendix H). 
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5.5.4 Independence of the error terms 
Independence of the error terms is another basic assumption of a regression model that needs 
to be considered. Sometimes, data collected over a period of time may have a relationship 
between their consecutive residuals (Levine, Krehbiel, & Berenson, 2002). If this relationship 
exists, it is known as autocorrelation and it violates the assumption of independence hence, 
the validity of a regression model will be low.  
There are many ways to detect autocorrelation, such as residuals plots, residual correlograms, 
Lagrange multiplier tests and Durbin-Watson statistics. The Durbin-Watson test statistics 
range in value from zero to four, with a value of two indicating no autocorrelation and a value 
between 1.5 and 2.5 indicating independence of observations (Garson, 2007). If a violation 
occurs, it can be addressed  using data transformations such as the inclusion of lagged 
dependant and lagged explanatory variables, or specially formulated regression models (Hair 
et al., 2010; Hill, Griffiths, & Lim, 2008). 
To test this assumption, inspections of the Durbin-Watson statistics were performed to check 
that the residuals are not autocorrelated in this study. The values obtained can be cross 
checked against the lower and upper values published in the Critical Value or Chi-Squared 
Tables. The Durbin-Watson test results are disclosed in every multiple regression results table 
with all results suggesting that the error terms are independent. 
5.5.5 Normality of the error terms distribution 
The error terms, represented by the residuals, should be normally distributed for each set of 
values of the independent variables (Garson, 2007). The normality of error terms’ distribution 
is usually inspected through visual inspection of the standardized residual plots histogram or 
the normal probability plots (P-P plots) (Hair et al., 2010). A histogram of standardized 
residuals should show a roughly normal curve while in a normal probability plot a 45-degree 
line or straight diagonal line will appear when observed data conforms to that normally 
expected (Garson, 2007; Hair et al., 2010). From inspection, the plots for current data appear 
to satisfy the normality assumption (Appendix G and Appendix H). 
5.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presents discussion on the research methodology used to test the hypotheses and 
validate data in this study. It started with a discussion of the sample selection, providing the 
justification for the sample selection criteria, followed by, the sample size, sampling 
techniques, and data collection methods. Issues for data screening, such as missing data, 
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outliers, normality and transformation were then reviewed. Under earnings management 
measurement, a detailed explanation was provided of how the three models (Jones Model, 
Modified Jones Model and Performance Matched Model) were employed to derive 
discretionary accruals figures. Finally, the regression analyses employed on the determinants 
of earnings management, together with the assumptions of such analysis, are explained. 
Having presented the research methodology, the following chapter (Chapter Six) presents and 
discusses all the results obtained in this study. 
  
96 
 
     Chapter 6 
Results and Discussion 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of various data analyses carried out in this study. Section 6.2 
presents the descriptive statistics of the earnings management measurements and the 
continuous and dichotomous variables used in the regression tests, then Section 6.3 examines 
the correlation between the independent variables and dependent variables. Section 6.4 reports 
the results of the multiple regression analysis using three established earnings measurements 
models (Jones, Modified Jones and Performance Matched Models). To ascertain the reliability 
of the initial analysis, Section 6.5 presents the results of several additional analyses of 
industry classification, audit committee independence and expertise, together with income 
increasing and decreasing analyses. Section 6.6 presents an overview of all the hypotheses 
tested. The chapter ends with Section 6.7 – summary of hypothesis, and Section 6.7– 
summary and conclusion. 
6.2 Descriptive Statistics 
This section provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study. Table 7 shows 
a summary of the estimated regression coefficients derived using the Jones Model, Modified 
Jones Model, and Performance Matched Model on a yearly basis from 2003 - 2007. The 
coefficients for the change in revenue ˆ1  are largely positive, as expected, since the change 
in revenue can cause income-increasing accruals (e.g., increases in accounts receivable) and 
income decreasing accruals (e.g., increases in accounts payable) as well (Bartov et al., 2001; 
Jones, 1991; Ronen & Yaari, 2008). However, the coefficients for the property, plant and 
equipment
 
ˆ2  are mostly negative, as expected, because property, plant and equipment are 
related to an income decreasing accrual, namely the depreciation expense (Bartov et al., 2001; 
Jones, 1991; Ronen & Yaari, 2008). The coefficient for return on assets ˆ3  is positive, as 
expected, so it appears that the models have produced plausible estimates for partitioning total 
accruals into discretionary and non-discretionary accruals (Bernard & Skinner, 1996). Thus, 
the models are well specified.  
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Table 7: Descriptive Statistics of Estimated Regression Coefficients  
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Panel A: Jones Model 
   
1 1 1 1 2 1
ˆ ˆˆ/ 1 / / /
it it i it it it it it it
TACC TA TA REV TA PPE TA   
   
    
 
 
ˆ  coefficient  
t statistics 
-678.786 
-0.419 
681.832 
0.289 
-543.168 
-0.478 
-1727.594 
-1.401 
-2756.314 
-2.011 
ˆ1  coefficient 
t statistics 
0.137*** 
2.531 
0.254*** 
4.691 
0.056*** 
3.835 
0.089*** 
2.741 
0.128*** 
4.230 
ˆ2  coefficient 
t statistics 
-0.044 
-1.038 
0.098 
2.156 
-0.062 
-2.390 
-0.064*** 
-1.837 
-0.059 
-1.574 
Panel B : Modified Jones Model 
   
1 1 1 1 2 1
ˆ ˆˆ/ 1 / ( ) / /
it it i it it it it it it it
TACC TA TA REV REC TA PPE TA   
   
      
 
 
ˆ  coefficient  
t statistics 
-678.787 
-0.419 
681.832 
0.289 
-543.168 
-0.478 
-1727.594 
-1.401 
-2756.314 
-2.011 
ˆ1  coefficient 
t statistics 
0.138*** 
2.531 
0.254*** 
4.691 
0.057*** 
3.836 
0.089*** 
2.740 
0.128*** 
4.230 
ˆ2  coefficient 
t statistics 
-0.044 
-1.038 
0.098** 
2.157 
-0.063*** 
-2.390 
-0.064* 
-1.837 
-0.059 
-1.574 
Panel C: Performance Matched Model 
   
11 1 1 1 2 1 30
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ/ 1 / ( ) / /
itit it i it it it it it it it
TACC TA TA REV REC TA PPE TA ROA     
   
       
 
 
ˆ  coefficient  
t statistics 
383.208 
0.238 
2863.503 
1.150 
357.139 
0.297 
-1004.570 
-0.831 
-2267.320 
-1.625 
ˆ1  coefficient 
t statistics 
-0.025 
0.659 
0.197*** 
3.167 
0.031** 
1.949 
-0.009 
-0.258 
0.043 
1.145 
ˆ2  coefficient 
t statistics 
-0.061 
0.142 
0.119*** 
2.642 
-0.059** 
-2.242 
-0.083*** 
-2.4421 
-0.073** 
-1.905 
ˆ3  coefficient 
t statistics 
0.408*** 
4.563 
0.405*** 
2.418 
0.254*** 
2.709 
0.281*** 
4.518 
0.184*** 
3.227 
*** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
**   Correlation is significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
*     Correlation is significant at 0.10 level (2-tailed) 
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Table 8 presents the discretionary accruals as estimated by the Jones Model (Jones, 1991), the 
Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al., 1995), and the Performance Matched Model (Kothari 
et al., 2005). 
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics of Discretionary Accruals 
 
Min Max Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis t-statistics 
p-value 
Jones Model -1.145 1.799 -0.010 0.130 2.297 50.071 -2.38** 
(0.018) 
Modified Jones 
Model 
-0.594 0.612 -0.008 0.115 0.080 7.264 -2.18** 
(0.029) 
Performance 
Matched Model 
-1.168 1.787 -0.019 0.136 1.998 41.578 -4.131*** 
(0.000) 
*** Significant at 0.01 level (2 tailed) 
**   Significant at 0.05 level (2 tailed) 
*     Significant at 0.10 level (2 tailed) 
The magnitude of the absolute value of discretionary accruals (DACC) of the companies in 
the sample, using the Jones Model, shows a small mean value of -0.010, with a minimum 
value of -1.145 and maximum of 1.799. Furthermore, a consistent negative means value of 
DACC is obtained for the Modified Jones Model and the Performance Matched Model, with 
means for discretionary accruals of -0.008 and -0.007 respectively. Based on the one sample t-
test, the p-value for absolute values of discretionary accruals is significantly different from 
zero at the five-percent significance level for all three models. These findings are consistent 
with Davidson et al. (2005), and, as such, provides evidence that, on average, Shariah-
approved companies manage their reported earnings. All three models provide a significant 
negative value of discretionary accruals, thus the null hypothesis H01, that there is no earnings 
management in Shariah-approved companies in Malaysia, can be rejected. In addition, the 
negative means value of DACC indicates that those companies commonly manage their 
earnings by income decreasing accruals. This is consistent with the result obtained by Siregar 
and Utama (2008), Muhandi (2010) and Vakili Fard, Nikoomaram, Kangarluei and Bayazidi 
(2011). A possible reason for income decreasing accruals is to avoid higher expectations from 
investors and/or to reduce income taxes.  
The following table provides descriptive statistics for the dependent variables used in the 
models in this study, except for the industry dummies.  
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Table 9: Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables 
 
Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Board Size 3.00 17.00 7.53 1.92 0.76 1.49 
Board Independence 0.00 1.00 0.41 0.11 1.32 3.89 
Board Duality 0.00 1.00 0.14 0.35 2.05 2.19 
Board Malay 0.00 1.00 0.37 0.25 0.88 0.11 
Board Expertise 0.00 0.67 0.22 0.11 1.18 1.42 
Board Multiple Directorship 0.00 1.00 0.64 0.26 -0.45 -0.72 
Board Remunerations 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.01 1.70 3.67 
Board Ownership  0.00 0.70 0.12 0.15 1.56 1.72 
Audit Committee Size 1.00 8.00 3.48 0.72 1.40 3.53 
Audit Committee Independence 0.00 1.00 0.71 0.13 0.50 2.80 
Audit Committee Malay 0.00 1.00 0.42 0.29 0.24 -0.56 
Audit Committee Expertise 0.00 1.00 0.36 0.17 1.39 3.13 
Audit Committee Meeting 1.00 21.00 4.84 1.43 4.37 33.07 
Institutional Ownership  0.00 0.90 0.11 0.15 2.38 7.60 
Firm Leverage 0.00 1.65 0.23 0.20 1.23 3.49 
Firm Size 10.10 18.03 12.61 1.30 1.20 2.04 
Firm Performance -1.53 0.52 0.05 0.11 -5.42 61.51 
Firm Growth -24.31 2532.16 20.67 166.67 10.58 127.62 
As shown inTable 9, the average size for a board of directors is eight people, with a maximum 
of 17 and minimum of three people. In terms of Board Independence, on average 41% of the 
board members are independent directors. These results suggest that the majority of these 
companies meet the Bursa Malaysia Revamped Listing Requirement (2001) that listed 
companies must have boards of directors comprised of at least one third independent 
directors.  
Table 9 indicates the number of companies with boards of directors having the CEO as 
Chairman is relatively small, with the mean at 14%, suggesting that majority of these 
companies comply with the recommendation in the MCCG 2000 for the separation of the 
CEO and Chairman roles. With respect to Board Malay, on average 37% of directors are 
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Malay, which indicates the domination of non- Malay directors in these companies. The 
minimum number of Malay Directors on the board is zero, indicating that there is at least one 
company without any Malay directors while at least one company has all Malay directors. 
With regards to Board Expertise, the results indicate that 22% of board of directors have 
expertise in finance and accounting while the percentage for Board Multiple Directorship 
ranges from zero to 100%, with an average of 64% indicating that the majority of directors in 
Shariah-approved companies in Malaysia hold multiple directorships. On average, the 
remuneration of board members is about one percent of the total assets of the company, while, 
the percentage of managerial ownership ranges from zero to 70%, with a small average of 
12%.  
Table 9 also shows the average audit committee consists of four people, thus the majority of 
these companies comply with the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements for the establishment 
of an audit committee comprised of at least three directors. With regards to Audit Committee 
Independence, the results show that, on average, 71% of the boards of directors are 
independent directors, meeting the recommendation in the MCCG 2000 that the majority of 
the audit committee members be independent. 
In terms of Audit Committee Malay, an average 42% of the audit committee members are 
Malay, which indicates the domination of non-Malay members on the audit committee. The 
minimum is zero, which indicates that there is at least one company without any Malay 
members on the audit committee at all, while at least one company has all Malay members on 
its audit committee. 
The results in Table 9 indicate that an average of 36% of the audit committee members are 
experts in financial and accounting matters complying with the Bursa Malaysia Listing 
Requirements and the MCCG 2000 for the establishment of audit committees that have at 
least one member with such expertise. The average number of audit committee meetings is 
four per year: the highest number being 21 and the lowest being one. All of these companies 
therefore comply with the recommendation in the MCCG 2000 for the audit committee to 
meet at least once a year. With regards to Institutional Ownership, the percentage ranges from 
zero to 90% and, though, the mean is low at 11%, the maximum percentage of institutional 
ownership in one company is very high at 90%.  
It can be further seen in Table 9 that the mean for leverage, measured by total debt divided by 
total assets, of the sample companies is 0.23 with a zero minimum which indicates that there 
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is at least one company that has no debt at all. On the other hand, the maximum leverage is 
1.65, indicating that one company is highly leveraged. The table also reveals data about the 
size of firms, as measured by total assets. The minimum size is RM 10.10 million and the 
maximum RM 18.03 million, with the average size being RM 12.61 million. Another 
characteristic being measured in this study is performance, measured by the return on assets, 
calculated as earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets. The average performance 
is low at 0.05 with the maximum and minimum being 0.52 and -1.53 respectively. This 
implies that the highest earnings equal half their total assets while the lowest earnings (losses) 
are one and half times total assets. The results also provide information about the growth of 
firms, as measured by market value of equity divided by book value of equity. The minimum 
growth rate achieved is -24.31 and the maximum 2532.16, the average rate being 20.67. 
By reviewing the skewness and kurtosis statistics in Table 8 and Table 9, the following 
variables indicated non-normality and they need to be transformed; discretionary accruals by 
all three models, Board Independence, Board Remuneration, Audit Committee Size, Audit 
Committee Expertise, Audit Committee Meetings, Institutional Ownership, Firm Leverage, 
Firm Performance and Firm Growth. Consequently, the normalisation procedure as explained 
in Cooke (1998) following the Van der Waerden (1952, 1953) approach is used before further 
analysis is conducted. The transformation is achieved by dividing the normal distribution into 
a number of observations plus one segment, on the basis that each segment has equal 
probability. The same transformation was performed for all variables in Table 8 not meeting 
the normality test with Table 9 presenting the transformed data and showing that all data is 
now normally distributed, conferring more predictive power on the findings. 
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Table 10: Transformed Descriptive Statistics 
 Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Jones DACC -3.07 3.07 0.00 0.99 0.00 -0.10 
Modified Jones DACC -3.07 3.07 0.00 0.99 0.00 -0.10 
Performance Matched DACC -3.07 3.07 0.00 0.99 0.00 -0.10 
Board Size 3.00 17.00 7.53 1.92 0.76 1.49 
Board Independence -2.94 2.85 0.00 0.98 0.02 -0.08 
Board Duality 0.00 1.00 0.14 0.35 2.05 2.19 
Board Malay  0.00 1.00 0.37 0.25 0.88 0.11 
Board Expertise 0.00 0.67 0.22 0.11 1.18 1.42 
Board Multiple Directorship 0.00 1.00 0.64 0.26 -0.46 -0.72 
Board Remunerations -0.67 2.52 0.04 0.78 0.00 -0.10 
Board Ownership  0.00 0.70 0.12 0.15 1.56 1.72 
Audit Committee Size -3.07 3.07 0.04 0.79 0.56 0.66 
Audit Committee Independence 0.00 1.00 0.71 0.13 0.50 2.80 
Audit Committee Malay 0.00 1.00 0.42 0.29 0.24 -0.56 
Audit Committee Expertise 0.00 1.00 0.36 0.17 1.38 3.13 
Audit Committee Meeting -2.85 3.07 0.02 0.88 0.26 0.54 
Institutional Ownership -1.26 3.07 0.02 0.94 0.32 -0.51 
Firm Leverage -1.73 3.07 0.01 0.97 0.14 -0.36 
Firm Size 10.10 18.03 12.60 1.30 1.20 2.03 
Firm Performance -3.07 3.07 0.00 0.99 0.00 -0.10 
Firm Growth -3.07 3.07 0.00 0.99 0.00 -0.10 
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6.3 Univariate Analysis 
This section provides the results of univariate analyses used in this study. In order to examine 
the relationships between the selected dependent variable and independent variables a 
correlation coefficient analysis is performed.  
Table 11 demonstrates that discretionary accruals (DACC - a proxy as earnings management) 
has a negative and significant correlation (r = -0.066 for the Modified Jones Model) at the 5% 
significance level with Board Multi Directorships (BMD). Furthermore, there is a positive 
significant correlation (r = 0.070 for the Jones Model, r = 0.070 for the Modified Jones 
Model, and r = 0.080 for the Performance Matched Model) at the 5% significance level 
between DACC with Audit Committee Independence (ACI). A positive significant correlation 
(r = 0.068) at the 5% significance level between DACC with Audit Committee Expertise 
appears using the Performance Matched Model, however, other characteristics of the board of 
directors and audit committee members do not appear to have a statistically significant 
correlation with earnings management. 
The results in Table 11 show Firm Leverage (FL) to be positively correlated (r = 0.045 for the 
Jones Model, r = 0.047 for the Modified Jones Model, and r = 0.071 for the Performance 
Matched Model) with earnings management however, only the result for the Performance 
Matched Model is significant at the 5% level. Firm Size (FS) appears to have a positive 
correlation (r = 0.013 for the Jones Model, r = 0.014 for the Modified Jones Model, and r = 
0.029 for the Performance Matched Model) however, none of these results are significant. 
The results Table 11 also indicate that, in all three models, Firm Performance (FP) has a 
consistently positive correlation at the 1% significance level (r = 0.133 for the Jones Model, r 
= 0.141 for the Modified Jones Model, and r = 0.119 for the Performance Matched Model 
with DACC. On the other hand, Firm Growth (FG) appears to have a negative correlation (r = 
-0.049 for the Jones Model, r = -0.042 for the Modified Jones Model, and r = -0.068 for the 
Performance Matched Model) with DACC but, only the result for the Performance Matched 
Model is significant at the 5% level. 
Table 11 also indicates that the Property Industry is strongly correlated (r = 0.122 for the 
Jones Model, r = 0.116 for the Modified Jones Model, and r = 0.109 for the Performance 
Matched Model) with DACC at the 1% significance level in all three models, while the 
Industrial Products sector appears to have a negative correlation (r = -0.069 for the Jones 
Model, r = -0.065 for the Modified Jones Model, and r = -0.057 for the Performance Matched 
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Model) although only the results for the Jones Model and the Modified Jones Model are 
significant at the 5% level. The Construction, Consumer Products, Plantations, Trading and 
Service, and Technology sectors do not show any statistical significant correlation with 
earnings management. 
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Table 11: Correlation Matrix between DACC and Independent Variables 
 Acronym Jones Model 
Modified Jones 
Model 
Performance 
Matched Model 
Board Size BS 0.044 0.044 0.034 
Board Independence BI 0.047 0.046 0.043 
Board Duality BD -0.038 -0.030 -0.027 
Board Malay BM 0.005 0.002 -0.003 
Board Expertise BE 0.008 0.011 0.018 
Board Multiple Directorship BMD -0.058 -0.066
**
 -0.057 
Board Remunerations BR -0.003 -0.006 -0.016 
Board Ownership BO 0.039 0.035 0.029 
Audit Committee Size ACS -0.014 -0.015 -0.027 
Audit Committee Independence ACI 0.070
**
 0.070
**
 0.080*
*
 
Audit Committee Malay ACM -0.021 -0.024 -0.023 
Audit Committee Expertise ACE 0.059 0.059 0.068
**
 
Audit Committee Meeting ACMT 0.018 0.014 0.007 
Institutional Ownership IO -0.008 0.001 -0.018 
Firm Leverage FL 0.045 0.047 0.071*
*
 
Firm Size FS 0.013 0.014 0.029 
Firm Performance FP 0.133*
**
 0.141
***
 0.119
***
 
Firm Growth FG -0.049 -0.042 -0.068*
*
 
Construction I1 0.043 0.045 0.050 
Consumer Products I2 -0.037 -0.041 -0.047 
Industrial Products I3 -0.069*
*
 -0.065*
*
 -0.057 
Plantation I4 0.028 0.029 0.038 
Property I5 .122*
**
 .116
***
 .109*
**
 
Trading &Service I6 0.014 0.012 -0.003 
Technology I7 -0.046 -0.042 -0.031 
*** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2 tailed)  
**   Correlation is significant at 0.05 level (2 tailed). 
*     Correlation is significant at 0.10 level (2 tailed).   
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Table 12: Correlation Matrix of All Independent Variables  
 
BS BI BD BM BE BMD BR BO ACS ACI ACM ACE ACMT IO FL FS FP FG I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6 I7 
BS 1.00 
        
                
BI -0.30*** 1.00 
       
                
BD -0.15*** 0.06 1.00 
      
                
BM 0.08** 0.22*** -0.18*** 1.00 
     
                
BE -0.29*** 0.10*** 0.00 0.09*** 1.00 
    
                
BMD 0.06 -0.02 -0.09*** 0.07** -0.07** 1.00 
   
                
BR -0.08** -0.12*** 0.04 -0.34*** 0.03 -0.16*** 1.00 
  
                
BO -0.18*** -0.02 0.04 -0.22*** 0.02 -0.12*** 0.25*** 1.00 
 
                
ACS 0.39*** 0.01 -0.08** 0.12*** -0.11*** 0.01 -0.04 -0.08** 1.00                 
ACI 0.15*** 0.33*** -0.01 0.11*** 0.04 0.03 -0.15*** -0.16*** -0.07** 1.00                
ACM 0.08** 0.02*** -0.17*** 0.80*** 0.09*** 0.04 -0.27*** -0.25*** 0.17*** 0.09*** 1.00               
ACE -0.19*** -0.04 0.05 -0.13*** 0.57*** -0.03 0.15*** 0.11*** -0.40*** -0.04 -0.13*** 1.00              
ACMT 0.09*** 0.07** -0.00 0.24*** -0.04 -0.06 -0.17*** -0.11*** 0.09*** 0.06 0.20*** -0.04 1.00             
IO 0.33*** -0.08** 0.01 0.23*** -0.04 0.06 -0.28*** -0.13*** 0.15*** 0.03 0.20*** -0.08** 0.11*** 1.00            
FL 0.07** -0.02 0.00 -0.00 0.03 -0.02 -0.13*** -0.05 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.05 -0.02 -0.14*** 1.00           
FS 0.40*** -0.07** -0.10*** 0.25*** -0.07** 0.19*** -0.67*** -0.21*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.22*** -0.17*** 0.19*** 0.51*** 0.12*** 1.00          
FP 0.20*** -0.05 -0.04 0.07** -0.05 0.00 -0.06 -0.04 0.12*** 0.04 0.09*** -0.09*** -0.10*** 0.35*** -0.22*** 0.26*** 1.00         
FG 0.10*** 0.01 0.08** 0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.03 -0.07** -0.03 0.33*** -0.14*** 0.14*** 0.33*** 1.00        
I1 0.09*** -0.03 -0.01 -0.05 -0.07** 0.01 -0.12*** 0.02 0.05 0.08** -0.07** -0.05 0.09*** -0.03 0.07** 0.12*** -0.08** -0.05 1.00       
I2 0.02 -0.15*** -0.04 -0.19*** 0.02 -0.03 0.20** -0.03 0.13*** -0.14*** -0.07** -0.01 -0.09*** -0.05 0.03 -0.14*** 0.12*** -0.02 -0.13*** 1.00      
I3 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.14*** -0.10*** 0.05 0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07** -0.14*** 0.04 -0.10*** 0.04 -0.05 -0.10*** -0.12*** -0.03 -0.23*** -0.38*** 1.00     
I4 0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.08** 0.10*** -0.14*** 0.07** -0.05 0.14*** -0.03 -0.11*** 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.20*** 0.05 0.09*** -0.07** -0.12*** -0.20*** 1.00    
I5 -0.07** 0.02 -0.08** 0.15*** 0.07** 0.05 -0.22*** 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.10*** 0.03 0.11*** -0.03 -0.04 0.17*** -0.01 -0.13*** -0.09*** -0.14*** -0.25*** -0.08** 1.00   
I6 -0.04 0.16*** 0.04 0.29*** 0.13*** -0.09*** 0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.09*** 0.22*** 0.07** 0.07** 0.02 0.06 -0.04 0.08** 0.15*** -0.13*** -0.21*** -0.36*** -0.11*** -0.14*** 1.00  
I7 0.07** -0.00 .14*** -0.00 0.07** -0.12*** 0.10*** -0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.05 0.00 0.08** -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.06 -0.10*** -0.17*** -0.05 -0.07* -0.09*** 1.00 
*** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2 tailed)   ** Correlation is significant at 0.05 level (2 tailed).   * Correlation is significant at 0.10 level (2 tailed).  Refer Table 10 for Acronym. 
 
.
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Table 12 presents the Pearson Correlation Matrix of all the independent variables used in the 
multiple regressions. The results indicate the highest correlation between Board Malay (BM) 
and Audit Committee Malay (ACM) (Pearson coefficient r = 0.80) with another between 
Board Expertise (BE) and Audit Committee Expertise (Xie et al.) (r = 0.57), not unexpected 
since the Audit Committee is comprised of board members. As claimed by Bradbury et al. 
(2006), the inclusion of independent variables that come from the same group will make the 
variable become not independent (Bradbury et al., 2006). There are four matching criteria of 
audit committees and boards being considered in this study: size, independence, Malay and 
expertise. Therefore, all these variables, Board Size, Board Independence, Board Malay, 
Board Expertise, Audit Committee Size, Audit Committee Independence, Audit Committee 
Malay, and Audit Committee Expertise, if included in one regression analysis, probably 
would  not give good results due to independence issues. Consequently, these variables will 
not be tested in the same regression analysis in order to avoid this issue.  
This section examined the correlation between corporate governance and firm characteristics 
and earnings management. Correlation analysis only measures the strength of association 
between two variables, however, multiple regression analysis provides a means of discerning 
the relationship between a single dependent variable and several independent variables. It is a 
versatile analysis technique, more widely used by far in business decision making (Hair et al., 
2010), therefore the next section provides multivariate analysis together with its results and 
discussions. 
6.4 Multivariate Analysis 
This section presents the multivariate analysis of the dependent variable and independent 
variables. Multiple regression analysis is further performed in order to measure the 
explanatory power of the independent variables.  
Table 13 shows the results of multiple regression analyses of DACC and the independent 
variables (characteristics of the Board of Directors, characteristics of the Audit Committee 
and firm-specific characteristics) using the Jones model, the Modified Jones Model and the 
Performance Matched Model. The R
2
 values for the three models are comparable and 
significant at the 1% level (0.058; p value = 0.000 for the Jones Model; 0.060, p value = 0.000 
for the Modified Jones Model; and 0.052, p value = 0.000 for the Performance Matched 
Model respectively). 
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Table 13: Multiple Regression Results between DACC and Independent Variables  
- Basic Model. 
 Jones Model Modified Jones Model Performance Matched 
Model 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept 0.081 0.878 0.181 0.732 -0.241 0.649 
Board Size 0.058 0.211 0.057 0.216 0.040 0.388 
Board Independent 0.056 0.154 0.055 0.161 0.046 0.240 
Board Duality -0.035 0.299 -0.029 0.391 -0.023 0.497 
Board Malay 0.060 0.295 0.055 0.337 0.045 0.436 
Board Expertise -0.024 0.579 -0.020 0.643 -0.020 0.653 
Board Multiple Directorship -0.054 0.108 -0.061 0.069* -0.058 0.086* 
Board Remuneration -0.032 0.511 -0.038 0.431 -0.028 0.567 
Board Ownership  0.044 0.208 0.039 0.259 0.034 0.335 
AC Size -0.012 0.761 -0.013 0.746 -0.018 0.667 
AC Independence 0.051 0.171 0.052 0.165 0.063 0.091* 
AC Malay -0.088 0.113 -0.089 0.109 -0.076 0.170 
AC Expertise 0.078 0.088* 0.076 0.096* 0.081 0.079* 
AC Meeting 0.037 0.288 0.033 0.335 0.021 0.535 
Institutional Ownership -0.027 0.520 -0.016 0.710 -0.035 0.409 
Firm Leverage 0.065 0.060* 0.071 0.043** 0.082 0.018** 
Firm Size -0.041 0.455 -0.050 0.368 -0.007 0.905 
Firm Performance 0.201 0.000*** 0.209 0.000*** 0.192 0.000*** 
Firm Growth -0.095 0.008*** -0.094 -0.009*** -0.111 0.002*** 
R
2
 
Adjusted R
2
 
0.057 
0.038 
 
0.000*** 
0.058 
0.040 
 
0.000*** 
0.058 
0.039 
 
0.000*** 
F-Value  3.019***  3.125***  3.086*** 
Durbin Watson 2.143  2.119  2.130  
*** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2 tailed) 
**   Correlation is significant at 0.05 level (2 tailed) 
*     Correlation is significant at 0.10 level (2 tailed)  
109 
 
As stated in Chapter Five, discretionary accruals (DACC) is the proxy for earnings 
management, and these two terms are used interchangeably in this study. Table 13 reveals that 
there is a significant negative relationship (-0.061, p-value = 0.069 for the Modified Jones 
Model and -0.058, p-value = 0.086 for the Performance Matched Model) between DACC and 
Multiple Directorships appearing to support the premise that holding multiple directorships 
helps mitigate earnings management in the Malaysian context.  
The results in Table 13 also indicate that there is a positive relationship (0.065, p-value = 
0.060 for the Jones Model; 0.071, p = 0.043 for the Modified Jones Model; and 0.082, p-value 
= 0.018 for the Performance Matched Model) between DACC and Firm Leverage. This 
suggests that leverage is a significant determinant of earnings management in Malaysia. 
There is also a strong positive relationship (0.201, p-value = 0.000 for the Jones Model; 
0.209, p- value = 0.000 for the Modified Jones Model and 0.192, p- value = 0.000 for the 
Performance Matched Model) between DACC and Firm Performance, indicating firm 
performance is another significant determinant. 
Furthermore, Table 13 also illustrates a significant negative relationship (-0.094, p-value = 
0.009 for the Jones Model; -0.095, p-value = 0.008 for the Modified Jones Model; and -0.111, 
p-value = 0.002 for the Performance Matched Model) between DACC and Firm Growth, 
supporting its relevance to earnings management. However, the study reveals that there is 
insufficient evidence of relationships between DACC and the other characteristics of the 
board of directors (independence, size, duality, Malay members, ownership, and 
remuneration), the other characteristics of the audit committee (size, meeting, Malay 
directors), institutional ownership and firm size, as presented in Table 13. Only three 
corporate governance characteristics, Board Multi Directorships, Audit Committee 
Independence and Audit Committee Expertise are found to have a significant relationship 
with earnings management, but at the 10% level only, which is not a strong relationship. This 
could perhaps be due to collinearity among the independent variables, though there is no 
severe problem.  
According to Gujarati and Porter (2009), the objective in regression analysis is not to obtain a 
high R square per se but rather to obtain dependable estimates of the true population 
regression coefficients and draw statistical inferences about them. The researcher should be 
more concerned about the logical or theoretical relevance of the explanatory variables to the 
dependent variable and their statistical significance; if the R square is low it does not mean 
the model is necessarily poor (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). 
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Hill et al., (2008) claimed that when a variable has an insignificant coefficient it can be either 
discarded as an irrelevant variable or retained because the theoretical reason for its inclusion 
is strong. There is no one set of mechanical rules that can be applied, so what is needed is an 
intelligent application of both theoretical knowledge and the outcomes of various statistical 
tests (Hill et al., 2008). Given any particular model, there is a possibility that it may have 
important variables omitted or irrelevant variables included that lead to a reduction in the 
precision of the estimated coefficients for other variables in the equation (Hill et al., 2008). 
This is known as a specification error. This leads to the re-specification and improvement of 
the regression model in this study.  
Stepwise regressions give the best prediction of the dependent variable (Lowe, Winzar, & 
Ward, 2007) and involve searching for one variable that explains the most variation in the 
dependent variable, then the next best independent variable is selected and added to the 
model, and so on until no significant improvement can be made (Lowe et al., 2007). 
Therefore, this study employed Stepwise regression analysis in order to improve the model. In 
addition, the regression models were re-run by dropping one non-significant independent 
variable each time. The values of the F-test, the adjusted R square, the standard error of the 
estimate and the t-statistics were examined for each model, with results indicating that 
dropping one of the non-significant independent variables increases the power of the model in 
terms of the F-test, the adjusted R square, the standard error of estimate, and the t-statistics.  
In addition, as the audit committee is a sub-committee of the board, including the same 
explanatory variable for both lead to multicollinearity (Bradbury et al., 2006), as do the 
variables for Malay, expertise, independence and size for both board of directors and audit 
committee. Therefore, Board Malay (BM), Board Expertise (BE), Board Independence (BI) 
and Audit Committee Size (ACS) are excluded from the regression analysis. The same 
correlation coefficient obtained from the multiple regression analyses applies to both 
variables. Further, the explanatory variable with the lowest insignificant coefficient 
(Institutional Ownership) is left out of the following analysis as suggested by (Hill et al., 
2008). The initial regression analysis actually does not give the best inference about all 
variables. The model is being improved by adapting to take account of a number of issues 
such as multicollinearity and independency. Therefore, these variables are removed because 
they exhibit multicollinearity with other variables that remains in the equation. A simplified 
model with better explanatory power is developed as in Table 14.  
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Table 14: Multiple Regression Results - Respecified Model. 
 Jones Model Modified Jones Model Performance Matched 
Model 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept 0.233 0.634 0.248 0.560 -0.059 0.905 
Board Size 0.038 0.320 0.038 0.319 0.019 0.619 
Board Duality -0.038 0.254 -0.031 0.352 -0.026 0.431 
Board Multiple Directorship -0.050 0.136 -0.058 0.085* -0.054 0.106 
Board Remuneration -0.050 0.287 -0.055 0.242 -0.043 0.364 
Board Ownership  0.047 0.178 0.042 0.227 0.036 0.300 
AC Independent  0.075 0.025** 0.074 0.025** 0.084 0.011*** 
AC Malay -0.044 0.209 -0.047 0.181 -0.046 0.192 
AC Expertise 0.063 0.061* 0.064 0.056* 0.070 0.037** 
AC Meeting 0.045 0.186 0.041 0.226 0.028 0.420 
Firm Leverage 0.070 0.041** 0.074 0.032** 0.088 0.010*** 
Firm Size -0.067 0.198 -0.069 0.180 -0.032 0.530 
Firm Performance 0.198 0.000*** 0.207 0.000*** 0.188 0.000*** 
Firm Growth -0.096 0.006*** -0.093 0.008*** -0.114 0.001*** 
R
2
 
Adjusted R
2
 
0.052 
0.039 
 
0.055 
0.041 
 
0.054 
0.041 
 
F-Value  3.848***  3.832***  4.030*** 
Durbin Watson 2.136  2.112  2.127  
N 925  925  925  
*** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2 tailed) 
**   Correlation is significant at 0.05 level (2 tailed) 
*     Correlation is significant at 0.10 level (2 tailed) 
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The selection of dependent variables and independent variables in Table 14 are made after 
considering three issues, namely, strong theory, measurement error, and specification error
34
 
(Hair et al., 2010). Table 14 provides evidence that after omitting Board Independence, Board 
Expertise, Audit Committee Size and Institutional Ownerships, the explanatory power (the 
adjusted R
2 
and the F-test) of all three regression models improved. In addition, the 
significance level for Audit Committee Independence and Audit Committee Expertise 
increased, and is more consistent for all three models. Therefore, the revised models and 
subsequent results provide better evidence regarding the determinants of earnings 
management in Malaysia.  
Firstly, Table 14 reveals that there is there is a significant negative (-0.058, p-value = 0.085 
for the Modified Jones Model) relationship between earnings management (as indicated by 
DACC), and Board Multiple Directorship, suggesting that holding multiple directorships 
helps in mitigating earnings management. The null hypothesis H06 that there is no 
relationship between multiple directorships and earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-
approved companies is therefore, rejected. It is posited that multiple directorships assist the 
directors because of the knowledge and best practices they gain from other companies 
(Bedard et al., 2004; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). This is again consistent with the result obtained 
by Bedard, Chtourou, and Courteau (2004) and Hashim and Devi (2008b). A similar result 
was obtained by Mohd Saleh et al. (2005) who reported that experienced directors with 
multiple directorship play their role in mitigating earnings management in firms that recorded 
unmanaged earnings only. 
As also shown in Table 14 there is a strong positive (0.075, p-value = 0.025 for the Jones 
Model; 0.074, p-value = 0.025 for the Modified Jones Model, and 0.084, p-value = 0.011 for 
the Performance Matched Model) relationship between discretionary accruals and Audit 
Committee Independence, therefore, the null hypothesis H011 that there is no relationship 
between the proportion of independent directors on the audit committee and earnings 
management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies is rejected. The positive relationship 
means that the higher the proportion of independent audit committee members, the higher the 
earnings management, contrary to results of studies such as Klien (2002) and Davidson et al. 
(2005) who found that, in developed countries, having a majority of independent directors on 
                                                 
34
 Strong theory means that the selection of both types of variables should be based principally on conceptual or 
theoretical grounds. Measurement error refers to the degree to which the variable is an accurate and consistent 
measure of the concept being studied. Even the best independent variables may be unable to achieve acceptable 
levels of predictive accuracy if the dependent variables contain measurement errors. Specification error in a 
situation when the inclusion of irrelevant variables or the omission of relevant variables from the set of 
independent variables. 
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the audit committee is related to a reduction in earnings management. In the Malaysian 
context, Mohd Saleh et al. (2007) found that the presence of a fully independent audit 
committee reduces earnings management. On the other hand, the study conducted by Abdul 
Rahman and Mohamed Ali (2008) in the Malaysian financial market obtained insufficient 
evidence of this relationship. The positive significant relationship found in this study might 
show that the establishment of an independent audit committee in the Malaysian capital 
market is ineffective in their role of monitoring internal controls and financial reporting. 
Other results from Table 14 indicate that there is a significant positive (0.063, p-value = 0.061 
for the Jones Model; 0.064, p-value = 0.056 for the Modified Jones Model, and 0.070, p-value 
= 0.037 for the Performance Matched Model) relationship between discretionary accruals and 
Audit Committee Expertise, thus, rejecting the null hypothesis H013. Such a positive 
relationship means that the higher the number of audit committee members with financial 
expertise, the higher the earnings management. Ignoring socio-economic differences, this 
result is inconsistent with results obtained in previous studies conducted in developed 
countries (Abbott et al., 2004; Bedard et al., 2004; Xie et al., 2003). However, this result 
appears to be consistent with the findings and claim made by Abdul Rahman and Mohamed 
Ali (2008) that the establishment of audit committees in Malaysia has yet to achieve success 
in its monitoring role. Further analyses on Audit Committee Expertise were carried out in the 
following section (6.5) to confirm these results. 
There is a significant positive (0.070, p-value = 0.041 for the Jones Model; 0.074, p-value = 
0.032 for the Modified Jones Model, and 0.088, p-value = 0.010 for the Performance Matched 
Model) relationship also between discretionary accruals and Firm Leverage, therefore, 
another null hypothesis, H017, is rejected. This is consistent with results of previous studies in 
developed economies, albeit in different socio-economic environments, (Ahorany et al., 1993; 
DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Glaum et al., 2004) suggesting that leveraged firms tend to 
manage their earnings.  
The results in Table 14 also reveal that there is a strong positive (0.198, p-value = 0.000 for 
the Jones Model; 0.207, p-value = 0.000 for the Modified Jones Model, and 0.188, p-value = 
0.000 for the Performance Matched Model) relationship between discretionary accruals and 
Firm Performance. Again consistent with developed countries studied by Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997) and Jordon et al. (2008), implying that firm performance, i.e. profitability, is 
associated with earnings management. Hence, the null hypothesis H019 that there is no 
relationship between firm profitability and earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-
approved companies is rejected. 
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The relationship between discretionary accruals and Firm Growth is also indicated as 
significantly negative (0.198, p-value = 0.000 for the Jones Model; 0.207, p-value = 0.000 for 
the Modified Jones Model, and 0.188, p-value = 0.000 for the Performance Matched Model) 
rejecting the null hypothesis H018 that there is no relationship between firm growth and 
earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies. The negative relationship 
means that the higher the growth rate, the less earnings management occurs in a company and 
shows that company growth is an important determinant of earnings management in 
Malaysia. This inverse relationship between firms’ growth and earnings management is 
consistent with the previous studies by Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali (2008) and Bowen 
et al., (2008).  
On the other hand, no significant
 
relationship between discretionary accruals and Firm Size 
was found in all three models, hence the null hypothesis H016 that there is no relationship 
between firm size and earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies is 
supported. This result contradicts previous studies (Davidson et al., 2005; Ebrahim, 2007; 
Jaggi & Leung, 2007; Niu, 2006; Park & Shin, 2004) that found a significant relationship 
between earnings management and firm size. 
Furthermore, as shown in Table 14 there is insufficient evidence to support the existence of a 
relationship between discretionary accruals and other characteristics of the board of directors 
such as its size, duality status, ownership and remuneration, and other characteristics of the 
audit committee, such as frequency of meetings, Malay committee members, and institutional 
ownership. As a result, the null hypotheses H03, H04, H07, H08, H012, H014, and H015 cannot 
be rejected.  
The insignificant relationship between board of directors size and earnings management is 
consistent with the studies conducted by Cornett et al. (2008). The notion that larger boards 
bring together a greater number of experienced directors and the resulting combined expertise 
plays a role in limiting earnings management is not supported in this study. 
Furthermore, the insignificant relationship between CEO duality status and earnings 
management is consistent with the results of Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali (2008), 
Bradbury et al. (2006), Cornett at al. (2008), Davidson et al. (2005), Hashim and Devi 
(2008a), Johari et al. (2008), and Xie et al. (2003). Therefore, it is concluded that the 
requirement of the MCCG 2000 for the separation of the duties and responsibilities of a CEO 
and chairman to ensure good governance has no significant affect, especially on the issue of 
earnings management.  
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The insignificant relationship between the percentage of managerial ownership and earnings 
management is consistent with the findings by Aman et al. (2006) providing no  support for 
the notion that managerial ownership provides better monitoring mechanisms. Moreover, 
there is limited evidence from prior studies on the relationship between directors 
remuneration and earnings management providing no evidence that the level of managerial 
compensation is significantly associated with earnings management. 
It is further concluded that the number of audit committees meetings is not an important 
determinant of earnings management as the insignificant relationship found here is consistent 
with the results found by Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali (2008), Bedard et al. (2004) and 
Hutchinson et al. (2008).  
Also, the insignificant relationship between Malay members on audit committee and earnings 
management is consistent with the findings by Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali (2008). In 
addition, the results of Abdul Rahman et al. (2005) provide no statistical evidence that 
Muslim managers practice less earnings management than non-Muslim managers. Although 
earnings management is prohibited in Islam, it appears that the ability of Malay audit 
committee members to influence non-Malay directors and to limit earnings management is 
not significant. However, further analysis would need to be carefully conducted to confirm 
this notion. 
Finally, the insignificant relationship between institutional ownership and earnings 
management is consistent with the findings of Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali (2008) and 
Yang et al. (2009). The results appear not to support the notion that institutional ownership 
can directly influence management activities and constrain the incentive for earnings 
management.  
6.5 Further Analysis 
A further three analyses were conducted in order to examine the relationship between 
earnings management and its determinants, being an industry analysis, audit committee 
independence and audit committee expertise analysis, and income increasing/decreasing 
accruals analysis. 
6.5.1 Industry Analysis 
Listed companies on Bursa Malaysia are classified under different sectors or industries based 
on the nature of their business or operations. Currently there are 15 industries available on the 
Main Market and 10 industries on the ACE Market of Bursa Malaysia (refer Appendix C and 
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Appendix D). Significant industry differences were found by Gu et al. (2005) in their research 
on the variability of accounting accruals, suggesting that different accounting choices are 
made by management in different industries. This study further explores the association of 
earnings management with industry classification for Shariah-approved companies in 
Malaysia.  
Since industry classification is a characteristic, also known as nonmetric data, a dummy 
variable is needed in order to incorporate this type of data into multivariate analysis (Gujarati 
& Porter, 2009; Hair et al., 2010; Hill et al., 2008). Dummy variables with the value of 1 or 0 
are used to indicate the presence or absence of the industry characteristic in this multiple 
regression analysis. Such variables must be carefully incorporated in regression models or 
else may invite the “dummy variable trap” (Gujarati & Porter, 2009; Hill et al., 2008; 
Thomas, 2005), also known as perfect collinearity or perfect multicollinearity. There are two 
ways of avoiding the dummy variable trap. First, the number of dummy variables introduced 
must be one less than the categories of that variable, for example, if a nonmetric or qualitative 
variable has k categories, the number of dummy variables should be (k-1) (Anderson et al., 
2009; Gujarati & Porter, 2009; Hair et al., 2010). In this approach, one variable should act as 
a baseline for comparison, usually the largest group, and be assigned the value of zero if there 
is no specific hypothesis (Anderson et al., 2009). The second approach is to omit the intercept 
from the model. The first approach is more appropriate than the second, since omitting the 
intercept alters several of the key numerical properties such as the value of the R
2
 (Gujarati & 
Porter, 2009; Hair et al., 2010; Hill et al., 2008), therefore this study follows the first 
approach.  
Table 15 presents the results of regression analyses of discretionary accruals with the previous 
independent variables and industry classifications on Bursa Malaysia. The coefficients are 
estimated by leaving out the dummy variable for industry 3, the Industrial Products industry, 
as this industry contains the highest number of sample companies (73 companies or 39%). 
Table 15 reveals that companies listed on Bursa Malaysia under the Property industry have a 
positive significant relationship (0.139, p-value = 0.000 for the Jones Model; 0.133, p-value = 
0.000 for the Modified Jones Model; and 0.118, p-value = 0.001 for the Performance Matched 
Model) with discretionary accruals for all the three models. In addition, there is a significant 
positive relationship (0.061, p-value = 0.076 for the Jones Model; 0.063, p-value = 0.068 for 
the Modified Jones Model; and 0.062, p-value = 0.074 for the Performance Matched Model) 
between discretionary accruals and the Construction industry using all three. Therefore, the 
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null hypothesis H020, that there is no relationship between type of industry and earnings 
management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies, is rejected. It is concluded that there 
is significant positive relationship between both the Property industry and the Construction 
industry and earnings management. As defined by Bursa Malaysia, Property companies are 
those that invest directly or indirectly in real estate through management or ownership, while 
Construction companies are those that engage in constructing any form of structure, including 
roads and railroads.  
The Malaysian Accounting Standards Board
35
 (MASB) also defines activities by the Property 
and Construction companies. According to the Financial Reporting Standard
36
 (FRS) 201 
Property Development Activities, property development activities are defined as activities 
involving the necessary steps to plan and construct, and comply with statutory and contractual 
requirements in the development of land into vacant lots, residential, commercial and/or 
industrial buildings. According to FRS 111 Construction Contracts, construction contracts 
include contracts for rendering of services which are directly related to construction of the 
asset, either a single asset such as a bridge, building, dam and pipeline or a number of 
interrelated assets such as refineries and other complex pieces of plant and equipment.  
The Property and Construction industries have special financial reporting standards due to 
their unique features and the nature of their business activities. One major feature that makes 
these industries different is that their activities are carried out over more than one accounting 
period or more than a year (MASB, 2005). Secondly, the recognition of revenue during 
development or construction involves estimation during these periods (MASB, 2005, 2007). 
Both FRS 111 and FRS 201 provide two options for this estimation, based on whether or not 
the development or construction activities can be reliably estimated. Normally, the outcome 
of a property development and/or construction project cannot be estimated reliably during the 
early stages of the project. Thirdly, the nature of these two industries requires a huge amount 
of current assets and non-current assets for their operations and, finally, the sale of 
development units in the property industry can occur at varying points in time, such as at the 
point of launching the project, any stage of the construction work, or some time after the 
completion of the project (MASB, 2005). 
                                                 
35
 The Malaysian Accounting Standard Board is an independent authority in Malaysia that responsible to develop 
and issue accounting and financial reporting standards in Malaysia that are consistent with the international best 
practices. 
36
 The Malaysia Financial Reporting Standards (FRS) are accessible and downloadable from the website of the 
Malaysian Accounting Standard Board (MASB) at (http://www.masb.org.my)  
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It is believed that all these features provide greater opportunity for managers to manage their 
earnings through the recognition of revenue and expenses. Managers will also have discretion 
as to when they manage their earnings, since the nature of these two industries invariably 
covers more than one accounting period. In addition, the manager has an opportunity for 
earnings management due to the uncertainties inherent in the estimation of the cost and/or 
stage of completion of their project. The involvement of large amounts of current and non-
current assets also gives management greater opportunities to manage discretionary accruals 
through accounts payable, accounts receivable and depreciation, while the nature of the sales 
process for the property industry has consequences for the recognition and measurement of 
revenue and expenses.  
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Table 15: Multiple Regression Results - Industry Classification. 
 Jones Model Modified Jones Model 
Performance Matched 
Model 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept 0.533 0.284 0.601 0.226 0.280 0.573 
Board Size 0.057 0.135 0.056 0.142 0.035 0.366 
Board Duality -0.024 0.474 -0.018 0.601 -0.015 0.660 
Board Multiple Directorship -0.058 0.082* -0.066 0.048** -0.062 0.063** 
Board Remuneration -0.013 0.794 -0.017 0.724 -0.006 0.894 
Board Ownership 0.022 0.534 0.017 0.630 0.012 0.731 
AC Independent 0.061 0.070* 0.060 0.074* 0.070 0.039** 
AC Malay -0.041 0.269 -0.042 0.253 -0.037 0.313 
AC Expertise 0.059 0.080* 0.061 0.070* 0.069 0.040** 
AC Meeting 0.029 0.399 0.025 0.459 0.013 0.694 
Firm Leverage 0.083 0.016** 0.087 0.012*** 0.103 0.003*** 
Firm Size -0.101 0.053** -0.104 0.046** -0.068 0.196 
Firm Performance 0.207 0.000*** 0.217 0.000*** 0.201 0.000*** 
Firm Growth -0.083 0.019** -0.079 0.025** -0.101 0.004*** 
Construction 0.061 0.076* 0.063 0.068* 0.062 0.074* 
Consumer Products -0.035 0.326 -0.042 0.240 -0.047 0.191 
Plantation 0.056 0.109 0.057 0.106 0.061 0.083* 
Property 0.139 0.000*** 0.133 0.000*** 0.118 0.001*** 
Trading &Service 0.019 0.610 0.013 0.717 -0.001 0.975 
Technology -0.034 0.316 -0.033 0.336 -0.022 0.511 
R
2
 
Adjusted R
2
 
0.075 
0.056 
 
0.000*** 
0.077 
0.058 
 
0.000*** 
0.074 
0.055 
 
0.000*** 
F-Value  3.867***  3.979***  3.819*** 
Durbin Watson 2.168  2.145  2.156  
N 925  925  925  
*** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2 tailed) 
**   Correlation is significant at 0.05 level (2 tailed) 
*     Correlation is significant at 0.10 level (2 tailed)  
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For firm specific characteristics, besides leverage, growth and performance as explained in 
the previous section, size is found to have a negative relationship (-0.082, p-value = 0.075 for 
the Jones Model, -0.079, p-value = 0.087 for the Modified Jones Model, -0.068, p-value = 
0.196 for the Performance Matched Model) with earnings management. The results for the 
Jones Model and the Modified Jones Model are significant at the 5% level, therefore, the null 
hypothesis H016, that there is no significant relationship between firm size and earnings 
management, is rejected. The negative relationship suggests that the larger the firm, the lower 
the level of earnings management, consistent with prior findings by Abdul Rahman and 
Mohamed Ali (2008), Benkel et al. (2006) Klein (2002), Lee and Choi (2002) and Xie et al. 
(2003). Benkel et al. (2006) claimed that the negative association is due to large firms 
receiving higher public scrutiny than small firms and their ability to attract directors with 
superior expertise and experience. In addition, Xie at al., (2003) and Lee and Choi (2002) 
claim that smaller firms operate with less scrutiny and may be able to engage in earnings 
management and activities that enable them to retain their private information. 
6.5.2 Audit Committee Independence and Audit Committee Expertise 
The initial analyses presented in Table 14 and Table 15 show that audit committee 
independence and expertise have a positive significant relationship with discretionary 
accruals. However, this result is inconsistent with prior studies in developed countries 
(Davidson et al., 2005; Klein, 2002). To confirm the above findings and to find an answer as 
to whether the minimum level of independence and expertise suggested by the Malaysian 
Code of Corporate Governance is effective, further analysis was performed and presented in 
Table 16 and Table 17. 
The strength of independence of the audit committee was investigated by grouping the sample 
companies into three groups, based on the proportion of the audit committee that were 
independent directors. The groupings were: more than 33% (one-third); more than 51% (a 
majority, as suggested by the MCCG); and 100%. A dichotomous variable 1 is allocated to 
each group (each time, separately) when the audit committee comprises at least one-third of 
independent directors, where a majority (more than 51%) are independent directors, and 
where the entire audit committee (i.e.100%) consists of independent directors; otherwise 0.  
A similar approach was taken for audit committee expertise, where the three groups were 
based on level of expertise; i.e. one audit committee member having financial expertise (the 
minimum level suggested by the code); more than 33% (one-third); and more than 67% (two-
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thirds). A dichotomous variable 1 is allocated to each group in the same way as for 
independent audit committee directors. 
Table 16 presents the results of the additional analyses for Audit Committee Independence. 
These results indicate that for Model 1 [at least 33% independent], there is a negative 
relationship (-0.015, p-value = 0.745 for the Jones Model; -0.010, p-value = 0.826 for the 
Modified Jones Model; and -0.016, p-value = 0.833 for the Performance Matched Model) 
between Audit Committee Independence and earnings management accruals. Model 2 [at 
least 51% independent], also shows a negative relationship (-0.017, p-value = 0.394 for the 
Jones Model; -0.023, p-value = 0.309 for the Modified Jones Model; and -0.026, p-value = 
0.498 for the Performance Matched Model) but neither are significant. Model 3 [100% 
independent directors] shows a positive relationship (0.040, p-value = 0.184 for the Jones 
Model; 0.043, p-value = 0.148 for the Modified Jones Model; and -0.052, p-value = 0.097 for 
the Performance Matched Model) with discretionary accruals, but is also not significant, 
except for the Performance Matched Model which is just within the 10% level of significance. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis H011, that there is no significant relationship between 
independent directors on audit committee and earnings management, cannot be rejected. The 
overall results for Audit Committee Independence indicate that having an audit committee 
consisting of independent directors has no effect on earnings management in Malaysian 
Shariah-approved companies.  
  
122 
 
Table 16: Multiple Regression Results - Further analysis for Audit Committee Independence 
 Jones Model Modified Jones Model Performance Matched Model 
 Model 1 
ACI33 
Model 2 
ACI51 
Model 3 
ACI100 
Model 1 
ACI33 
Model 2 
ACI51 
Model 3 
ACI100 
Model 1 
ACI33 
Model 2 
ACI51 
Model 3 
ACI100 
Intercept 0.864 0.882 0.836 0.924* 0.954 0.897 0.656 0.688 0.621 
Board Size 0.066* 0.063 0.062 0.064 0.061 0.061 0.044 0.040 0.040 
Board Duality -0.023 -0.025 -0.025 -0.017 -0.018 -0.018 -0.014 -0.016 -0.016 
Board Multiple Directorship -0.059* -0.058* -0.058* -0.067** -0.066** -0.066** -0.064* -0.062* -0.062* 
Board Remuneration -0.017 -0.015 -0.013 -0.021 -0.018 -0.017 -0.011 -0.008 -0.006 
Board Ownership  0.015 0.013 0.017 0.010 0.008 0.013 0.004 0.002 0.007 
AC Independence  -0.015 -0.017 0.040 -0.010 -0.023 0.043 -0.016 -0.026 0.052 
AC Malay -0.038 -0.043 -0.042 -0.040 -0.045 -0.044 -0.034 -0.040 -0.040 
AC Expertise 0.058* 0.062* 0.058* 0.061* 0.064** 0.059* 0.068** 0.073** 0.067** 
AC Meeting 0.028 0.029 0.030 0.025 0.026 0.027 0.013 0.014 0.015 
Firm Leverage 0.083** 0.083** 0.083** 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.102*** 
Firm Size -0.102** -0.099* -0.099* -0.105** -0.102** -0.102** -0.069 -0.065 -0.065 
Firm Performance 0.208*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.218*** 0.217*** 0.217*** 0.203*** 0.200*** 0.201*** 
Firm Growth -0.084** -0.082** -0.083** -0.080** -0.078** -0.079* -0.102*** -0.100*** -0.101*** 
Construction 0.066** 0.065* 0.063* 0.068** 0.067** 0.064 0.067** 0.066* 0.063* 
Consumer Products -0.039 -0.041 -0.039 -0.046 -0.048 -0.046 -0.051 -0.054 -0.051 
Plantation  0.064* 0.065* 0.059* 0.065* 0.065* 0.059* 0.070** 0.070** 0.063* 
Property 0.140*** 0.139*** 0.137*** 0.134*** 0.132*** 0.131*** 0.120*** 0.117*** 0.116*** 
Trading &Service  0.024 0.025 0.022 0.019 0.020 0.016 0.005 0.006 0.002 
Technology  -0.033 -0.032 -0.034 -0.031 -0.030 -0.033 -0.021 -0.020 -0.022 
R
2
 
Adjusted R
2
 
0.072 
0.052 
0.072 
0.052 
0.073 
0.054 
0.074 
0.054 
0.074 
0.055 
0.076 
0.056 
0.070 
0.051 
0.070 
0.051 
0.072 
0.053 
F-Value 3.691*** 3.694*** 3.762*** 3.803*** 3.825 3.893*** 3.590*** 3.612*** 3.720*** 
Durbin Watson 2.165 2.166 2.166 2.142 2.143 2.143 2.153 2.154 2.155 
N 925 925 925 925 925 925 925 925 925 
*** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2 tailed)  
**   Correlation is significant at 0.05 level (2 tailed)  
*     Correlation is significant at 0.10 level (2 tailed) 
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Table 17: Multiple Regression Results - Further analysis for Audit Committee Expertise 
 Jones Model Modified Jones Model Performance Matched Model 
 Model 1 
ACE1 
Model 2 
ACE33 
Model 3 
ACE67 
Model 1 
ACE1 
Model 2 
ACE33 
Model 3 
ACE67 
Model 1 
ACE1 
Model 2 
ACE33 
Model 3 
ACE67 
Intercept 0.510 0.503 0.555 0.578 0.583 0.622 0.252 0.245 0.622 
Board Size 0.065* 0.051 0.051 0.064 0.049 0.051 0.043 0.028 0.051 
Board Duality -0.023 -0.024 -0.023 -0.017 -0.018 -0.016 -0.014 -0.015 -0.016 
Board Multiple Directorship -0.055* -0.058* -0.056* -0.063** -0.066** -0.064** -0.059* -0.062* -0.064* 
Board Remuneration -0.011 -0.006 -0.007 -0.015 -0.010 -0.012 -0.004 0.001 -0.012 
Board Ownership  0.024 0.025 0.023 0.019 0.020 0.017 0.015 0.015 0.017 
AC Independence  0.061* 0.061* 0.064** 0.060* 0.060* 0.063** 0.070** 0.070** 0.063* 
AC Malay -0.037 -0.045 -0.046 -0.038 -0.047 -0.047 -0.033 -0.042 -0.047 
AC Expertise -0.060* 0.024 0.027 -0.062* 0.020 0.033 -0.070** 0.028 0.033 
AC Meeting 0.030 0.031 0.029 0.027 0.027 0.025 0.015 0.016 0.025 
Firm Leverage 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.086*** .091*** 0.091*** 0.090*** 0.108*** 0.107*** 0.090*** 
Firm Size -0.099** -0.098* -0.103** -0.102** -0.101** -0.106** -0.066 -0.064 -0.106** 
Firm Performance 0.209*** 0.207*** 0.206*** 0.220*** 0.217*** 0.216*** 0.204*** 0.201*** 0.216*** 
Firm Growth -0.084** -0.086** -0.084** -0.080** -0.082** -0.080** -0.102*** -0.104 -0.080** 
Construction 0.061* 0.059* 0.060* 0.062* 0.060* 0.061* 0.061* 0.059* 0.061* 
Consumer Products -0.033 -0.037 -0.037 -0.040 -0.044 -0.044 -0.045 -0.049 -0.044 
Plantation  0.051 0.050 0.053 0.052 0.051 0.054 0.055 0.054 0.054 
Property 0.141*** 0.142*** 0.139*** 0.135*** 0.136*** 0.132*** 0.120*** 0.122*** 0.132*** 
Trading &Service  0.019 0.022 0.022 0.014 0.017 0.017 -0.001 0.002 0.017 
Technology  -0.039 -0.037 -0.037 -0.037 -0.035 -0.035 -0.028 -0.025 -0.035 
R
2
 
Adjusted R
2
 
0.075 
0.056 
0.072 
0.053 
0.073 
0.053 
0.077 
0.058 
0.074 
0.055 
0.075 
0.055 
0.074 
0.054 
0.071 
0.051 
0.075 
0.055 
F-Value 3.855*** 3.723*** 3.731*** 3.965*** 3.814*** 3.851*** 3.792*** 3.621*** 3.851*** 
Durbin Watson 2.163 2.161 2.164 2.140 2.137 2.140 2.151 2.148 2.140 
N 925 925 925 925 925 925 925 925 925 
*** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2 tailed)  
**   Correlation is significant at 0.05 level (2 tailed)  
*     Correlation is significant at 0.10 level (2 tailed) 
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Table 17 presents the results of the additional analyses for Audit Committee Expertise. These 
results indicate that for Model 1 [one audit committee member with financial expertise], there 
is a significant negative relationship (-0.060, p-value = 0.075 for the Jones Model; -0.062, p-
value = 0.064 for the Modified Jones Model; and -0.070, p-value = 0.048 for the Performance 
Matched Model) between audit committee expertise and earnings management. Model 2 [at 
least 33% of the audit committee have financial expertise] shows a positive relationship 
(0.024, p-value = 0.652 for the Jones Model; 0.020, p-value = 0.759 for the Modified Jones 
Model; and 0.028, p-value = 0.631 for the Performance Matched Model) as does Model 3 [at 
least 67% of audit committee have financial expertise] (0.027, p-value = 0.424 for the Jones 
Model; 0.033, p-value = 0.324 for the Modified Jones Model; and 0.033, p-value = 0.326 for 
the Performance Matched Model). Since the results for Model 2 and Model 3 are not 
significant, the null hypothesis H013, that there is no significant relationship between financial 
expertise of the audit committee and earnings management, is rejected. 
Overall, these results indicate that having one audit committee member with financial 
expertise does enhance the monitoring mechanism and has a negative impact on earnings 
management, but having more than one does not. These results provide evidence that having 
one financial expert on the audit committee is adequate and effective in monitoring earnings 
management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies but little is gained when there is more 
than one financial expert; in fact, it is possible that having more than one financial expert may 
not be as effective in monitoring and controlling earnings management. 
6.5.3 Income Increasing and Income Decreasing Accruals 
In the previous analysis, the absolute value of discretionary accruals was used and the 
direction of earnings management disregarded to include the combined effect of positive and 
negative accruals. Subsequently, separate regressions on whether the discretionary accruals 
(DACC) are positive (income increasing) or negative (income decreasing) were run (Bradbury 
et al., 2006). The results of the regression analysis for income increasing accruals are 
presented in Table 18 and for income decreasing accruals in Table 19, once again using the 
Jones Model, the Modified Jones Model and the Performance Matched Model. 
Table 18 and Table 19 show results for board characteristics (board multiple directorships), 
audit committee characteristics (audit committee expertise), and firm characteristics (leverage, 
size, performance and growth consistent with the previous analyses reported in Table 13, 14, 
15, 16 and 17. However, there is an additional significant negative relationship (-0.122, p-
value = 0.116 for the Jones Model; -0.214, p-value = 0.004 for the Modified Jones Model; and 
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-0.199, p-value = 0.010 for the Performance Matched Model) between firm size and income 
increasing accruals, thus, the null hypothesis H016, that there is no significant relationship 
between firm size and earnings management, is rejected. The negative relationship suggests 
that the larger the firms, the lower level of earnings management.  
In addition, Table 18 indicates that there is a significant positive relationship (0.141, p-value 
= 0.009 for the Modified Jones Model; and 0.094, p-value = 0.073 for the Performance 
Matched Model) between board size and income decreasing accruals, rejecting, the null 
hypothesis H03, that there is no significant relationship between board size and earnings 
management. These results are consistent with the studies by Abdul Rahman and Mohamed 
Ali (2008) and Beasley (1996) who claim that as board size increases, they become 
ineffective in their oversight duties relative to smaller boards. However, this study posits 
another possible explanation; that, with a large number of directors there has to be some form 
of compromise adopted to reach a shared understanding of the required level of effective 
control. Directors who had lower control requirements may have to raise their expectations, 
while, conversely, directors with high expectations of control may have to lower them to 
achieve agreement. This leads to a positive relationship between board size and earnings 
management.  
As stated in Chapter Four, Malay is the proxy for people who are followers of Islam or 
Muslim, and these two terms are used interchangeably in this study. The results in Table 18 
also reveal that Malay directors’ presence on the audit committee has a negative relationship 
(-0.107, p-value = 0.037 for the Jones Model; -0.077, p-value = 0.135 for the Modified Jones 
Model; and -0.060, p-value = 0.237 for the Performance Matched Model) with income 
decreasing accruals, although only the results for the Jones Model are significant at the 5% 
level. This provides evidence that companies with a greater number of Muslim directors have 
a lower level of earnings management, consistent with Shariah law whereby such 
opportunistic behaviour is prohibited. Thus, Muslim directors on audit committees in 
Malaysia comply with the first tier of regulations concerning financial reporting and fulfil the 
second tier of regulations related to Shariah principles. The result of this study is consistent 
with (Dyreng et al., 2010; Grullon et al., 2010; McGuire et al., 2012) who found significant 
association between religiousity and earnings management. Conversely, the results in Table 
17 show that there is a significant positive relationship (0.096, p-value = 0.079 for the Jones 
Model; and 0.109, p-value = 0.029 for the Performance Matched Model) between Audit 
Committee Malay and income increasing discretionary accruals, which contradicts the 
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findings in Table 19. However, it must be remembered that there are income decreasing 
discretionary accruals across Malaysia in general, as shown in Table 8.  
To further investigate this issue, this study explores the level of influence or control by the 
majority of Audit Committee Malay on earnings management. A dichotomous variable of 1 
when the majority [more than 50%] of the audit committee are Malay, otherwise 0 was used. 
This approach was carried out for both income increasing and income decreasing accruals.  
Table 20 and Table 21 present the results of the additional analysis for Audit Committee 
Malay. The results in Table 21 indicate a negative relationship (-0.049, p-value = 0.313 for 
the Jones Model; -0.091, p-value = 0.059 for the Modified Jones Model; and -0.041, p-value = 
0.380 for the Performance Matched Model) between Audit Committee Malay and income 
decreasing accruals, however, only the result using the Modified Jones Model is significant at 
the 5% level. On the other hand, there is a positive relationship between Audit Committee 
Malay and income increasing accruals (0.092, p-value = 0.070 for the Jones Model; and 
0.092, p-value = 0.079 for the Performance Matched Model), “slightly significant” at the 10% 
level. Consequently, the null hypothesis H014, that there is no significant relationship between 
the number of Malay members on the audit committee and earnings management, is rejected 
due to this evidence that the higher the proportion of Muslim/Malay directors on the audit 
committee, the more likely the influence in accordance with the tenets of Islam.  
The results of this study support previous evidence (Dyreng et al., 2010; Grullon et al., 2010; 
McGuire et al., 2012) of a negative relationship between religious background and earnings 
management, and claims that religious social norms provide monitoring mechanisms over 
corporate financial reporting. However, these studies by Dyreng et al. (2010), Grullon et al. 
(2010) and McGuire et al. (2012), were all conducted in the U.S. and contradict the study 
conducted by Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali (2008) who found no significant relationship 
between the proportion of Malay directors on the audit committee and earnings management 
in Malaysia  
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Table 18: Multiple Regression Results - Income Increasing Accruals 
 Jones Model Modified Jones Model Performance Matched 
Model 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept 0.684 0.404 2.131 0.000*** 2.118 0.000*** 
Board Size 0.113 0.046** -0.013 0.808 0.014 0.809 
Board Duality -0.001 0.985 -0.037 0.443 -0.068 0.170 
Board Multiple Directorship -0.033 0.508 -0.121 0.013*** -0.120 0.017** 
Board Remuneration 0.049 0.498 -0.037 0.594 -0.046 0.526 
Board Ownership 0.038 0.454 0.065 0.178 -0.019 0.706 
AC Independent 0.041 0.410 0.017 0.722 0.064 0.237 
AC Malay 0.096 0.079* 0.054 0.303 0.109 0.029** 
AC Expertise 0.175 0.000*** 0.103 0.031** -0.108 0.030** 
AC Meeting -0.037 0.463 -0.066 0.170 0.042 0.408 
Firm Leverage 0.118 0.024** 0.163 0.001*** 0.141 0.006*** 
Firm Size -0.122 0.116 -0.214 0.004*** -0.199 0.010*** 
Firm Performance 0.144 0.010*** 0.126 0.015** 0.123 0.022** 
Firm Growth -0.034 0.530 0.106 0.037** 0.081 0.125 
Construction 0.120 0.017** 0.165 0.001*** 0.144 0.006*** 
Consumer Products 0.007 0.892 -0.097 0.062* -0.109 0.046** 
Plantation  0.126 0.013*** -0.015 0.771 0.009 0.871 
Property 0.144 0.006*** 0.132 0.014*** 0.164 0.003*** 
Trading &Service  0.020 0.717 -0.029 0.587 0.031 0.573 
Technology  -0.069 0.168 -0.039 0.418 -0.059 0.243 
R
2 
Adjusted R
2
 
0.105 
0.064 
 
0.000*** 
0.137 
0.098 
 
0.000*** 
0.130 
0.088 
 
0.000*** 
F-Value  2.579***  3.547***  3.112*** 
Durbin Watson 1.703  1.741  1.839  
N  438  446  416 
*** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2 tailed) 
**   Correlation is significant at 0.05 level (2 tailed) 
*     Correlation is significant at 0.10 level (2 tailed)  
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Table 19: Multiple Regression Results - Income Decreasing Accruals 
 Jones Model Modified Jones Model Performance Matched 
Model 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept 0.822 0.229 -1.174 0.006*** -1.531 0.000*** 
Board Size -0.022 0.684 0.141 0.009*** 0.094 0.073* 
Board Duality -0.049 0.296 -0.007 0.891 -0.009 0.846 
Board Multiple Directorship -0.099 0.032** 0.029 0.543 -0.014 0.764 
Board Remuneration -0.041 0.536 0.022 0.748 0.045 0.495 
Board Ownership  0.001 0.983 0.011 0.829 0.010 0.839 
AC Independent  0.047 0.325 -0.009 0.851 -0.009 0.841 
AC Malay -0.107 0.037** -0.077 0.135 -0.060 0.237 
AC Expertise -0.028 0.554 -0.044 0.356 -0.052 0.263 
AC Meeting 0.075 0.116 -0.020 0.682 -0.013 0.781 
Firm Leverage 0.072 0.125 -0.062 0.206 -0.070 0.142 
Firm Size -0.092 0.205 0.037 0.628 0.128 0.083* 
Firm Performance 0.238 0.000*** 0.126 0.021** 0.090 0.094* 
Firm Growth -0.093 0.048** -0.217 0.000*** -0.227 0.000*** 
Construction 0.019 0.687 -0.096 0.042** -0.074 0.110 
Consumer Products -0.054 0.275 -0.094 0.058* -0.069 0.156 
Plantation  0.009 0.857 -0.019 0.694 -0.049 0.299 
Property 0.145 0.003*** -0.033 0.494 -0.023 0.617 
Trading &Service  0.001 0.986 -0.072 0.158 0.001 0.982 
Technology  -0.021 0.656 -0.051 0.288 -0.027 0.571 
R
2
 
Adjusted R
2
 
0.095 
0.058 
 
0.000*** 
0.093 
0.055 
 
0.001*** 
0.078 
0.042 
 
0.003*** 
F-Value  2.585***  2.473***  2.174*** 
Durbin Watson 2.038  1.807  2.008  
N  487  479  509 
*** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2 tailed) 
**   Correlation is significant at 0.05 level (2 tailed) 
*     Correlation is significant at 0.10 level (2 tailed) 
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Table 20: Multiple Regression Results - Income Increasing Accruals (Dummy variable 
for Audit Committee Malay)  
 Jones Model Modified Jones Model Performance Matched 
Model 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept 0.624 0.360 2.149 0.000*** 2.144 0.000*** 
Board Size 0.112 0.049** -0.009 0.869 0.018 0.758 
Board Duality -0.010 0.843 -0.037 0.435 -0.069 0.161 
Board Multiple Directorship -0.030 0.548 -0.118 0.015** -0.116 0.021** 
Board Remuneration 0.047 0.514 -0.027 0.695 -0.038 0.600 
Board Ownership 0.028 0.574 0.059 0.220 0.032 0.515 
AC Independent 0.040 0.416 0.011 0.814 -0.024 0.627 
AC Malay 0.083 0.109 0.092 0.070* 0.092 0.079* 
AC Expertise 0.173 0.000*** 0.107 0.024** 0.112 0.025** 
AC Meeting -0.028 0.565 -0.066 0.164 -0.107 0.031** 
Firm Leverage 0.119 0.023** 0.167 0.001*** 0.145 0.004*** 
Firm Size -0.118 0.127 -0.214 0.004*** -0.199 0.010*** 
Firm Performance 0.141 0.012*** 0.120 0.021** 0.117 0.030** 
Firm Growth -0.036 0.504 0.109 0.032** 0.083 0.114 
Construction 0.121 0.016*** 0.170 0.001*** 0.149 0.004*** 
Consumer Products 0.015 0.776 -0.093 0.075* -0.104 0.055* 
Plantation  0.128 0.012 -0.013 0.806 0.012 0.829 
Property 0.140 0.008*** 0.125 0.020*** 0.159 0.004*** 
Trading &Service  0.031 0.565 -0.031 0.554 0.032 0.557 
Technology  -0.064 0.197 -0.039 0.414 -0.056 0.264 
R
2 
Adjusted R
2
 
0.104 
0.063 
 
0.000*** 
0.141 
0.103 
 
0.000*** 
0.134 
0.092 
 
0.000*** 
F-Value  2.548***  2.548***  3.682*** 
Durbin Watson 1.683   1.738   
N 438  446  416  
*** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2 tailed) 
**   Correlation is significant at 0.05 level (2 tailed) 
*     Correlation is significant at 0.10 level (2 tailed)  
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Table 21: Multiple Regression Results - Income Decreasing Accruals (Dummy variable 
for Audit Committee Malay)  
 Jones Model Modified Jones Model Performance Matched 
Model 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept 0.734 0.284 -1.188 0.005*** -1.565 0.000*** 
Board Size -0.026 0.629 0.136 0.011*** 0.092 0.080* 
Board Duality -0.037 0.421 -0.002 0.965 -0.002 0.958 
Board Multiple Directorship -0.106 0.022** 0.022 0.645 -0.018 0.696 
Board Remuneration -0.028 0.670 0.020 0.772 0.050 0.456 
Board Ownership 0.017 0.724 0.016 0.754 0.016 0.747 
AC Independent 0.049 0.302 -0.008 0.870 -0.009 0.845 
AC Malay -0.049 0.313 -0.091 0.059* -0.041 0.380 
AC Expertise -0.027 0.571 -0.046 0.335 -0.051 0.275 
AC Meeting 0.067 0.160 -0.024 0.611 -0.019 0.689 
Firm Leverage 0.077 0.100 -0.062 0.202 -0.068 0.154 
Firm Size -0.094 0.195 0.036 0.635 0.128 0.081* 
Firm Performance 0.235 0.000*** 0.127 0.020** 0.088 0.101 
Firm Growth -0.088 0.063* -0.217 0.000*** -0.224 0.000*** 
Construction 0.025 0.611 -0.096 0.043** -0.073 0.116 
Consumer Products -0.055 0.270 -0.097 0.052** -0.071 0.145 
Plantation  0.014 0.771 -0.019 0.697 -0.047 0.313 
Property 0.142 0.004*** -0.031 0.510 -0.023 0.630 
Trading &Service  -0.018 0.723 -0.076 0.126 -0.007 0.887 
Technology  -0.028 0.542 -0.054 0.263 -0.030 0.531 
R
2 
Adjusted R
2
 
0.089 
0.052 
 
0.001*** 
0.095 
0.058 
 
0.000*** 
0.077 
0.041 
 
0.004*** 
F-Value  2.391***  2.549***  2.138*** 
Durbin Watson 2.028  1.813  2.009  
N 487  479  509  
*** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2 tailed) 
**   Correlation is significant at 0.05 level (2 tailed) 
*     Correlation is significant at 0.10 level (2 tailed) 
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6.6 Overview of Hypotheses  
Having all the relevant analyses performed in this study, this section presents an overview of 
all the hypotheses tested and the resulting conclusions: 
H01: Malaysian Shariah-approved companies do not manage their reported earnings. 
The analyses of discretionary accruals show significant results, thus the null hypothesis H01 
can be rejected, and it is concluded that there is earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-
approved companies. 
H02: There is no relationship between the proportion of independent directors and 
earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies. 
The regression analyses results show an insignificant relationship between the proportion of 
independent directors and earnings management. Therefore the null hypothesis H02 cannot be 
rejected, and it is concluded that the proportion of board independent is not a significant 
determinant of earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies. 
H03: There is no relationship between board size and earnings management in 
Malaysian Shariah-approved companies. 
There is a significant evidence of a relationship between board size and earnings 
management, therefore, the null hypothesis H03 is rejected, and it is concluded that board size 
is a significant determinant of earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-approved 
companies. 
H04: There is no relationship between CEO duality and earnings management in 
Malaysian Shariah- approved companies. 
There is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis H04, hence it is concluded that 
there is no significant relationship between CEO duality and earnings management in 
Malaysian Shariah-approved companies 
H05: There is no relationship between the financial expertise of the board and earnings 
management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies. 
The results indicate a significant relationship between board financial expertise and earnings 
management, thereby rejecting the null hypothesis H05 concluding that board financial 
expertise is a significant determinant of earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-approved 
companies. 
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H06: There is no relationship between multiple directorships and earnings management 
in Malaysian Shariah- approved companies. 
The results further reveal a significant relationship between multiple directorships and 
earnings management. Thus, the null hypothesis H06 is rejected, and multiple directorships 
are shown to be significant determinants of earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-
approved companies. 
H07: There is no relationship between the percentage of managerial ownership and 
earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies. 
There is insufficient evidence of an association between the percentage of managerial 
ownership and earnings management, thus the null hypothesis stands. 
H08: There is no relationship between directors’ remuneration and earnings 
management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies 
There is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis H08, and it is concluded that there 
is no significant relationship between director’s remuneration and earnings management in 
Malaysian Shariah-approved companies. 
H09: There is no relationship between the proportion of Malay directors and earnings 
management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies. 
The results show a significant relationship between the proportion of Malay directors and 
earnings management. Therefore, the null hypothesis H09 is rejected, and it is concluded that 
having Malay directors is a significant determinant of earnings management in Malaysian 
Shariah-approved companies. 
H010: There is no relationship between audit committee size and earnings management 
in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies. 
There is a significant relationship between the size of the audit committee and earnings 
management, according to the results, therefore, the null hypothesis H010 is rejected, and it is 
concluded that audit committee size is a significant determinant of earnings management in 
Malaysian Shariah-approved companies. 
H011: There is no relationship between the proportion of independent directors on the 
audit committee and earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-approved 
companies. 
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There is insufficient evidence to correlate the proportion of independent directors on the audit 
committees with earnings management. The null hypothesis H011 cannot be rejected, and it is 
thus concluded that there is no significant relationship.  
H012: There is no relationship between the frequency of meeting of audit committees 
and earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies. 
Once again, there is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis H012 thus it is 
concluded that there is no significant relationship between frequency of audit committees 
meeting and earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies. 
H013: There is no relationship between the financial expertise of the audit committee 
and earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies. 
However, there is significant evidence of a relationship between financial expertise of audit 
committee and earnings management. The null hypothesis H013 is thus rejected, and audit 
committee financial expertise is acknowledged as a significant determinant of earnings 
management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies. 
H014: There is no relationship between the proportion of Malay directors on the audit 
committee and earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies 
The results indicate that there is significant relationship between the proportion Malay 
directors on the audit committee and earnings management. Therefore, the null hypothesis 
H014 is rejected, and it is concluded that Malay members on the audit committee is a 
significant determinants of earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies. 
H015: There is no relationship between the proportion of institutional ownership and 
earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies 
There is insufficient evidence on the association between the proportion of institutional 
ownership and earnings management. Therefore, the null hypothesis H015 cannot be rejected, 
and it is concluded that there is no significant relationship between institutional ownership 
and earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies. 
H016: There is no relationship between firm size and earnings management in 
Malaysian Shariah-approved companies. 
The results also indicate that there is significant relationship between firm size and earnings 
management. Therefore, the null hypothesis H016 is rejected, and it is concluded that firm size 
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is a significant determinants of earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-approved 
companies. 
H017: There is no relationship between leverage and earnings management in 
Malaysian Shariah-approved companies 
The results also reveal that there is significant relationship between leverage and earnings 
management. Hence, the null hypothesis H017 is rejected, and it is concluded that leverage is 
a significant determinants of earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-approved 
companies. 
H018: There is no relationship between firm growth and earnings management in 
Malaysian Shariah-approved companies 
The results also present that there is significant relationship between firm growth and earnings 
management. Therefore, the null hypothesis H018 is rejected, and it is concluded that firm 
growth is a significant determinants of earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-approved 
companies. 
H019: There is no relationship between firm profitability and earnings management in 
Malaysian Shariah-approved companies 
The results also show that there is significant relationship between firm profitability and 
earnings management Thus, the null hypothesis H019 is rejected, and it is concluded that firm 
performance is a significant determinants of earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-
approved companies. 
H020: There is no relationship between type of industry and earnings management in 
Malaysian Shariah-approved companies 
Finally, the results also indicate that there is significant relationship between type of industry 
and earnings management. Hence, the null hypothesis H020 is rejected, and it is concluded 
that type of industry is a significant determinants of earnings management in Malaysian 
Shariah-approved companies. 
6.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented the empirical results based on the research hypotheses and 
methodology as discussed in Chapters Four and Five, respectively. Three earnings 
management models, the Jones Model, the Modified Jones Model and the Performance 
Matched Model, were used to test the association between related variables and earnings 
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management. A number of additional analyses were conducted to test the stability and the 
robustness of the findings.  
Evidence of earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies was found, in 
association with corporate governance characteristics and firm specific characteristics. 
Descriptive statistics, univariate analyses and multivariate analyses were performed to provide 
answers to the research questions of this study (as stated in Chapter One). All data were 
examined before being analysed, and the basic assumptions underlying the multiple 
regression analyses were tested. Preliminary analysis using univarite tests provided initial 
insight into the relationship between the dependent and independent variables and several 
multiple regression analyses were conducted in order to find the answers for the testable 
hypotheses (as stated in Chapter Four).  
With respect to earnings management, this study provides evidence that on average, Shariah-
approved companies manage their reported earnings. A consistent result of negative means 
values of DACC is obtained for all three models which indicates that, generally, those 
companies manage their earnings via income decreasing accruals. 
The regression analyses consistently show that there is a significant negative relationship 
between board multi directorship and earnings management.  
The initial analysis showed Audit Committee Independence and Expertise have a positive 
significant relationship with earnings management. The results of further analysis however, 
show that having multiple independent directors on the audit committee has no significant 
effect on earnings management, while having one audit committee member with financial 
expertise, as suggested by the MCCG 2000, does act as a control mechanism and is effective 
in reducing earnings management. 
Further analysis also reveals that the proportion of Malay directors on the audit committee has 
a significant negative relationship with income decreasing accruals. This provides evidence 
that having majority Malay members on the audit committee influenced the action of 
company and has a significant role in reducing earnings management.  
In addition, a significant relationship between board size and earnings management was 
found. A possible explanation is that with a large number of directors, compromise on their 
shared understanding of the required level of control is required, which leads to a positive 
effect on earnings management. 
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Consistent with previous studies, there are significant relationships between firm size, 
leverage, growth, profitability and industry classification and earnings management. It is 
therefore concluded that firm-specific characteristics are significant determinants of earnings 
management. 
There is insufficient evidence of relationships between the proportion of independent 
directors, CEO duality, percentage of managerial ownership, directors’ remuneration, 
proportion of independent directors on the audit committee, frequency of audit committee 
meetings, proportion of institutional ownership, and earnings management. Thus hypotheses 
H02, H04, H07, H08, H011, H012, and H015 cannot be rejected. 
However, hypotheses H01, H03, H05, H06, H09, H010, H013, H014, H016, H017, H018, H019, 
and H020 are rejected. This indicates that there is earnings management among Shariah-
approved companies in Malaysia, the determinants of which are found to be: board size, 
financial expertise of the board, multiple directorships, proportion of Malay directors, audit 
committee size, financial expertise of the audit committee, proportion of Malay directors on 
the audit committee, firm size, leverage, firm growth, firm profitability, and type of industry. 
Having presented the results, the last chapter (Chapter Seven) will summarise the purpose of 
this study, review the methodology implemented in answering the research questions, 
summarise the findings, identify the limitations of the study, interpret the implications from 
the findings and finally highlight possible areas for future research. 
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     Chapter 7 
Conclusion  
7.1 Introduction 
The main purpose of this study is to examine whether earnings management occurs in 
Malaysian Shariah-approved companies, and, if so, the extent of earnings management in 
these companies. In addition, this study aims to examine whether corporate governance 
practices and/or company specific characteristics are the determinants of said earnings 
management. Therefore, the research questions were developed as follows: 
 Does earnings management occur in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies? 
 What is the extent of earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies? 
 What is the relationship between corporate governance practices (represented by the 
board independence, board size, CEO duality, board expertise, multiple directorships, 
managerial ownership, director remuneration, Malay directors, AC size, AC 
independence, AC Malay, frequency of AC meeting, AC financial expertise and 
institutional ownership) and earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-approved 
companies? 
 What is the relationship between company specific characteristics (represented by size, 
leverage, growth and profitability) and industry types with earnings management in 
Malaysian Shariah-approved companies? 
In order to answer the research questions, this study examined a sample of Shariah-approved 
companies listed on Bursa Malaysia for the period January 2003 to December 2007 (the 
justification for the sample and time frame chosen is explained in Chapter 5). The sample size 
was calculated using the formula suggested by Krejcie and Morgan (1970) and the table for 
sample size as suggested by Sekaran (2003). A final sample of 185 companies for five years 
(a total of 925 observations) was selected from the list after excluding companies in the 
finance sector, non-Shariah approved companies, initial public offerings companies, 
companies that changed their name and/or financial year, delisted companies, and companies 
with incomplete financial and corporate governance disclosure. This sample companies were 
selected from the total eligible population using stratified random sampling (for stage one) 
and systematic random sampling (for stage two). Two stages of sampling techniques were 
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used as listed companies on Bursa Malaysia are classified into 15 industries and these 
techniques were needed to ensure the final sample fairly represented the whole population.  
Data regarding corporate governance characteristics was obtained from published annual 
reports that are available on the Bursa Malaysia website while financial data was obtained 
primarily from the Datastream Worldscope system, with missing data collected from annual 
reports. A pilot study was conducted prior to the data collection process to ensure the required 
information in this research was available and to estimate the time involved with data 
collection. Data screening was carefully performed in order to ensure validity for the analysis 
stage of this study. The basic assumptions underlying the multiple regressions: linearity, 
multicollinearity, and homoscedasticity, normality, and independence of residuals, were also 
examined to see if any violations existed. All data that did not meet the normality assumption 
were transformed using the normalisation procedure known as the Van der Warden approach 
before further analysis was conducted.  
Several corporate governance variables, such as characteristics of boards of directors and 
characteristics of audit committees, that may be associated with earnings management were 
examined. In addition, several characteristics of firm that may also be related to earnings 
management were determined. Both univariate and multivariate analyses were conducted to 
explore the relationship between dependent and independent variables. Several multiple 
regression analyses were conducted in order to find the answers for the testable hypotheses 
(as stated in Chapter Four). 
The major findings of the study will be summarised in the next section. Limitations of the 
study will be discussed in the subsequent sections, followed by the implications from the 
results of the study. The final section will identify possible areas for future research. 
7.2 Major findings of the study 
This section summarises the major findings of the study. The findings will be discussed based 
on the research objectives of this study under the following headings: 
 Earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies 
 Corporate governance practices and earnings management 
 Firm characteristics and earnings management 
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7.2.1 Earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies 
The main objectives of this study were to measure whether earnings management occurs in 
Malaysian Shariah-approved companies, and the extent of earnings management in these 
companies. Discretionary accruals (DACC) was used as a proxy of earnings management, and 
was measured using three well known models in earnings management literature: the Jones 
Model, the Modified Jones Model and the Performance Matched Model. Three models were 
used to ensure the robustness of the results obtained in this study. The descriptive statistics 
show that the estimated coefficients obtained for the change in revenue is, on average, 
positive, the estimated coefficients for the property, plant and equipment was, on average, 
negative and the estimated coefficients for return on assets was positive. All the estimated 
coefficients obtained in measuring discretionary accruals are as expected and consistent with 
previous literature, therefore, it appears that the models have produced plausible estimates and 
are well specified. 
The consistent negative means value of DACC obtained for all the three earnings 
management measurements models indicates that, on average, these companies manage their 
earnings via income decreasing accruals. The results of one-sample t-test indicated that the p-
value for absolute values of discretionary accruals is significantly different from zero, 
providing evidence that, on average, Shariah-approved companies in Malaysia managed their 
earnings downward. A possible reason is to avoid higher expectations from investors and/or 
to reduce amount of tax expenses.  
7.2.2 Corporate governance practices and earnings management 
The third research objective of this study was to examine whether selected corporate 
governance practices are determinants of earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-
approved companies. The descriptive statistics for the characteristics of board of directors and 
audit committee provide evidence that, on average, the majority of the companies comply 
with the MCCG 2000 and the Bursa Listings Requirements in terms of: board size, CEO 
duality, audit committee size, the proportion of independent members on the audit committee, 
audit committee expertise, and the frequency of audit committee meetings. 
This study also revealed, via correlation analysis, that there are significant relationships 
between Board Multiple Directorships, Audit Committee Independence, Audit Committee 
Expertise and earnings management.  
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The results of multiple regressions analysis provided a means of showing the relationship 
between a single dependent variable and several independent variables. Stepwise regression 
was performed to determine the variable that explained the most variation in the dependent 
variable. The basic multiple regression model was re-specified to address the issues of 
multicollinearity and independency with this model providing better explanatory power and 
offering the best inferences about all variables. Having confirmed all the underlying 
assumptions for regression analysis, the results revealed that all regressions results for the 
models were significant. Using the absolute value of DACC as a proxy for earnings 
management, this study reveals a significant negative relationship between earnings 
management and the holding of multiple directorships. This indicates that governance 
expertise and knowledge of best practices gained by holding multiple directorships is 
transferred to other companies by the directors involved. With this expertise and knowledge, 
directors play an influential role in monitoring financial reporting activities in their 
companies. Therefore, it is concluded that board multi directorship is a significant 
determinant of earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies. 
The initial findings of this study showed a significant positive association between earnings 
management and both Audit Committee Independence and Audit Committee Expertise,  
implying that the establishment of audit committees in the Malaysian Islamic capital market 
has not been effective in monitoring earnings management. However, further analysis using a 
dichotomous variable for the proportion of audit committee that were independent directors, 
further analysis indicated that having independent directors on the audit committee has no 
significant effect on earnings management. A possible explanation could be that, in general, 
the directors of Shariah-approved companies act ethically so being independent does not 
really matter.  
Similar further analysis on Audit Committee Expertise was also carried out, with results 
indicating that having one audit committee member with financial expertise has a significant 
negative relationship with earnings management. However, having more than one audit 
committee member with financial expertise has no impact confirming that the requirement of 
the MCCG 2000 is adequate and effective in monitoring earnings management in Malaysian 
Shariah-approved companies. Indeed, there is a possibility that having more than one 
financial expert could lead the audit committee members to be ineffective in their oversight 
duties. 
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The results of further analyses revealed that board size has a significant positive relationship 
with earnings management, in other words, the greater the board size, the less their efficiency 
in monitoring the financial reporting process. This suggests that, with bigger board sizes, 
directors have to compromise on their shared understanding of the required level of effective 
control. Therefore, it is concluded that board size is an important determinant of earnings 
management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies. 
The initial findings of this study further showed that there was a negative relationship 
between the proportion of the Audit Committee Malay and earnings management with Malay 
names used as a surrogate for the followers of Islam. However, none of the results were 
significant and further analysis was needed to investigate any influence a majority of Malay 
members on the Audit Committee might have on earnings management. Using a dichotomous 
variable, the results provided evidence of majority Malay/Muslim members on the audit 
committee having a significant negative relationship with earnings management. The result is 
significant for income decreasing accruals, providing evidence that having a majority of 
Malay/Muslim members on the audit committee influenced the behaviour and action of the 
company in accord with the tenets of Islam.  
The findings revealed that the majority of Malaysian Shariah-approved companies comply 
with the MCCG 2000 and the Bursa Malaysia Listings Requirements for corporate 
governance characteristics. However, only some characteristics: board multi directorship, 
board size, audit committee size, financial expertise of board , and financial expertise of the 
audit committee, were found to have a significant relationship with earnings management. It 
is therefore, questionable whether the compliance is just to fulfil the requirements rather than 
achieve the intent of these requirements. 
7.2.3 Firm characteristics and earnings management 
The fourth set of objectives of this study was to determine whether company specific 
characteristics such as size, leverage, growth, profitability and industry classification are 
factors influencing earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies. 
Consistent with previous studies, size and growth of companies were found to be negatively 
related to earnings management. It is suggested that large firms receive higher public scrutiny 
and are able to attract directors with superior expertise and experience, and therefore their 
level of earnings management is lower than small firms’. As for growth, a possible 
explanation could be that high growth companies are more likely to have incentives for 
earnings management in order to meet earnings forecasts by analysts. For these reasons, it is 
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concluded that size and growth of firms are also important determinants of earnings 
management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies. 
Consistent with the results found by previous studies, firm leverage and profitability are 
positively associated with earnings management, meaning that leveraged firms tend to 
manage their earnings more than companies with low levels of debt. A possible explanation 
could be that high debt levels could lead managers to manage earnings in order to facilitate 
debt contracts. As for profitability, it implies that companies reporting a high return on assets 
actively manage their reported earnings. Therefore, it is concluded that both leverage and 
profitability are also earnings management determinants. 
Finally, using a dichotomous variable, industry classification, such as Property and 
Construction, was found to have a significant positive relationship with earnings 
management. The unique features and nature of business activities for the Property and 
Construction industries provide greater opportunity for managers to manage earnings through 
the recognition of revenue and expenses. The most unique feature for these industries is that 
their activities are carried out over more than one accounting period. Secondly, the revenue 
recognition during development or construction involves estimation plus the nature of these 
two industries requires a huge amount of current assets and non-current assets for their 
operation. Fourthly, and finally, the sale of development units for the property industry can 
occur at varying points in time. It is therefore concluded that industry classification is another 
important determinant of earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies. 
7.3 Limitations of the study 
There are several limitations which should be taken into consideration when interpreting the 
findings of this study. Firstly, the Islamic Capital Market in Malaysia is unique and subject to 
Shariah law as well as ‘conventional’ rules and regulations. It is a (relatively) new capital 
market and therefore comparisons with research relating to developed countries where the 
socio-economic environment is different may not be appropriate. In addition, the application 
of accounting standards and practices in Islamic finance may not be uniform in all countries, 
therefore the results of this study may not be generalized to Islamic markets worldwide. 
Secondly, this study covers the period from 2003 until 2007, and is therefore focussed on the 
initial code of corporate governance and excludes any subsequent revisions to that code. All 
the arguments and ideas, especially for characteristics of Property and Construction 
companies, are based on the applicable Financial Reporting Standard at the time and exclude 
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any subsequent amendment to the standards. Therefore, generalising the results to other years 
should be viewed with some caution. 
Thirdly, for the purpose of this study, Malay names have been used as a proxy for people who 
are the followers of Islam. However, there are Muslim converts among other ethnic groups, 
such as Chinese Muslims and Indian Muslims or other Muslim foreigners, therefore, the 
results could be generalised by expanding the definition of followers of Islam by using some 
other terms to allow for people who are non-Malay but are followers of Islam. In this study, 
however, there were no people who satisfied these criteria, therefore, the proxy is applicable 
in the Malaysian context only.  
This study also employed three earnings management models to ensure the robustness of the 
results obtained. In the literature, there are many earnings management models being 
developed by researchers, who claim that their models are powerful. However, there is no 
conclusive evidence, as yet, which model is the most powerful methodology with less 
measurement errors when measuring earnings management. Therefore, the results obtained 
and the inferences made are, as always, subject to the measurement errors of the models used.  
Finally, this study used the definition of earnings management by Healy and Wahlen that it 
“reflects the opportunistic behaviour of management” and such behaviour is prohibited in 
Islam. However, there are other definitions of earnings management in the literature therefore, 
different inferences might be obtained if a definition of earnings management other than that 
of opportunistic behaviour were used. 
7.4 Implications of the research findings 
The findings from this study will contribute several benefits to the knowledge of earnings 
management and to the Malaysian regulatory bodies. There are also implications for investors 
and users of financial statements, especially those who are very keen on investment in 
Shariah-approved companies in Malaysia. 
This research will extend existing knowledge of earnings management, insofar as the area of 
investigation is unique. In the Malaysian capital market the Islamic capital market runs 
parallel with the conventional capital market. This study is different from any prior research 
as it provides evidence about earnings management specifically in Malaysian Shariah-
approved companies. It contributes to the existing literature by examining the determinants of 
earnings management in Shariah-approved companies in Malaysia, in which little effort has 
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been made previously. This study provides evidence of and adds to the literature showing a 
significant relationship between Islamic principles and earnings management. 
Most of the previous earnings management studies focus on event studies in relation to 
earnings management, such as initial public offerings, seasoned equity offerings, import relief 
investigations, debt covenant violations and mergers and acquisition. Unlike previous studies, 
this research broadens the knowledge on earnings management during normal times, and links 
the issue with Shariah or Islamic tenets. 
It is further hoped that the results of this study will provide direction to the Malaysian 
Securities Commission, the Bursa Malaysia, and the Malaysian Institute of Corporate 
Governance for future regulations and/or revision of the current Code of Corporate 
Governance. In addition, it should create awareness in management and shareholders of the 
importance of best corporate governance practices in enhancing the quality and credibility of 
financial reporting. 
This study involved a five year time period of cross-sectional analysis and a wide range of 
industries, together with three models of earnings management measurement. In addition, this 
study examined several characteristics for both boards of directors and audit committees. 
Therefore, this study offers a more comprehensive analysis using panel data than other 
previous studies. 
In addition, the results of this study will provide knowledge to the users of financial 
statements produced by Malaysian Shariah-approved companies. The implications of this 
study will be discussed under the following headings: 
 Implications for Shariah Advisory Council 
 Implications for Regulatory Bodies 
 Implications for Malaysian Accounting Standards Boards 
 Implications for Theory  
7.4.1 Implications for Shariah Advisory Council  
The regulator in the Islamic capital market in Malaysia, the Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) 
of Securities Commission, should get a clearer view regarding financial reporting and 
earnings management in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies. The result obtained for the 
main objective of this study reveals that earnings management does occurs in Malaysian 
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Shariah-approved companies. As stated in Chapter One, this study used the definition of 
earnings management that reflect the opportunistic behaviour of management, which such 
behaviour in prohibited in Islam and yet occurs. Therefore, the regulatory organization in 
Malaysia, especially the Shariah Advisory Council should consider revising the criteria and 
screening process for Shariah-approved status of listed companies on Bursa Malaysia.  
In addition, further analysis reveals evidence of a significant negative relationship between 
majority Malay/Muslim directors on the audit committee and earnings management. This 
result revealed that Malay/Muslim members on the audit committee follow the tenet of Islam 
and are in a stronger position to limit opportunistic earnings management. Therefore, the 
Shariah Advisory Council should consider the religious background of the directors in 
formulating the criteria for Shariah-approved status. This will further enhance the credibility 
and reliability of the financial reports produced by Malaysian Shariah-approved companies.  
7.4.2 Implications for Regulatory bodies  
Based on the results obtained from this study, it is suggested that the regulatory bodies in 
Malaysia reconsider the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance, especially the 
characteristics of boards of directors in terms of: multi directorship, board accounting and 
financial expertise, and board size. This study reveals that having one audit committee 
member with financial expertise has a significant negative effect on earnings management. 
The revised MCCG of 2012, which supersedes MCCG 2007, removed the requirement for at 
least one ‘expert’ on the audit committee. It is therefore suggested that future code revisions 
should reinstate this requirement.   
This study also reveals that holding multi directorships helps to mitigate earnings 
management. The latest revision made to the code (as discussed in Chapter 2) limits the 
number of multi directorships to a maximum of five. However, a limitation on multi 
directorships appears to be unnecessary.  
In addition, the result of this study indicates that there is a positive relationship between board 
size and earnings management. Therefore, it is suggested that future regulations limit the size 
of the board of directors since a large board is less efficient in monitoring the financial 
reporting process. 
The results of this study also revealed that the majority of Malaysian Shariah-approved 
companies comply with the MCCG and the Bursa Listing Requirements with respect to 
corporate governance characteristics. However, those characteristics (other than board multi 
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directorship, board size, audit committee size, financial expertise of board, and financial 
expertise of audit committee) were found to have an insignificant relationship with earnings 
management. Therefore, it is suggested that extensive education programmes regarding best 
corporate governance practices be provided to boards of directors, audit committees, internal 
auditors, institutional investors and investors in Malaysia.  The Minority Shareholders 
Watchdog Group could take a proactive role in this regard.  
In line with the Malaysian government objective of becoming a global hub for the Islamic 
Finance industry, it would be appropriate for the Malaysian Securities Commission to 
consider a code of corporate governance that applies specifically to Shariah-approved 
companies. This would provide guidance to Boards and enhance public confidence in the 
Islamic capital market. 
7.4.3 Implications for Malaysian Accounting Standards Boards  
The unique features and nature of business activities for the Property and Construction 
industries offer more opportunities for earnings management. Thus, it is suggested that the 
financial reporting standards for the Construction and Property industry be revised to limit 
these opportunities. 
7.4.4 Implications for Theory 
As claimed by Fama and Jensen (1983), one of the roles of board of directors is to eliminate 
conflicts of interest between principal and agent and different levels of risk preference. 
Previous literature has provided evidence on the association of agency theory as a basis for 
the occurrences of opportunistic earnings management (as discussed in Chapter 3). The 
findings of this study show that board multi directorship, expertise and board size is 
significantly related to earnings management as predicted by the agency theory. However, 
contrary to agency theory, board independence, CEO duality, remuneration and ownership are 
not significantly related with earnings management. The occurrences of income decreasing 
accruals in Malaysian Shariah-approved companies, with different legislation and 
environment, are predicted to avoid higher expectations from investors and/or to reduce 
income taxes. Therefore, the results of this study enhance the knowledge and implications to 
the theory, especially agency theory.  
7.5 Recommendations for future research 
This study relies on quantitative information published in the Datastream system and annual 
reports. Future research may need to adopt qualitative information and use appropriate 
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research methodologies to provide enhanced evidence on the association between the quality 
of financial reporting and corporate governance practices. 
This study measures the determinants of earnings management for the period from 2003 to 
2007. Future research may consider a longer time frame with the resulting impact of other 
regulations related to Shariah-approved companies, earnings management and corporate 
governance released by the regulatory authorities. A comparative research could be conducted 
to examine the pre and post regulation periods related to corporate governance and earnings 
management. 
Future research could be extended to all companies in general, thereby providing a 
comparison with Shariah-approved companies. In addition, future research in the area of 
Shariah-approved stock markets may be conducted not only in Malaysia but other Islamic 
countries. 
More variables in terms of external governance could also be explored, such as the role 
played by auditors in association with earnings management. Comprehensive analysis of this 
variable, such as the inclusion of individual variables for Big4 auditors and small auditors 
should be considered.  
In addition, the variable for institutional ownership may be further analysed in detail by 
separating it into several categories, such as the top five institutional funds, nominee 
ownerships, bank and insurance company ownerships, unit trust, pension fund, and state-
owned institutional ownerships. These analyses could provide further evidence of different 
ownership categories relationships with earnings management. 
Further, in-depth analysis with the inclusion of interactions between variables of the 
determinants, such as between board independence and board expertise, or board 
independence and Malay boards, may further contribute to the existing literature. Inclusion of 
other religious backgrounds such as Christianity, Buddhism and Hinduism may also further 
contribute to the literature. 
In future, researchers may use different methods to calculate total accruals, such as using the 
Cash Flow approach, or different measurements for earnings management such as those 
suggested by Dechow and Dichev (2002). Different methods to measure earnings 
management such as real earnings management, as performed by (Roychowdhury, 2006), 
could also be employed. Since there is no standardised method to measure earnings 
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management, analysing the relationship using different proxies of earnings management could 
validate the findings in this study. 
Finally, future research could analyse the effect of corporate governance characteristics on 
earnings management and its relationship with firm value. It is valuable for regulatory bodies 
and market players to know the significant determinants of earnings management and their 
consequences, especially on firm value.  
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Appendix A : 
Islamic Business Principle/Contract 
 Principle/Contract Definition 
 
1. Bai’ Bithaman Ajil  A contract that refers to the sale and purchase transaction for 
the financing of assets on a deferred and an instalment basis 
with a pre-agreed payment period. The sale price will include 
a profit margin. 
2. Mudharabah A contract made between two parties to finance a business 
venture. The parties are a rabb al-mal (investor) who solely 
provides the capital and a mudarib (entrepreneur) who solely 
manages the project. If the venture is profitable, the profit will 
be distributed based on a pre-agreed ratio. In the event of a 
business loss, the loss shall be borne solely by the provider of 
the capital. 
3. Murabahah A contract that refers to the sale and purchase transaction for 
the financing of an asset whereby the cost and profit margin 
(mark up) are made known and agreed by all parties involved. 
The settlement for the purchase can be settled either on a 
deferred lump sum basis or on an instalment basis, and is 
specified in the agreement. 
4. Mushakarah A partnership arrangement between two parties or more to 
finance a business venture whereby all parties contribute 
capital either in the form of cash or in kind for the purpose of 
financing the business venture. Any profit derived from the 
venture will be distributed based on a pre agreed profit 
sharing ratio, but a loss will be shared on the basis of equity 
participation. 
5. Ijarah A manfaah (usufruct) type of contract whereby a lessor 
(owner) leases out an asset or equipment to his client at an 
agreed rental fee and pre-determined lease period upon the 
aqad (contract). The ownership of the leased equipment 
remains in the hands of a lessor. 
6. Istina’ A purchase order contract of assets whereby a buyer will 
place an order to purchase an asset that will be delivered in 
the future. In other words a buyer will require a seller or a 
contractor to deliver or construct the asset that will be 
completed in the future according to the specifications given 
in the sale and purchase contract. Both parties to the contract 
will decide on the sale and purchase prices as they wish and 
the settlement can be delayed or arranged based on the 
schedule of the work completed. 
Sources: IOSCO (2004) and Securities Commission (2006c)  
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Appendix B : 
Table for Determining Sample Size from a Given Population 
Population Sample Size Population Sample Size Population Sample Size 
10 10 220 140 1200 291 
15 14 230 144 1300 297 
20 19 240 148 1400 302 
25 24 250 152 1500 306 
30 28 260 155 1600 310 
35 32 270 159 1700 313 
40 36 280 162 1800 317 
45 40 290 165 1900 320 
50 44 300 169 2000 322 
55 48 320 175 2200 327 
60 52 340 181 2400 331 
65 56 360 186 2600 335 
70 59 380 191 2800 338 
75 63 400 196 3000 341 
80 66 420 201 3500 346 
85 70 440 205 4000 351 
90 73 460 210 4500 354 
95 76 480 214 5000 357 
100 80 500 217 6000 361 
110 86 550 226 7000 364 
120 92 600 234 8000 367 
130 97 650 242 9000 368 
140 103 700 248 10000 370 
150 108 750 254 15000 375 
160 113 800 260 20000 377 
170 118 850 265 30000 379 
180 123 900 269 40000 380 
190 127 950 274 50000 381 
200 132 1000 278 750000 382 
210 136 1100 285 1000000 384 
Sources: Sekaran (2003) and Krejie and Morgan (1970). 
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Appendix C : 
Industry Classification for the Main Market on Bursa Malaysia 
 
 Sector Classified Definition 
 
1. Consumer Products Companies manufacture materials or components into new 
products for consumer use 
 
2. Construction Companies engage in constructing any form of structure 
including roads & railroads 
 
3. Closed-End Funds Close-ended investment entities 
 
4. Exchange Traded 
Funds 
Open-ended investment entities 
5. Finance Companies that provide services in activities of obtaining 
and redistributing funds, in the form of deposits by Central 
Banks and other monetary institutions, insurance and other 
activities auxiliary to financial intermediation 
 
6. Hotels Companies that provide hospitality services in the form of 
accommodation, meals and drinks 
 
7. Industrial Products Companies manufacture materials or components into new 
products for industrial use 
8. Infrastructure Project 
PLCs 
Infrastructure project companies 
9. Mining Companies engage in exploration extraction, dressing and 
beneficiating of minerals 
10. Plantations Companies engage in the cultivation, planting and/or 
replanting of crops. The processing of agricultural products 
in factories on farms and plantations is also included if it is 
not feasible to report separately this activity from 
production of crops 
11. Properties Companies invest directly or indirectly in real estate 
through management or ownership 
12. Real Estate Investment 
Trusts 
Real estate investment trusts or corporations (REITs) 
13. Special Purpose 
Acquisition Company 
Special purpose acquisition companies 
14. Trading/Services Companies engage in distribution of products and 
provision of services other than financial services, e.g. 
banking and insurance 
15. Technology Companies that provide information technology solutions 
Source: Bursa Malaysia website 2011  
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Appendix D : 
Industry Classification for the ACE Market on Bursa Malaysia 
 Sector Classified Definition 
1. Consumer Products Companies manufacture materials or components into new 
products for consumer use 
2. Construction Companies engage in constructing any form of structure 
including roads & railroads 
3. Finance Companies that provide services in activities of obtaining 
and redistributing funds, in the form of deposits by Central 
Banks and other monetary institutions, insurance and other 
activities auxiliary to financial intermediation 
4. Hotels Companies that provide hospitality services in the form of 
accommodation, meals and drinks 
5. Industrial Products Companies manufacture materials or components into new 
products for industrial use 
6. Mining Companies engage in exploration extraction, dressing and 
beneficiating of minerals 
7. Plantations Companies engage in the cultivation, planting and/or 
replanting of crops. The processing of agricultural products 
in factories on farms and plantations is also included if it is 
not feasible to report separately this activity from production 
of crops 
8. Properties Companies invest directly or indirectly in real estate through 
management or ownership 
9. Trading/Services Companies engage in distribution of products and provision 
of services other than financial services, e.g. banking and 
insurance 
10. Technology Companies that provide information technology solutions 
Source: Bursa Malaysia website 2011 
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Appendix E : 
Multicollinearity Test 
 
Jones Model 
Modified Jones 
Model 
Performance 
Matched Model 
 Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
Board Size 
0.468 2.137 0.468 2.137 0.468 2.137 
Board Independent 0.673 1.485 0.673 1.485 0.673 1.485 
Board Duality 0.881 1.135 0.881 1.135 0.881 1.135 
Board Malay 0.288 3.470 0.288 3.470 0.288 3.470 
Board Expertise 0.516 1.938 0.516 1.938 0.516 1.938 
Board Multiple Directorship 0.906 1.104 0.906 1.104 0.906 1.104 
Board Remuneration 0.428 2.335 0.428 2.335 0.428 2.335 
Board Ownership  0.820 1.219 0.820 1.219 0.820 1.219 
AC Size 0.601 1.664 0.601 1.664 0.601 1.664 
AC Independence 0.731 1.367 0.731 1.367 0.731 1.367 
AC Malay 0.328 3.046 0.328 3.046 0.328 3.046 
AC Expertise 0.477 2.096 0.477 2.096 0.477 2.096 
AC Meeting 0.853 1.172 0.853 1.172 0.853 1.172 
Institutional Ownership 0.546 1.833 0.546 1.833 0.546 1.833 
Firm Leverage 0.831 1.203 0.831 1.203 0.831 1.203 
Firm Size 0.317 3.156 0.317 3.156 0.317 3.156 
Firm Performance 0.709 1.411 0.709 1.411 0.709 1.411 
Firm Growth 0.760 1.316 0.760 1.316 0.760 1.316 
Construction 0.844 1.185 0.844 1.185 0.844 1.185 
Consumer Products 0.751 1.331 0.751 1.331 0.751 1.331 
Plantation  0.786 1.272 0.786 1.272 0.786 1.272 
Property 0.776 1.289 0.776 1.289 0.776 1.289 
Trading &Service  0.696 1.438 0.696 1.438 0.696 1.438 
Technology  0.840 1.191 0.840 1.191 0.840 1.191 
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Appendix F : 
Linearity and Homoscedasticity Test - Scatter Plot 
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Appendix G : 
Linearity Test - Normal P-P Plot 
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Appendix H : 
Normality Test - Histogram 
 
 
 
